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Abstract 
Using previous work on the subject as a foundation, Norwegian local government 
spending behaviour is analysed in a dynamic framework facilitated by a panel 
dataset, combining municipality data for the years 2001 to 2008. Local 
governments are assumed to be utility maximising agents and therefore choose the 
best combination of budget surplus or deficit and output of public services, subject 
to the budget constraint that total spending does not exceed total income, which 
consists of grants from the central government and local taxes. The analysis is 
conducted in a simultaneous framework using a structural Linear Expenditure 
System model where government expenditure in each service sector is endogenous 
and dependent on the expenditures in the other sectors. Extending existing research 
on the subject, this study analyses changes over time in local government spending 
behaviour, exploiting both cross-section and time-series variation in the data to 
account for any unobserved municipality or time heterogeneity. Panel data methods 
such as fixed effects are found to be well suited to the analysis with unobserved 
time and municipality heterogeneity playing an important role in the changes in 
spending patterns. Moreover, the observed sluggishness of spending adjustment 
over time suggests that a combination of fixed and/or time effects with a dynamic 
partial adjustment model is a promising specification for future research. 
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1. Introduction  
The current research builds on existing work of examining the behaviour of local 
governments in Norway by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), Aaberge and 
Langørgen (2006), Langørgen, Galloway, Mogstad and Aaberge (2005) among 
others. Using previous work on the subject as a foundation, the key purpose of this 
paper is to analyse local government spending behaviour in a dynamic framework 
facilitated by a panel dataset, combining municipality data for the years 2001 to 
2008. A local government is represented by a dominant party or coalition and has 
preferences, given by a Stone-Geary utility function, over the budget surplus 
(sector zero) and output in 12 service sectors. Since local governments are assumed 
to be utility maximising agents, they choose the best combination of budget surplus 
or deficit and output of public services, subject to the budget constraint that total 
spending (spending and budget surplus) does not exceed total income, which 
consists of grants from the central government and local taxes. Furthermore, local 
government spending is analysed in a simultaneous framework, that is using a 
structural model where government expenditure in each service sector is 
endogenous and dependent on the expenditures in the other sectors, since allocating 
a larger share of income to one sector will reduce the share of income in other 
sectors. 
 
Local government expenditure in each sector is modeled to consist of two 
components: the minimum required expenditure, that is expenditure required to 
meet the public service mandates dictated by the central government or the expert 
opinion consensus among local government, and the discretionary income – the 
remaining income after the minimum required expenditure has been covered – 
which is divided between the sectors according to local priorities. The share of 
discretionary income allocated to a sector is the marginal budget share for that 
sector.  
 
Since data on public service prices are not available, this paper uses the method 
employed by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006), namely using information on 
municipality characteristics that capture variation in costs and capacity to produce 
local public services in order to estimate the expenditure for each sector. Minimum 
required expenditure (sector-specific subsistence spending) and minimum fiscal 
surplus are assumed to depend on central government regulations and technological 
constraints, represented by factors that include demographic variables (residents in 
specific age groups, civil status, employment status etc.), settlement pattern within 
a municipality, economies of scale, climatic conditions (e.g. amount of snowfall), 
sewage purification regulations. Marginal budget shares are assumed to vary with 
local population's average education level, settlement density and the political party 
composition of the local council. 
 
The independent contribution of this study is to extend the existing research on 
Norwegian local governments’ behaviour, which uses cross-sectional data, by 
combining the cross-sections for the 8 available years (2001 – 2008). This will 
allow for a quasi-dynamic study and long-term analysis of local government 
behaviour, also allowing one to account for any municipality or time heterogeneity 
not captured by the included explanatory variables. This study is quasi-dynamic 
because it contains both static and dynamic elements. It is static in a sense that it is 
not based on intertemporal optimisation. That is local governments’ preferences are 
observed at a point in time with no explicit relationship between preferences across 
time periods. Moreover, local governments are assumed to be subject to a static 
budget constraint; that is a budget condition that is not specified to include linkages 
between different time periods. However, this study analyses changes over time in 
local government spending behaviour, exploiting both cross-section and time-series 
variation in the data, and is therefore referred to as quasi-dynamic. Panel data is 
well-suited to analysing the dynamics of change as well as to controlling for the 
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, a panel study allows for a richer analysis of how 
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local government behaviour changes over time in the presence of unobserved 
municipality and time effects.  
 
Well-known panel data methods such as fixed effects estimation are adapted to 
estimating a system of equations. Models with both municipality and time effects 
are developed and estimated using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
technique. All empirical analysis, including model estimations, is conducted using 
the SAS software1.  
 
Models with municipality fixed effects and/ or time effects are found to perform 
better than the benchmark model which accounts for increasing minimum required 
expenditures only through income growth. When unobserved time and 
municipality heterogeneity are not taken into account, the effects on the minimum 
required expenditures are usually biased. The municipality heterogeneity is 
modeled in two ways: by introducing municipality-specific dummy variables or 
dummy variables for labour market regions into which all municipalities are 
grouped. Many of the region effects are found significantly different from the Oslo 
region, which is chosen as the reference, particularly when region effects are 
included together with the time effects. Finally a dynamic model is estimated to 
analyse the dynamics of adjustment of municipality spending over time, where 
spending is modeled as a weighted average of optimal long-run spending and the 
spending in the previous period. The weight measures the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium and is estimated to be relatively low, suggesting sluggishness in the 
municipalities’ spending behaviour over time.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review 
of selected studies of local government behaviour and the different models used. 
Section 3 discusses some well-known panel data methods such as fixed effects and 
random effects regression as well as their application to balanced and unbalanced 
data sets. Section 4 presents the benchmark model used and comments on some of 
the issues that may arise in applying the model to a panel data set. Section 5 
suggests some possible model variants that extend the benchmark model to account 
for unobserved heterogeneity. Section 6 outlines the data used and provides a 
discussion of the results obtained by estimating the models in Section 5. A 
discussion of the change in the parameters of interest between different model 
formulations is also provided. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
A number of studies have already been conducted on various aspects of economic 
behaviour of local governments. Both the expenditure and the revenue sides of the 
local governments’ budgets have been discussed, using models appropriate to the 
particular question under investigation. Some studies are based on cross-section 
data, while others make use of panel data to capture any possible unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
Borge (1995) focuses on the revenue aspect and analyses determinants of fee 
income for Norwegian municipalities, using a representative voter model where the 
utility function of the pivotal voter is maximised subject to the relevant resource 
constraint (disposable income is spent on private consumption and user fees). A 
separable utility function is assumed. Its arguments are per capita service 
production of free services, services subject to user fees and the level of private 
consumption, as well as sociodemographic variables such as share of children, 
youth and the elderly in a municipality’s population. Two additional variables are 
included to capture structural differences across local governments: population size 
and settlement pattern (average traveling distance to the center of the municipality). 
The estimation is conducted using panel data of 414 municipalities for the years 
                                                     
1 Program code is available on request. 
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1980 – 1990; time dummies are included additively allowing the intercept to shift 
from year to year. These dummy variables capture the shift in the functional 
responsibility between the counties and the municipalities, and the effects of any 
left-out variables that vary over time. A municipality-specific term is also included, 
which is assumed constant, fixed or random depending on the specification. Borge 
(1995) finds among other things that higher private income and higher compulsory 
expenditures contribute to an increase in fee income. 
 
Other studies focus extensively on the expenditure side of the budgets, analysing 
how a fixed total budget is allocated among different service sectors. In a 
dynamics-centred analysis Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) develop a partial 
adjustment model with endogenous speed of adjustment to analyse how pressure 
from interest groups and mass media influence the adjustment process of local 
governments’ spending. Based on a combined cross-section and time-series data 
set for Norwegian local governments, the sluggishness of the adjustment process is 
estimated for 6 service sectors2, with pressure groups related to primary education 
explaining an important part of the sluggishness observed. Pressure groups 
promoting kindergartens and health care or care for the elderly are found to 
stimulate budget reallocations. Similarly to Borge (1995), the desired allocation is 
influenced by the share of youth, the share of the elderly and the share of children. 
Additional variables are population density, population growth and the inverse of 
the population size. As in Borge (1995), the intercepts are allowed to vary over 
time for the available years 1984 – 1990.  
 
The reduced form of the partial adjustment model is estimated.  
(2.1) 
 
Ait =
1
1 + h(POL)
α i 0 + α i1 logYt + α i 2 log I t + α i 3Z t + α i 4POL( ) + 1− 11 + h(POL)



 Ait −1  
 
where Ait is local government spending share in sector i in year t, Yt is total local 
government spending per capita, It is per capita private consumption and Zt is a 
vector of sociodemographic characteristics. The budget constraint is satisfied with 
the spending shares adding up to 1 for all 6 sectors.  
The adjustment coefficient 
1
1+ h(POL)  for each local government measures the share 
of the desired change which is implemented in the first year and POL is a vector of 
interest group variables. In the benchmark model a constant speed of adjustment is 
assumed with the POL vector empty.  
 
The two extensions of the benchmark model are based on a non-constant speed of 
adjustment 
1
1+ μt where μt=h(POL) and POL includes variables that capture the 
pressure form special interest groups and pressure from the mass media.  
 
All versions of the model are estimated in reduced form by a system technique. 
Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) cite three key reasons for analysing the sector 
expenditure shares simultaneously. First, the error terms of the demand equations 
are correlated due to the budget constraint and should therefore be estimated as a 
system instead of equation by equation to obtain efficient estimates. Second, a 
system technique is required to capture restrictions on the model’s parameters. 
Third, since the demand equations are non-linear in the parameters in two of the 
model’s specifications, a non-linear estimation method is needed. In estimating 
these models the Fixed Information Maximum Likelihood method is used, a system 
technique that handles non-linear restrictions. The benchmark constant speed of 
adjustment model is linear in the parameters, and is estimated by the SUR method 
(Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen, 1995). To avoid a singular covariance matrix, one of 
                                                     
2The service sectors are: administration, education, health, kindergartens, culture and infrastructure. 
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the equations is omitted from the estimation. The demand equation of this sector is 
determined by the budget restriction and the estimated coefficients for the other 
sectors. Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) chose cultural services as the residual 
sector. 
 
Conclusions derived by Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) are mostly reasonable 
and in line with expectations. An increase in the share of youths contributes to a 
significantly higher expenditure share for primary education, while the share of 
elderly has a similar effect on resources allocated towards health care or care for 
the elderly. However, spending on kindergartens is not significantly related to the 
share of children in the community. As expected based on the budget constraint, 
higher expenditures in one sector are financed by cutbacks in other sectors. Borge, 
Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) report a negative effect of the share of elderly on the 
expenditure on primary education, kindergartens and cultural services, and 
similarly a negative effect of the share of youth (7-15 years) on kindergartens, 
cultural services and infrastructure. Evidence of economies of scale is found in the 
administration and primary education sectors. Although the current study is related 
to the Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) paper both in its goals, type of data used 
and the factors proposed to explain spending behaviour variation in different 
service sectors, some important differences must be highlighted. The key 
methodological difference between Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) and the 
present study is that the former estimates a simultaneous reduced form Almost 
Ideal Linear Demand System, while this paper follows the methodology of 
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) in estimating a structural simultaneous 
Linear Expenditure System. By estimating the model in its structural form, we are 
able to derive the structural parameters directly, which facilitates the analysis of 
parameters of interest (the effects of service target groups and other sector-specific 
factors on the minimum required expenditures and marginal budget shares in 
different service sectors). Moreover, Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) are not 
able to include price effects in their model as prices of the local government 
services are not observed. Following Langørgen and Aaberge (2003), the present 
study incorporates prices into the model through the minimum required 
expenditure parameters.  
 
In Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) variations in spending per capita in 
various service sectors are analysed by specifying the expenditure in each service 
sector to consist of two components: the minimum required expenditure according 
to the service provision standards set by the central government, and the additional 
expenditure in each sector after the minimum requirement has been met (the share 
of the discretionary income allocated to each service sector according to local 
priorities). Each municipality's operating expenses by service sector (indexed by i) 
are decomposed as follows:  
(2.2)  
ui = α i + βi y − α i
i =0
12         
  i = 0,...,12  
 
where ui is the per capita expenditure in service sector i, αi is the minimum required 
expenditure and βi is the marginal budget share in service sector i; y is total 
income.  
 
The minimum required expenditure, marginal budget shares and discretionary 
income vary between municipalities as functions of observable characteristics. A 
detailed description of the way minimum required expenditures and marginal 
budget shares are modeled, as well as the derivation of the Linear Expenditure 
System, is provided in Section 4.2.  
 
Allers and Elhorst (2007) investigate fiscal policy interaction, testing for 
interdependent behavior among Dutch municipalities with respect to taxation and 
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spending in 9 public service sectors using a structural form simultaneous equation 
framework. The expenditure in a particular service sector is assumed to depend on 
the price or cost variables of other service sectors. A linear expenditure system 
(LES) is developed following the logic of Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) 
with some notational differences. However, Allers and Elhorst (2007) develop two 
extended versions of the model: the first includes a spatially lagged dependent 
variable and the second – a spatial autoregressive process in the error term of each 
equation.  
 
The spatial lag model posits that a municipality’s fiscal policy depends on the 
fiscal policy in neighbouring municipalities and on a set of observed local 
characteristics. Allers and Elhorst (2007) formulate the spatial lag by making 
minimum required expenditure dependent on the expenditure of neighboring 
municipalities. Using the notation of Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) 
described above and including an error term εi , the spacial lag model is given by: 
(2.3) 
ui = δ iWui + α i + βi y − α i
i =1
9  + ε i      
   i = 1,..., 9  
 
where Wui is the dependent variable observed in neighboring municipalities 
according to a spatial weights matrix W describing the spatial arrangement of the 
municipalities in the sample, δi is the spatial autoregressive coefficient and αi and βi 
are a function of exogenous variables determining the cost of reaching the 
minimum standard for public service sector i and exogenous variables determining 
the share of discretionary income spent on service i, respectively.  
 
The spatial error model, on the other hand, posits that a municipality’s fiscal policy 
depends on a set of observed local characteristics and that the error terms are 
correlated across space, resulting in the following version of the  LES: 
(2.4) 
ui = α i + βi y − α i
i =1
9  + φi   
 i = 1,..., 9  , φi = λiWφi + ε i  
 
where φi is the spatially autocorrelated error term, W is a spatial weights matrix  
describing the spatial arrangement of the municipalities in the sample and λi is the 
spatial autocorrelation coefficient. The spatial error model is consistent with a 
situation where determinants of fiscal policy omitted from the model are spatially 
autocorrelated, and with a situation where unobserved shocks follow a spatial 
pattern (Allers and Elhorst, 2007). 
 
To estimate the spatial LES Allers and Elhorst (2007) use cross-sectional data from 
496 Dutch municipalities in 2002. However, the authors acknowledge that a panel 
data study would offer an opportunity to control for non-observed local 
characteristics, which do not vary over time. Thus, the estimation may be further 
extended by adding spatial fixed or random effects to each equation within LES to 
account for these characteristics. 
 
Similarly to Allers and Elhorst (2007), the current paper closely follows the 
methodology and arguments of Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006), which are 
outlined in Section 4.2. However, while the simple benchmark model is the same in 
all of these papers, the current research focuses on fixed effects estimation, 
extending the work of Langørgen and Aaberge (2003, 2006) in the context of panel 
data, rather than employing the spacial lag or spacial error models of Allers and 
Elhorst (2007). While these models certainly yield insight into possible interaction 
elements in the behaviour of local municipalities, this issue is not the primary focus 
of this paper. Rather, the objective is to analyse the dynamics of municipalities’ 
spending behaviour, comparing the estimated effects on the minimum required 
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expenditures and budget shares with those based on cross-sectional estimations and 
a chosen baseline model. 
3. Theoretical foundations and methods 
3.1. Advantages and limitations of panel data  
Advantages and limitations of panel data are discussed in, among others, Hsiao 
(1985), Baltagi (2005), Wooldridge (2002a) and Gujarati (2003). Panel data allows 
one to look at dynamic relationships and is better suited to analysis of dynamics of 
change or adjustment. Panel data also makes it possible to control for unobserved 
cross section heterogeneity (i.e. take into account unobserved individual or time 
effects by including them in the model) (Wooldridge, 2002a). Having access to a 
panel data set also significantly increases the number of observations, provides a 
more informative data set, less collinearity among variables, more variability and 
more degrees of freedom (Gujarati, 2003). Limitations include panel surveys 
design and data collection problems, measurement errors, self-selectivity, non-
response and attrition (Baltagi, 2005). Some of these are less relevant for this 
study. However, an important and relevant problem associated with the short time-
series panels is the incidental parameters problem.  
3.1.1. Incidental parameters problem 
A characteristic feature of a typical panel data set is a large number of cross-
sectional units combined with a small time dimension (each unit observed only a 
few times). This feature causes a so-called incidental parameters problem, whereby 
the number of parameters increases with the sample size leading to a loss in 
consistency of these parameters (Beck, 2004). For example, when a fixed effects 
model is estimated, cross-sectional unit-specific intercepts are added to the 
regression in the form of dummy variables. Treating these parameters as 
parameters to be estimated leads to the incidental parameter problem as discussed 
by Neyman and Scott (1948) and Chamberlain (1980).  
 
Whether the inconsistency in estimating the fixed effects will give rise to 
inconsistency for estimators of the structural parameters of interest, say θ , depends 
on whether the estimators of θ satisfy the Neyman-Scott principle. That is, if there 
exist functionsψ Nj y1,...., yN |
θ( ), j = 1,...., m of observables yi = yi1,....., yiT( ) 'which are 
independent of the incidental parameters such that when θ are the true values, 
ψ Nj y1,...., yN | θ( )converge to zero in probability as N tends to infinity, then an estimator 
ˆθ derived by solving ψ Nj y1,...., yN |
ˆθ( ) = 0, j = 1,..., m, is consistent under suitable 
regularity conditions (Hsiao, 1985:136).  
 
Green (2001) provides an accessible discussion of the problem. In a single linear 
equation case with fixed individual effects, the parameters can be estimated by the 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) or 'within groups' estimator, denoted 
bLSDV. This is computed by least squares regression of the dependent variable, from 
which its mean over all time periods (T) is subtracted, on the same transformation 
of the explanatory variables. The slope parameters can also be estimated using first 
differences. Under the assumptions, bLSDV is a consistent estimator of the 
parameters associated with the explanatory variables. However, the individual 
fixed effects are each estimated with the T(i) individual specific observations for 
each cross-sectional unit i. Since T(i) is typically small, and is fixed, the LSDV 
estimator of the fixed effects is inconsistent. However this inconsistency is not 
transmitted to the LSDV estimator bLSDV because it is not a function of the fixed 
effects estimator (Green, 2001:2). That is the Neyman-Scott principle is satisfied.  
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The incidental parameter problem disappears if the effects are treated as random 
since they are assumed to possess a probability density function characterized by a 
finite number of parameters. However, making specific distributional assumptions 
imposes a degree of restrictiveness, whose severity depends on the type of the 
model being investigated (Hsiao,1985:136). 
3.2. Fixed effects 
In a panel data set, the same unit (for example an individual, firm or municipality) 
is followed over a number of time periods. In this framework there may be effects 
that are not captured by the vector of explanatory variables. Wooldridge (2002a) 
represents these effects as an omitted random variable “c”, called an unobserved 
effect. In the context of the local government expenditure model, this is a 
municipality effect ck where k is a municipality index. The population regression 
function is then given by: 
 
(3.1) E[ykt | xkt ,ck ] = b0 + xktb + ck       t = 1,2,...,T      k = 1,2,..., K  
where  
(3.2) xktb = b1x1kt + .... + bJxJkt  
 
and xjkt indicates variable j at time t and municipality k, b1 ... , bJ are slope 
parameters and b0 is the intercept. 
 
Hsiao (1985) offers a classification of variables used in panel data analyses, which 
is particularly useful in the discussion of fixed effects estimation that follows. 
Economic variables are divided into three types: individual time-invariant, period 
individual-invariant, and individual-time varying variables. The individual time-
invariant variables are the same for a given cross-sectional unit through time but 
vary across cross-sectional units. Examples include ability, sex, and socio-
economic background. The period individual-invariant variables are the same for 
all cross-sectional units at a given point in time but vary through time. Examples of 
these are prices, interest rates and widespread optimism or pessimism. The 
individual-time varying variables are variables that vary across cross-sectional 
units at a point in time and also exhibit variations through time, for example firm 
profits, sales, and capital stock (Hsiao, 1985:130).  
 
In equation (3.1) ck is assumed to be of the first type (time-invariant or time-
constant), i.e. ck has the same effect on the mean response in each time period 
(Wooldridge, 2002a). If the unit of observation is a municipality, ck contains 
unobserved municipality characteristics—such as administrative structure and 
efficiency—that can be viewed as being roughly constant over the period in 
question. Allers (2007) also suggests work ethos as an unobserved effect, which 
influences local government efficiency. In a model of municipality expenditures 
where the observed explanatory variables are factors affecting minimum required 
expenditures and the factors affecting the share of the discretionary income used on 
various sectors, an unobserved effect represents all factors affecting municipality 
expenditures that are constant (or roughly constant) over time. Geographical 
position for example is constant over time (except in cases where municipalities 
merge, in which case it is still approximately constant over the period of interest). 
Whether a municipality is located on relatively flat land or in a mountainous region 
may have an effect on some of the expenditures, such as road infrastructure, as it is 
more difficult and costly to build roads on mountainous terrain. Also, a 
mountainous area may be more suitable for skiing such that a municipality may 
spend more on sporting activities and skiing infrastructure in the culture and 
recreation sector. 
 
In most applications, the main reason for collecting panel data is to allow for the 
unobserved effect to be correlated with the explanatory variables, i.e. 
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(3.3) Ε[x'kt ,ck ] ≠ 0 
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, ck is the fixed effect and 0 is a vector 
of zeros. 
 
In this situation, a fixed effects model may be appropriate (Wooldridge,2002b). For 
example, in modeling municipality expenditures we may allow the unmeasured 
municipality factors to be correlated with some of the explanatory variables – for 
example geographic location may be correlated with population density and 
amount of snowfall.  
 
A method commonly applied in the literature to model these time-constant 
unobserved effects is Least Squares Dummy Variable regression. Typically a 
dummy variable for each cross-sectional unit (here: municipality) is added, 
omitting a base category municipality to avoid the so-called dummy variable trap 
of perfect collinearity. However, when the number of cross-sectional units is very 
large (300 – 400 municipalities) and the time period is small (here: 8 years), the 
estimation may be difficult as there may not be enough degrees of freedom. The 
incidental parameters problem is also applicable in this situation. 
 
We may also have unobserved effects that are constant across municipalities but 
not time (what Hsiao (1985) calls period individual-invariant effects, or more 
simply time effects). There may be omitted variables that capture effects or 
characteristics that at a given time are common to all municipalities. For example, 
central government legislation that affects spending behaviour of all municipalities 
in a given year is one such unobserved effect.  
 
A potential pitfall of this type of model is that when we include a full set of year 
dummies—that is, year dummies for all years but the base—we cannot estimate the 
effect of any variable whose change is constant over time. This is a consequence of 
the fixed effects taking up the between unit variation in the variables, making it 
impossible to estimate the impacts of any variables that do not vary over time 
(Beck, 2004). On first examination, however, this does not seem to be relevant to 
the expenditure model for local governments; however, population size does 
appear to be roughly constant over time.  
 
Moreover, the parameters of time-invariant variables cannot be estimated in the 
fixed effect model. This is a consequence of the fixed effects taking up the between 
unit variation in the variables, making it impossible to estimate the impacts of any 
variables that do not vary over time (Beck, 2004). For example Allers (2007) 
discusses soil condition as a time-invariant explanatory variable, which impacts 
road and sanitation costs. This variable is effectively removed (its effect cannot be 
estimated) when fixed effects for municipalities are introduced. Similarly, if we 
have variables that change very slowly over time (such as institutional measures), 
then the fixed effects approach will essentially wipe them out (Beck, 2004).  
 
However, the time-invariant variables can be interacted with variables that change 
over time and, in particular, with year dummy variables. For example, in a wage 
equation where education is constant over time for each individual, we can interact 
education with each year dummy to see how the return to education has changed 
over time. Even though fixed effects cannot be used to estimate the return to 
education in the base period – and hence in any period – we can see how the return 
to education in each year differs from that in the base period (Wooldridge, 
2002b:444). 
3.2.1. Interactive fixed effects 
In the standard fixed effects models, fixed and time effects are typically introduced 
separately, either additively or multiplicatively depending on the model’s 
assumption. However, it is also possible to introduce these effects in a way that 
links the time and cross-sectional heterogeneity. Arellano and Honoré (2000) 
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discuss an example of a model where individual effects are interacted with the time 
effects. The model is formulated in the following way: 
 
(3.4) ykt = bxkt + δ tηk + υkt  
 
where b is a vector of parameters, xkt is a vector of explanatory variables, k 
represents a cross-sectional unit such as municipality and t is the time index. 
 
In this specification the time effects could represent an aggregate shock, which is 
allowed to have individual-specific fixed effects on ykt, measured by ηk. In this case 
we clearly cannot simply first difference away the fixed effects. The authors then 
go on to suggest a transformation first derived by Chamberlain (1984), which 
provides a solution (Arellano and Honoré, 2000:25). Generalising the previous 
specification to 
(3.5) fkt = gktηk + υkt  
where E(υkt | xk ) = 0, xk are some predetermined variables and gkt is a function of 
predetermined variables and unknown parameters. Dividing by gkt and first 
differencing, they obtain  
(3.6) fk(t −1) − (gkt
−1gk(t −1) ) fkt = vk(t −1) − (gkt
−1gk(t −1) )vkt = v
+
kt  
 
Hübler (2006) suggests a similar model, specifying a time-varying individual effect 
where the effect varies e.g. with cyclical ups and downs, although individual 
characteristics stay the same. He argues that one cannot expect that unobserved 
individual effects to have the same effects in different situations, such as different 
time periods (Hübler, 2006). 
3.2.2. Partial adjustment model 
A dynamic variant of the fixed effects model can be specified as a partial 
adjustment model, which includes a lagged dependent variable as well as possibly 
lagged explanatory variables in addition to the fixed and time effects. Arellano and 
Honoré (2000) discuss a model of this type:  
 
(3.7) ykt = αyk(t −1) + β0xkt + β1xk(t −1) + δ t + ηk + υkt ,   k = 1,..., K , t = 2,...,T  
(3.8.) E(υkt | xk
T ) = 0   
By construction yk(t-1) is correlated with the fixed effect ηk and may also be 
correlated with the past, present and future values of the residuals υkt since these 
may be autocorrelated.  
 
A more general version of the partial adjustment model, however, is the 
specification employed by Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995): 
(3.9) ykt = λykt
* + 1− λ( )ykt −1 + υkt  
 
or equivalently 
(3.10) ykt = ykt −1 + λ ykt
*
− ykt −1( ) + υkt  
 
where λ is the speed of adjustment parameter, which shows how fast the dependent 
variable yt adjusts to its equilibrium value y*kt. The desired allocation y*kt may be 
specified as a function of explanatory variables xkt as well as time and/or fixed 
effects δt and ηk respectively. This model is adapted to analyse the adjustment of 
the local government expenditures and is presented in Section 5, while the results 
are discussed in Section 6.  
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3.3. Random effects 
If the unobserved effect ck in equation (3.1) is assumed uncorrelated with each 
explanatory variable in all time periods, 
 
(3.11) Cov(xjkt,ck) = 0,  t = 1,2,…,T   j =1,2,…,J   k=1,2,...,K 
 
where t represents time period, j is a subscript on an explanatory variable and k 
represents observation, then using a fixed effects model results in inefficient 
estimators and the random effects method is preferable. However, if the c k  are 
correlated with some explanatory variables, the fixed effects method is needed; if 
random effects is used, then the estimators are generally inconsistent (Wooldridge, 
2002b:453). 
 
A random effects model assumes c k to be a component in the composite error 
(vkt=ck+ukt) in each time period; the vkt are serially correlated across time. 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) may be used to solve the serial correlation 
problem. In order for the procedure to have good properties, it must have a large 
cross-sectional dimension and relatively small time dimension  (Wooldridge, 
2002b).  
 
A random effects model allows for explanatory variables that are constant over 
time, which is an advantage of random effects over fixed effects. This is possible 
because the unobserved effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with all explanatory 
variables, whether they are fixed over time or not (Wooldridge, 2002b:450). 
3.4. A comparison of fixed and random effects  
In the fixed effects approach one is typically interested in measuring the effect of 
regressors holding unobserved heterogeneity constant, while in the random effects 
approach the parameters of interest are those characterising the distribution of the 
error components (Arellano and Honoré, 2000:1). 
 
The fixed effect model involves making inferences conditional on the effects that 
are in the sample. The random effect model is one where inference is unconditional 
or marginal with respect to the population of all effects. Thus, whether the 
conditional likelihood function or the marginal likelihood function is used depends 
on the context of data and the manner in which they were gathered (Hsiao, 1985). 
Hsiao (1985) provides an illustrative example where several technicians care for 
machines. If one wants to assess differences between specific technicians, then the 
fixed effect model is more appropriate. However, if the technicians are randomly 
sampled from all employees, the effects of technicians may be assumed random. 
Similarly, if an experiment involves hundreds of individuals that are considered a 
random sample from some larger population, random effects are more appropriate. 
But if one is interested in analyzing just a few individuals, then fixed individual 
effects would be more relevant. 
 
 When individual units in the sample are of interest, the effects are 
more appropriately considered fixed. When inferences will be made about the 
characteristics of a population from which those in the data are considered to be a 
random sample, then the effects should be considered random (Hsiao, 1985:132).  
 
Hence, a fixed effect specification appears to be more appropriate to analysing the 
behaviour of local governments, which are viewed as the units of interest rather 
than a random sample of a larger population. 
3.5. Random Coefficient Model 
Beck (2006) suggests an alternative to the fixed and random effects models, 
namely a version of a random coefficient model (RCM). This model allows for 
cross-sectional unit heterogeneity, but also assumes that the various unit level 
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coefficients are draws from a common (normal) distribution. Thus the RCM may 
be described by as 
(3.12) ,     
where βk is a vector of parameters, which are assumed to be random, composed of 
a vector of constants α, a vector of some exogenous variables zk (χ is the vector of 
corresponding parameters) and a random effect μk which has a normal distribution; 
k indexes the cross-sectional units and t  indexes time. 
 
A feature of the above specification is that one can model the variation of the unit 
coefficients as a function of unit level variables (z). This allows us to move from 
saying for example that the effect of some variable is different in country A and 
country B to this impact differs because of some institutional difference between 
the two nations (Beck, 2006:9). While this model is often estimated by Bayesian 
methods, it is also feasible to estimate it via standard maximum likelihood as has 
been implemented by Pinheiro and Bates (2000). 
 
In a classic paper, Hsiao (1975) discusses the estimation of a Random Coefficient 
Model, in which the random component is decomposed into a time and a cross-
sectional random effect. The coefficients of the explanatory variables are assumed 
to have common means, as well as some random components associated with the 
time and/or cross-section units. The model is specified in the following way: 
(3.13) 
ykt = β jkt xjkt
j =1
J + εkt
  
   β jkt = β j + δ jk + γ jt , k = 1,..., K  , t = 1,...,T  
where k indexes the individual units, for example municipalities, j represents an 
index of an explanatory variable such that xjkt is an exogenous variable j for 
municipality k for year t. And each exogenous variable xjkt is assumed to have a 
random parameter βjkt, which consists of three components: a constant parameter βj 
for each xj , a cross-sectional random effect δjk and a time random effect γjt. The 
error term εkt and both of the random effects are assumed to have zero means and 
constant variances. The random effects are also assumed to be uncorrelated with 
one another, or with the error term.  
 
It may be noted that the Random Effects model is a special case of the RCM. The 
RCM is reduced to Random Effects if it is only the intercept, which is a random 
parameter, that is: 
(3.14) 
β jkt =
β j + δ jk + γ j t
β j
x jkt = 1
otherwise
 
 
Hsiao and Pesaran (2004) discuss a simplified variant of the above model, where in 
vector notation 
(3.15)    ,    
 
In other words, there are only individual-specific effects; these stay constant over 
time and are independently normally distributed over k with mean zero and 
covariance ∆.The error term has mean zero and a covariance matrix C. If the errors 
and δk are normally distributed and the errors are independently distributed across 
k and over t, i.e.  
(3.16) E ε
2
kt( ) = σ 2k  
 
where σ2k  is the variance of the errors, 
then the GLS estimator of β is the maximum likelihood estimator of β conditional 
on ∆ and σ2k. Without knowledge of ∆ and σ2k, we can estimate β, ∆ and σ2k  for k 
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= 1, ... ,K simultaneously by the maximum likelihood method, although 
computationally it can be tedious (Hsiao and Pesaran, 2004:9). 
3.6. Balanced  vs. unbalanced panel 
Wooldridge (2002a:250) defines a balanced panel as a panel where we have the 
same time periods, denoted t = 1, ... ,T for each cross sectional observation, i.e. the 
same time periods are available for all cross sectional units. Some panel data sets 
have missing years for at least some cross-sectional units in the sample. This is 
referred to as an unbalanced panel. The dummy variable fixed effects regression 
goes through in the same way as with a balanced panel. In the local government 
expenditure model, some of the municipalities have merged over the period 2001 
to 2008. Provided that the reason the municipality leaves the sample is uncorrelated 
with the error term, the estimators will remain unbiased. This seems likely to hold 
in most cases of municipality mergers. However, a closer examination may be 
warranted (Wooldridge, 2002b:448). 
 
Greene (2003) suggests that if a time effects estimation is theoretically justified and 
is performed (i.e. a full set of time dummies are added using the union of the dates 
represented in the full data set even though some of the dates have missing 
observations), then any missing data in any time period is accounted by a dummy 
variable for that time period. Thus the dummy variable regression with time effects 
automatically takes care of the unbalanced data set.  
4. Model 
4.1. Norwegian local government fiscal responsibilities 
and financing 
In Norway municipalities play an important role in provision of public services. 
The services offered range from almost pure collective services such as 
administration, to 'quasi private goods' such as care for the elderly. The differences 
in central government control over these services, varying from a regulated primary 
education sector to an almost unregulated infrastructure sector, are the result of a 
compromise between the wish for local democracy and the requirement of national 
standards. This is partly reflected in the variation in per capita spending between 
municipalities. The variation is less in the more heavily regulated sectors, such as 
primary schools, and much higher in other sectors. It is of interest to examine if 
this variation in spending is a reflection of preferences (Rongen, 1995:254-255).  
 
Municipalities’ resources are largely concentrated on production of national 
welfare services. Child care, primary schools and social services (including care for 
the elderly) account for about 70 percent of the municipalities' gross operating 
expenses. Municipalities also have a local responsibility in water supply and 
sanitation, culture, economic development, planning and community development 
(NOU, 2005/18:66).  
 
The revenues of Norwegian municipalities consist primarily of: 
• Fee income (user fees), which includes sales and rental income  
• Interest income, which includes interest on bank deposits and other receivables 
• Tax revenue, consisting of taxes on income and wealth, property and other 
production taxes, as well as licensing fees 
• Transfers from the state (general grants and earmarked grants) (NOU, 
2005/18:68). 
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4.2. Baseline model description and specification 
The model of municipality expenditures, referred to as KOMMODE, explains 
variations in spending per capita in various service sectors in which local 
governments have a responsibility to provide services to their constituencies. The 
model is designed such that the accounting relationships between revenues, 
expenses and net operating surplus are always maintained. The supply of funds is 
always equal to their use. For example, if a municipality receives 1 krone extra in 
income, this will be exactly offset by changes in expenditures and net operating 
surplus (Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge, 2010). 
 
The present research will consider an extended version of KOMMODE, which 
consists of 12 service sectors: 
 
1. Administration  
2. Primary schools 
3. Other education 
4. Child care 
5. Health care 
6. Social services 
7. Child protection 
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 
9. Culture 
10. Municipal roads 
11. Water supply and sanitation 
12. Other infrastructure 
 
The analysis is conducted to determine how the minimum required expenditure 
(subsistence requirement) varies within the different sectors between municipalities 
based in part on demographic, social and geographic factors. Hypotheses about the 
variables that give rise to minimum required expenditures can be derived from 
knowledge of statutory responsibilities, minimum standards, production conditions 
and other conditions for municipalities.  
 
Discretionary income shows economic freedom as measured by the revenues that 
the municipalities have at their disposal after the minimum required expenditures 
for all sectors are covered. The marginal budget shares show how the discretionary 
income is distributed among sectors, depending on local priorities. The marginal 
budget shares are assumed to vary from municipality to municipality depending on 
the local population's educational level, settlement density, and the political party 
composition of the council. 
 
Based on these concepts, each municipality's operating expenses by service sectors 
(sector i) may be decomposed as follows:  
 
(4.1) Expenditure(i) = Minimum required expenditure(i) + Marginal 
budget share(i) * Discretionary income  
where the minimum required expenditure, marginal budget shares and 
discretionary income vary between municipalities as functions of observable 
characteristics.  
 
There are thus three types of explanatory factors for municipality expenditures 
included in the model: 
 
- Local income basis (given by tax rates, tax bases and transfers)  
- Factors that explain variations in minimum required expenditures 
- Factors affecting local government priorities over and above the minimum 
required expenditures  
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4.2.1. Outline of model derivation 
In Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) and Pedersen (2008) a linear expenditure system 
is derived by constrained utility maximisation. The production function for sector i 
is assumed to be 
(4.2) qi = fi xi ,zi( ), i = 1,...,12 
where xi is a vector of factor inputs and zi  is a vector of community characteristics 
that affect production opportunities. 
 
Under constant returns to scale and cost minimisation, the cost function is given by 
(4.3) Ci qi ,wi ,zi( ) = pi wi ,zi( )qi  
where wi is a vector of factor prices and pi  is unit cost in sector i. 
Local governments (municipalities) are treated as utility maximising agents. A 
Stone-Geary utility function is given by 
(4.4) 
W u0 ,q1,q2 ,...,q12( ) = u0 − α0( )β0 qi − γ i( )βi
i =1
12∏
 
 
where  
(4.5) 
βi
i =0
12 = 1
 
 
and 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1∀i , γ i ≤ qi , α0 ≤ u0 are assumed satisfied. 
 
Equation (4.5) is the restriction which says that the marginal budget shares in all 
sectors must sum to 1. 
 
The utility function (4.4) is maximised subject to a budget constraint  
(4.6) 
y = u0 + pi
i =1
12 qi
  
 
where y is exogenous income inclusive of user fees, u0 is budget surplus, pi and qi 
are price and quantity in service sector i and ui = piqi, i ≠0 is the expenditure on 
service sector i (Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003). 
 
As Allers and Elhorst (2007) note, the Stone-Geary utility function presupposes 
that all public services are normal and all pairs of public services are net 
substitutes. These conditions are likely to be satisfied as long as local public 
services are categorised into a limited number of broad groups, as is indeed the 
case in KOMMODE.  
 
The resulting linear expenditure system is of the following form: 
(4.7) 
ui = α i + βi y− α i
i =0
12   
  i = 0,1,...,12  
where price variation is included in the   α i = piγ i , i ≠ 0 
(4.8) 
α i
i =0
12 = α0 + α i
i =1
12 = α0 + α
 
 
and α is the minimum required expenditure on all services while α0 is the minimum 
savings parameter. 
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The following heterogeneity in the parameters is introduced by translating the 
demand system in the sense described by Pollak and Wales (1981), whereby 
“translating can sometimes be interpreted as allowing ‘necessary’ or ‘subsistence’ 
parameters of a demand system to depend on the demographic variables” (Pollak 
and Wales, 1981:1534-1535 ). 
(4.9) 
α i = α i 0 + α ij
j =1
k zj
 
(4.10) 
βi = βi 0 + βij
j =1
m vj
 
 
Equation (4.9) insures that the minimum required expenditures per capita depend 
on production technology and cost structure captured by exogenous variables z1, z2, 
... , zk, while (4.10) says that the marginal budget share parameters depend on local 
taste variables v1, ..., vm that affect the allocation of discretionary income (y – α) 
between sectors.  
 
Two additional restrictions are imposed such that (4.5) holds. 
(4.11) 
βij
i =0
12 = 0
 
 
 j = 1,2,..., m  
 
(4.12)  
βi 0
i =0
12 = 1
 
4.3. Practical issues 
In creating a panel data set, data are available for the years 2001 – 2008. However, 
the number of municipalities under observation differs slightly from year to year 
due to mergers of municipalities. This problem may be dealt with by selecting only 
those municipalities common to all the years. However, by taking all the 
municipalities in all the years, we are free to exclude the municipalities with 
missing data when performing the estimation, and hence both balanced and 
unbalanced panel estimation is possible.  
4.3.1. Outlier municipalities 
In the previous estimations of KOMMODE certain municipalities were considered 
outliers and excluded from the estimation. An outlier is defined in Langørgen, 
Pedersen and Aaberge (2010) as a municipality that does not fit into the model. If 
such municipalities are included in the model estimation, the estimates may be 
distorted. Thus, these outliers are excluded from estimation.  
 
Several grounds for exclusion are used. First, municipalities that have special 
characteristics are considered outliers. Oslo municipality is excluded from 
estimation because it is both a municipality and a county government, and it is 
therefore not possible to distinguish completely between municipal and county 
expenditures in its accounts. If Oslo were included in the estimation, total 
expenditure would be overestimated. Other outliers in this category are: rich 
municipalities (Bykle, Eidfjord and Modalen), little municipalities (Utsira), very 
poor municipalities (Haram in 2002, Bø in 2006). Second, the municipalities that 
have particularly large residuals on initial estimation are excluded from the final 
model estimation. Third, Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010) suggest that it 
is possible to determine which municipalities have an independent effect on the 
estimation results, that is whether there is a significant difference in the estimated 
coefficients with and without a particular municipality. If a significant difference is 
observed, that municipality is considered an outlier and omitted from the model. 
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Finally, municipalities that have negative or large positive per capita expenditures 
as well as large net operating surpluses are excluded from estimation.  
 
The outlier municipalities differ somewhat from year to year and hence need to be 
combined in a meaningful way for the panel model. It is reasonable to exclude 
municipalities that are outliers in at least 1 year or in at least 2 years. Both 
formulations may be used to estimate different versions of the model. Table A.1 in 
Appendix A shows these municipalities as well as the total number of outliers in 
each year.  
4.4. Price and income indices 
In order to remove the effect of inflation and make the coefficients comparable 
over the time period of consideration, the income and expenditure variables in the 
model may be adjusted by a price index such that all of these variables are 
measured at the base of a selected year, for example 2008. The price growth (ΔP) 
values are taken from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development (2009) report. The standard formula is used to calculate the price 
indices (PI), normalising 2008 to 1, 
 
(4.13) 
PI t =
PI t +1
1+ ΔPt +1  
 
Thus the price indices are calculated recursively from 2008 back to 2001. 
 
As an alternative deflator, an income index measure may be used. As one of the 
key reasons for increasing minimum expenditures is the income growth over time, 
deflating the income and expenditure variables by the average income growth is the 
method employed in this paper. Adjusting the expenditures and income in this way 
accounts for the part of time heterogeneity in the minimum required expenditures 
that is due to the fact that municipality incomes are growing over time and ensures 
that the estimates are comparable over time. While the price index may be more 
suitable in other contexts and may be used in further studies on the subject, the 
income index has a better theoretical basis in the present context, as we expect the 
change in the minimum required expenditures to result primarily from growing 
incomes rather than prices.  
 
The income index Rt is determined as the mean per capita income over all 
municipalities3 in each period as a fraction of the mean per capita income in the 
base year 2008. Thus, Rt=1 in 2008. 
 
(4.14) 
Rt =
yt
y8  
 
where 
(4.15) 
yt =
1
Kt
ykt
k=1
Kt
 
 
 k = 1,..., Kt ,   t = 1,..., 8. 
yt  is the mean per capita income in year t and Kt is the number of municipalities 
included in the estimation for a particular year. Calculations are shown in Tables 
A.2 – A.5 in Appendix A. 
                                                     
3  The index is calculated for municipalities included in the estimation; hence different indices are 
used for different versions of the model. 
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Table 4.1. Price and income indices 
year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
price growth .......... 0.063 0.043 0.037 0.033 0.025 0.036 0.044 0.064
price index ............ 0.759 0.791 0.821 0.848 0.869 0.900 0.940 1.000
 
income index (A) ... 0.656 0.683 0.730 0.764 0.803 0.895 0.939 1.000
income index (B) ... 0.655 0.682 0.733 0.765 0.802 0.896 0.939 1.000
income index (C) ... 0.654 0.683 0.731 0.765 0.804 0.895 0.939 1.000
income index (D) ... 0.654 0.683 0.733 0.765 0.803 0.896 0.940 1.000
 
(A) unbalanced panel, excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 1 year 
(B) unbalanced panel, excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 2 years 
(C) balanced panel4 excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 1 year 
(D) balanced panel, excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 2 years 
 
In addition to a close proximity between the price index and income index values, 
Table 4.1 demonstrates an even closer relationship between the four different 
specifications of the income index. The income index is insensitive to the number 
of outliers excluded from estimation as well as the structure of the panel (balanced 
or unbalanced). It is therefore expected that models with income growth adjusted 
expenditure and income, estimated using data specifications (A) – (D), will yield 
similar results. 
5. Panel data models for a system of equations 
5.1. Time and municipality-constant effects on minimum 
required expenditures and marginal budget shares 
In the context of panel data the linear expenditure system (4.7) may be written as: 
(5.1) 
uit = α it + βit yt − α it
i =0
12  + ε it  
  i = 1,...,12  t = 1,..., 8 
 
where the index for municipality is implicit and yt is total exogenous income.  
The error terms in the sector equations are assumed to be correlated resulting in 
contemporaneous error correlation: 
 
(5.2) 
Cov(ε it ,ε jt )
i ≠ j
≠ 0
 
  i, j = 1,...,12  
 
Specification (5.2) is reasonable since the error terms for different expenditure 
categories are expected to reflect some common unobservable or omitted factors.  
 
Estimating the model given by (5.1), however, will lead to biased estimates. This is 
a result of the fact that the effects on minimum required expenditure (αi0 and αij , 
j=1,..,r) are assumed to be constant over time and to vary only by sector. However, 
based on intuitive understanding and past estimations done on cross-sectional data 
for the years 2001 to 2007 documented in Pedersen (2008), it is known that the α’s 
are increasing over time, as prices and incomes are increasing over time. Secondly, 
we expect that there may be unobserved effects that may account for the minimum 
expenditures increasing over time (so-called time effects) as well as unobserved 
municipality effects that may explain differences between municipalities that are 
not explained by the included explanatory variables. If these unobserved effects are 
correlated with at least some of the explanatory variables in the model, model (5.1) 
                                                     
4 In a balanced panel municipalities that have missing data in some of the years are excluded; these 
municipalities are given in Table A.6 in Appendix A. 
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will suffer from omitted variable bias and the estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent.  
 
One approach to removing the time variation in the minimum required expenditure 
is to transform the data by the income index, thus accounting for time variation due 
to income growth. Model 1 is a benchmark model to which other more complex 
models can be compared.  
(Model 1) 
uit = α it + βit yt − α it
i =0
12  + ε it  
 
Where 
 
uit =
uit
Rt , 
yt =
yt
Rt ,     
Rt =
yt
y8 ,     
yt =
1
K
ykt
k=1
K
 k = 1,..., K ,  t = 1,..., 8 
 
(5.3) 
α it = α i 0 + α ij
j =1
r zjt
 
 
and 
(5.4) 
βit = βi 0 + βij
j =1
m vjt
 
 
The expenditure and income variables in Model 1 are adjusted for growth in 
income, putting the model into real instead of nominal terms. The index Rt by 
which expenditures and income are deflated is determined as the mean income in 
each period as a fraction of the mean income in the base year 2008, as described in 
Section 4.4. The mean income is found as an average over K municipalities 
(indexed by k) included in the estimation in a given year. Rt is expected to be less 
than one in the years 2001 – 2007 since incomes have increased from 2001 to 2008 
( yt ≤ y8  for all t) and is equal to 1 in 2008 by definition.  
 
Model 1 is consistent with the budget constraint 
 
uit
i = 0
12 = yt
 
 
Since 
 
 
1
Rt
uit
i = 0
12 = 1Rt yt   
is consistent with the budget constraint and is by definition equal to 
 
uit
i = 0
12 = yt
 
 
 which follows directly from Model 1. 
5.2. Time variation in minimum required expenditures 
To account for other unobserved heterogeneity due to factors other than income 
growth, an alternative model that accounts for variation over time is introduced (αi0 
and αij, j=1,..,r, are assumed to vary over time and are specified as αi0t and αijt). 
Some of this variation is due to growing incomes and prices; the rest is due to any 
unobserved or omitted factors common to all municipalities in a given year. The 
effects on the marginal budget shares (βi0 and βij, j=1,..,m) are specified as time-
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invariant based on previous cross-sectional estimation where these parameters are 
found to be roughly constant throughout the years under consideration. The model 
is given by equation (5.5). 
(5.5) 
uit = α it + βit yt − α it
i =0
12  + ε it  
 
where  
(5.6) 
α it = α i 0t + α ijt
j =1
r zjt
 
 
and βit  is given by equation (5.4). 
 
A potential problem with a model given by equations (5.5) and (5.6) is the large 
number of parameters to be estimated; with a separate minimum expenditure 
parameter for each sector and year.  
5.3. Multiplicative time effect 
A time effect implies that expenditures change over time because of unobserved 
factors such as changes in regulatory or government policies. Using standard panel 
data methods for fixed effects, we can introduce a dummy variable for each time 
period (i.e. year) to account for the differences in αs over time. Since from (4.9) αi 
is a linear combination of parameters and exogenous variables z that explain the 
variation in the minimum required expenditure, we need to introduce the time 
dummies in a way that would account for differences over time in the constant term 
αi0 as well as the growth over time in the slope parameters αij. If the time dummies 
are introduced additively, the increase in minimum required expenditures over time 
is not fully internalised because the effect of increasing income on the slope 
parameters is not accounted for. Thus, the time dummies need to be introduced 
multiplicatively. This results in Model 2, which is equivalent to model (5.5) with a 
specific time structure imposed on the αi0t and αijt, i.e. α i 0t = α i 0τ it  and α ijt = α ijτ it or 
equivalently α it = α itτ it . 
(Model 2) 
uit = α itτ it + βit yt − α itτ it
i =0
12  + ε it  
 
where τit is the time effect. 
 
The model is estimated by introducing dummy variables ht for each year such that 
for each sector i 
ui = α i 0τ it ht
t =1
8 + α i j
j =1
r τ i t zj ht
t =1
8 + β i y − α i 0τ i t ht
t =1
8 + α i jτ i t
j =1
r zj ht
t =1
8

i = 0
12


 + ε i  
 
where  
ht =
1,
0,
year = t
otherwise    t = 1,2,..., 8  
 
The model has 8 year intercepts αi0tτit and may be estimated given the 
normalization τi8=1, such that in 2001 the intercept for every sector i is αi0τi1  , in 
2002 it is αi0τi2, and in the base year 2008 αi0.  
 
It may also be desirable to test whether the beta parameters are indeed constant 
over time. If the betas are assumed to have time variation in the intercept 
parameters βi0t then Model 2 can be specified with an additive time effect γit as 
follows: 
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(Model 3) 
uit = α itτ it + βit + γ it( ) yt − α itτ it
i =0
12  + ε it  
 
The model is estimated by introducing dummy variables ht for each year such that 
for each sector i 
ui = α i 0τ i t ht
t =1
8 + α i jτ i t
j =1
r zj ht
t =1
8 + β i 0 + γ i t ht + β i j v j
j =1
m
t =1
8

 y − α i 0τ i t htt =1
8 + α i j
j =1
r τ i t zj ht
t =1
8

i = 0
12


 + ε i  
where γi8 = 0 and τi8 = 1. 
5.4. Municipality fixed effect  
Although models 2 and 3 account for unobserved time effects, it may be desirable 
to test both municipality and time effects and/or combination of the two. In the 
context of the KOMMODE model, a fixed municipality effect implies that there 
exist some municipality-specific characteristics that do not change over time and 
are correlated with the included explanatory variables.  
 
Before introducing the municipality effect, the expenditure and income variables 
are adjusted for growth in income (Rt), putting the model into real instead of 
nominal terms. Having accounted for time effects owing to income growth, 
municipality effects are included by introducing municipality dummy variables. 
Two specifications are proposed:  
(Model 4)  
uikt = α i t + θ ik + β ikt ykt − α it + θ ik( )
i = 0
12

 + ε ikt  
 
  i = 0,...,12 , k = 1,..., K , t = 1,..., 8  
 
(Model 5)   
uikt = α itθik + βit ykt − α itθik
i =0
12  + ε ikt    
 
  i = 0,...,12 , k = 1,..., K , t = 1,..., 8 
 
where k is an index for municipality, θik is the fixed municipality effect, and in 
Model 4 one base municipality k is excluded to avoid the dummy variable trap, i.e. 
θi k = 0 . 
Model 4 is estimated by including municipality dummies additively, based on an 
assumption that only intercepts vary between municipalities. However, if there is 
also municipality variation in the slope parameters (the marginal effects of the 
exogenous z variables differ from municipality to municipality), the dummies 
should be included multiplicatively as in Model 5. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that any such effects are due to municipality characteristics already 
included in the model (e.g. municipality size: a unit increase in population for 
example may be expected to have a higher marginal effect on a smaller 
municipality’s expenditures than a larger municipality).  
 
As there are over 400 municipalities in the sample, there will be many variables in 
the model making estimation difficult. However, three solutions are proposed and 
implemented. First, first-differencing may be used to make the model more 
tractable.  
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Model 4 then becomes: 
 
(Model 6) 
uikt − uikt −1 = α i j
j =1
r zjkt − zjkt −1( ) + β it ykt − ykt −1 − α i j
j =1
r zjkt − zjkt −1( )
i = 0
12


+ ε ikt − ε ikt −1
 
 
Transforming Model 5 by first differencing does not decrease the number of 
explanatory variables. Other methods may be necessary if this model is to be 
estimated.  
 
There are, however, a number of problems facing first-difference estimation. First, 
differencing can greatly reduce the variation in the explanatory variables, which 
can in turn lead to large standard errors. However, the problem is reduced when a 
large cross section is available. Further, using longer differences over time is 
sometimes preferred to using year-to-year changes as this may help to mitigate the 
reduced cross-sectional variation in the explanatory variables since the variation 
becomes more pronounced over longer periods (Wooldridge, 2002b:423). 
Alternatively, a within-estimator may be used. In our case, however, only 8 years 
are available, which does not allow for taking longer time differences. Thus, when 
Model 6 is estimated using year on year differences, most of the cross-sectional 
variation is expected to be removed causing many of the estimates to have low t-
values and signs that are not in line with theoretical expectations. Since each 
municipality effect in Model 6 is estimated with 8 observations (one for each year), 
the poor performance of the model is not surprising (Beck, 2004). Moreover, by 
first-differencing we lose the first time period for each cross-section (municipality). 
Thus care must be taken in implementing a differencing model. Provided that the 
panel is arranged by municipality (each municipality has T consecutive 
observations for the T time periods under observation), differences for observation 
numbers 1, T+1, 2T+1, 3T+1,...,(N-1)T+1 must be set to missing as these 
observations correspond to the first time period for every cross section unit. Also, 
the explanatory variables (z and y) must be time-varying for at least some 
municipalities, otherwise these variables will fall away from the transformed model 
and their effect will not be estimated (Wooldridge, 2002a:280). In the KOMMODE 
model, many of the variables explaining the variation in the minimum required 
expenditures have only a small time variation. Correlation plots between the years 
2001 and 2008 values are presented in Appendix B.  
 
A second method of estimating Model 4 is to isolate and include only the 
significant municipality effects, thus limiting the number of dummy variables in 
the model and making it possible to estimate. The significance of the unobserved 
municipality effects may be judged based on a number of criteria. While it is 
possible to use the t-statistic or the adjusted R-squared to judge the significance of 
a given dummy variable or the improvement of the model’s fit, respectively, this 
paper employs a criterion of economic rather than statistical significance.  
 
If it is not possible to estimate the model from the general version (all municipality 
effects included) to specific (only the significant effects remain), the alternative 
would be to start by including one municipality and then carrying out an iterative 
estimation until all municipalities have been tested. The significance criterion used 
may be statistical or economic. Some researchers, such as Deirdre McCloskey, are 
proponents of economic significance. McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) caution against 
relying on statistical significance without reference to theoretical or policy 
importance, arguing that an effect can be statistically significant without being 
important for science or policy, and it can be economically significant without 
being statistically significant. This paper uses an economic relevance criterion, 
namely, a municipality effect is deemed significant if it is in absolute value at least 
as large as 50% of the relevant sector’s per median capita expenditure adjusted by 
the income index. The selection of relevant municipality effects is carried out in 3 
  
Documents 6/2011 Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context
Statistics Norway 27
steps. First, the model is estimated 13 times (for sectors 0 to 13) for each 
municipality, including only one fixed effect at a time, while changing the service 
sector in which the fixed effect is included. After the significant fixed effects have 
been revealed, the second step is to include all the significant fixed effects in the 
model. This yields a more general model that is controlling for significant fixed 
effects. The third step is to test all the fixed effects again by iteration, while 
controlling for the fixed effects included in the second step. A second version of 
step 1 can also be conducted, testing each municipality in all sectors 
simultaneously. The details and results of the iterative procedure are presented in 
Section 6.2 and Appendix D.  
 
Although the iteration procedure is instructive in isolating significant fixed effects, 
it is not without problems. The most significant pitfall is that statistical properties 
of the iteration procedure are unknown and could be producing poor results.  
5.5. Economic region fixed effect 
A third alternative specification is therefore proposed for the fixed effects model. 
In Model 7, fixed effects are included as dummy variables for economic regions 
into which municipalities may be grouped rather than for individual municipalities. 
The regional classification is developed in Bhuller (2009) and is based on 
commuting patterns between municipalities in order to categorise municipalities by 
the labour market to which they belong. A municipality must have at least 10 
percent of its working population commuting to a neighbouring region if it is to be 
added to that region. The list of the 46 regions is provided in Appendix E.  
 
(Model 7) 
uit = α it + ρiR + βit yt − α it + ρiR( )
i =0
12

 + ε it  
  i = 0,...,12 , R= 1,..., 46 , t = 1,..., 8 
 
where ρiR is the fixed region effect and one base region Ris excluded to avoid the 
dummy variable trap, i.e. ρi R = 0 . 
5.6. Region and time effects 
Once the region effects have been added, it is possible to test both fixed and time 
effects in one model. Adding region dummies to Model 2 and including an 
interaction term to account for any time variance in the region effects, Model 8 
captures both municipality and time heterogeneity.  
(Model 8) 
uit = α it + ρiR( )τ it + βit yt − α it + ρiR( )τ it
i =0
12

 + ε it   
 
 τ i 8 = 1, ρi R = 0  
 
This may be specified by introducing dummy variables in the following way:  
ui = α i 0τ i t ht
t =1
8 + α i jτ i t
j =1
r zj ht
t =1
8 + ρiRτ i t htdR
t =1
8
R=1
46 + β i y − α i 0τ i t ht
t =1
8 + α i jτ i t
j =1
r zj ht
t =1
8 + ρiRτ i t htdR
t =1
8
R=1
46

i = 0
12


 + ε i  
where  
ht =
1,
0,
year = t
otherwise     t = 1,..., 8   
            
dR =
1,
0,
region = R
otherwise     R= 1,..., 46 . 
 
  
Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context Documents 6/2011
28 Statistics Norway
5.7. Partial adjustment model with time heterogeneity 
While Model 8 accounts for time and municipality heterogeneity, it is only a quasi-
dynamic model in a sense that it can describe changes in local government 
behaviour over time and between economic regions but does not say anything 
about the way in which these changes take place. Model 8 thus assumes that all 
spending allocations are optimised at any point in time. A partial adjustment model 
9 of the form presented in Section 3.2.2. estimates how quickly the spending 
allocation adjusts to the desired allocation, while also taking into account time 
heterogeneity. Model 9 assumes existence of inertia in the adjustment of spending 
to its equilibrium level; that is, it takes time for municipalities to adapt their 
spending behaviour to changes in income, expectations, government regulation and 
so on. Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010) discuss a number of possible 
reasons for inertia in spending allocation. Restructuring costs may contribute to 
spending inertia because it is costly to adapt service production to a desired level in 
the short term. These costs are a result of difficulty in terminating municipality 
workers, expensive resources required for faster restructuring and credit rationing 
(difficulty in obtaining funds needed for restructuring). Moreover, it takes time to 
free up resources and to adjust production of services to meet the changing needs 
of the service users or changes in the central government’s policy. Thus, Model 9, 
which explicitly models the speed of adjustment of spending to its equilibrium 
level rather than assuming this adjustment to be instantaneous, may be an 
appropriate specification for local government spending. 
(5.7) 
uit = λuit* + 1− λ( ) ytyt −1 uit −1 + ν it  
(5.8) 
uit
*
= α itτ it + βit yt − α itτ it
i =0
12  + ε it  
 
Substituting (5.7) into (5.6) gives Model 9.  
 
(Model 9) 
uit −
yt
yt −1
uit −1 = λ α i tτ i t + β i t yt − α i tτ i t
i = 0
12  − ytyt −1 uit −1



 + ε i t  
 ε i t = λε i t + vit   τ i 8 = 1 
 
where λ is the speed of adjustment parameter, which is assumed constant and equal 
for all service sectors – an assumption also made by Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen 
(1995). This assumption may be relaxed in future extensions of the model. When 
the speed of adjustment parameter is 1, adjustment is instantaneous and Model 9 
reduces to the time effects Model 2. When the speed of adjustment parameter is 0, 
the expenditure in year t is simply equal to the previous year’s expenditure adjusted 
for income growth, represented by the 
yt
yt −1 term.  
Since the budget constraint holds by definition both out of and in equilibrium such 
that 
(5.9) 
uit
i =0
12 = yt
 
 
 for all t,  
  
uit
*
i =0
12 = yt
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and  hence 
λuit* + 1− λ( ) ytyt −1 uit −1 + vit



i =0
12 = λyt + 1− λ( ) yt = yt
  
 
using  
uit −1
i =0
12 = yt −1
   
vit
i =0
12 = 0
, 
Model 9 is a logically consistent expenditure system that satisfies the budget 
constraint.  
 
While it is possible to specify Model 9 to also include municipality heterogeneity, 
for instance via regional effects, this more complex version is beyond the scope of 
this paper and is therefore left to future research. 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Data and variables 
All models are based on KOSTRA5   data available from Statistics Norway. 
Expenditures (uit) are per capita expenditure in sector i. The expenditure in sector 4 
(child care) excludes fee income from municipal kindergartens. Per capita income 
yt is inclusive of user fees in all sectors except child care and exclusive of employer 
payroll taxes.  
 
6.1.1. Factors that explain variation in the minimum required 
expenditures 
Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010) select the variables in Table 6.1 as 
significant factors affecting minimum required expenditures in the KOMMODE 
model, which the authors estimate for the years 2001 to 2008. The minimum 
quantity of service which must be provided in a given sector is assumed to depend 
on the size of the target groups for the services in that sector, while other factors 
affect the unit costs of providing the service. The target group variables and the 
variables affecting the unit costs of service provision are shown in Table 6.1 
together with the sectors in which each variable is relevant.  
 
Population age group variables6 are included in sectors 2, 4 and 8 and are calculated 
as the number of municipality residents in a specified age group as a share of that 
municipality’s total population. Since primary education, child care and care for 
the elderly and disabled are directed towards specific target groups, the age 
composition of the population is assumed to affect the demand for these services. 
Parameter estimates of these variables show the increase in minimum quantity 
when the target group is increased by one person.  
                                                     
5 As of 2001 all municipalities report their expenses via KOSTRA (Kommune-Stat-Rapportering/ 
Municipal statistical reporting) to Statistics Norway. 
6 All population variables are measured as of 1 January of the relevant year and sourced from 
Statistics Norway Section for Population statistics (320). 
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Table 6.1. Variables that affect minimum required expenditures found to be significant in the 
cross-sectional analysis 
  (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population 1-5 years of age X     
Population 6-12 years of age X     
Population 13-15 years of 
age X     
Population 67-79 years of 
age   X  
Population 80-89 years of 
age   X  
Population 90 years and 
above   X  
Children 0-15 years with 
single mother/ father  X   
Fulltime working women 20-
44 years share of total 
population 
X X     
Refugees with integration 
grants * X X    
Refugees without integration 
grants  X    
Divorced/ separated 16-59 
years X    
Unemployed 16-59 years  X    
Number of poor X X   
Disablement pensioners 18-
49 years X    
Mentally disabled 16 years 
and above without grants   X  
Mentally disabled 16 years 
and above with grants   X  
High-cost recipients   X  
Kilometers of municipal roads     X
Amount of snowfall     X
Capacity of advanced 
purification     X
Index of farming industry X     
Distance to centre of 
municipal sub-district ** X X X   X  
Inverse population size  X X X X   X X X X
Growth in municipality 
incomes .............................. X     
Note: All age-group variables are measured as shares of the total population. X shows the sector/s for which a variable 
is included in the minimum required expenditure. 
Sector 0: Budget surplus Sector 5: Health  care Sector 10: Municipal roads 
Sector 1: Administration Sector 6: Social services Sector 11: Water supply and sanitation 
Sector 2: Primary schools Sector 7: Child protection Sector 12: Other infrastructure 
Sector 3: Other education Sector 8: Care for the elderly and disabled 
Sector 4: Child care Sector 9: Culture 
* total number of refugees for whom a given municipality has received integration grants throughout a particular year. 
** in Norwegian miles (1 mile=10 km) 
6.2. Results  
The models developed in Section 5 are summarised in Table 6.2. Four versions of 
each model are estimated. Version A excludes municipalities which are considered 
outliers in at least 1 year, while version B excludes municipalities which are 
considered outliers in at least 2 years. The procedure for classifying a municipality 
as an outlier is explained in Section 4.3.1. Versions C and D are parallel to A and B 
in their treatment of outliers; however, specifications C and D are estimated on a 
balanced panel, i.e. additional municipalities are removed which have missing 
values for some of the years. All 4 versions, however, yield similar results and only 
version A is reported here. The models’ residual plots are reported in Appendix C. 
The residuals are well-behaved and approximately normally distributed, satisfying 
the critical assumption of residual normality of FIML estimation. Adjusted R-
Squared values are presented in Table 6.3. These statistics show a reasonable to 
good fit in all service sectors. The values for the R-Squared in Model 6 (first-
difference model) are not reported as these are not meaningful in a first-difference 
model where the constant is differenced away. Model 9 has relatively low adjusted 
R-Square values, particularly in sector 11. However, this model is specified with 
the difference between sector expenditure and income growth adjusted lagged 
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sector expenditure as the dependent variable. Thus, adjusted R-squared values are 
not comparable to the adjusted R-squared values of the other models.  
Table 6.2. Summary of estimated models 
Model name Model number Adjusted by income index Time effects 
Municipality or 
regional fixed 
effects
Baseline  .......................................... Model 1 Yes No No
Time effects ...................................... Model 2 No Yes No
Time effects with time heterogeneity in 
the budget shares ............................. Model 3 No Yes No
Municipality fixed effects .................... Model 4 Yes No Yes
First difference .................................. Model 6 Yes No No*
Regional effects ................................ Model 7 Yes No Yes
Time and regional effects ................... Model 8 No Yes Yes
Partial adjustment ** .......................... Model 9 No Yes No
*Municipality effects are differenced away 
** Estimates the sector expenditures as a weighted average of the desired allocation and the expenditure in the 
previous period multiplied by income growth. The weight is the speed of adjustment parameter estimated to be 0.169.  
 
Table 6.3. Adjusted R-Squared 
Sector Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4* Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
1. Administration ............................... 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.45
2. Primary schools ............................. 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.39
3. Other education ............................. 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.57 0.45 0.49 0.20
4. Child care ..................................... 0.35 0.86 0.87 0.39 0.46 0.88 0.30
5. Health care ................................... 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.17
6. Social assistance ........................... 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.21
7. Child protection ............................. 0.23 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.35 0.46 0.13
8. Care for the elderly and disabled ..... 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.38
9. Culture ......................................... 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.74 0.67 0.70 0.15
10. Municipal roads ........................... 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.78 0.72 0.74 0.14
11. Water supply and sanitation .......... 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.55 0.44 0.46 0.08
12. Other infrastructure ...................... 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.73 0.65 0.68 0.12
Log likelihood  ................................... -28811 -20450 -20255 -23691 -25532 -17037 -3505
*Significant municipality effects are included in 12 service sectors 
Model 1 is useful as a point of departure and comparison. The expenditures and 
income are adjusted by the income growth index, effectively removing time 
variation in the minimum required expenditures due to the increasing municipality 
incomes. However, any variation due to unobserved or omitted time-invariant 
factors is not accounted for in this model. As evident from the significant time 
effect estimates in Model 2, there is indeed strong justification to explicitly model 
minimum required expenditures as different for different years. Model 3 is 
estimated but not reported as the estimates are similar to Model 2 and most of the 
time-effects imposed on the budget shares are not significant (with the exception of 
child care and other education where the marginal budget share time effects are 
significant in 2001 – 2005) as shown in Table 6.4. Model 2 is therefore preferred to 
Model 3. Following the methodology employed by Langørgen, Pedersen and 
Aaberge (2010), models 1 and 2 are calibrated such that discretionary income7 is 
approximately zero for the municipality with the lowest discretionary income. In 
Model 1, this is achieved by imposing a restriction on the sum of the constant terms 
in the minimum required expenditure in each sector8 to ensure that discretionary 
income is approximately zero for municipality 0228 (Rælingen). Model 2 is 
similarly calibrated for municipality 1089 (Songdalen) by imposing a restriction on 
the constant term in the residual sector’s minimum required expenditure9. 
                                                     
7 Discretionary income is given by difference between total income and the sum of minimum required 
expenditures in all sectors, including the residual sector, that is
y − α ikt
i = 0
12 . 
8 
α i 0
i = 0
12 = 10,72 
9 α 00 = −1,841 
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Table 6.4. Additive time effects in the marginal budget shares in Model 3  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Administration ................. -0.017 -0.038 -0.010 -0.014 -0.016 -0.023 -0.014 0
 (1.66) (4.18) (1.09) (1.80) (2.10) (2.86) (2.11)  -
Primary schools .............. -0.013 -0.002 -0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011 0
 (1.50) (0.26) (0.06) (1.03) (0.88) (1.74) (2.09)  -
Other education .............. 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.002 0
 (2.54) (3.16) (2.29) (2.52) (2.12) (0.72) (0.64)  -
Child care ....................... 0.040 0.043 0.029 0.021 0.010 -0.006 -0.003 0
 (6.62) (8.46) (5.19) (4.09) (2.26) (1.78) (1.06)  -
Health care ..................... -0.002 0.012 0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0
 (0.23) (2.12) (1.05) (0.18) (0.96) (1.10) (0.32)  -
Social services ................ 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0
 (0.11) (0.65) (1.32) (0.56) (0.39) (1.24) (1.03)  -
Child protection ............... -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0
 (0.61) (1.23) (1.61) (1.06) (0.58) (0.50) (0.15)  -
Care for the elderly and 
disabled ......................... -0.013 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.009 -0.004 -0.011 0
 (0.69) (0.35) (0.39) (1.28) (0.67) (0.29) (1.00)  -
Culture ........................... 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.002 0
 (1.31) (1.82) (1.87) (2.30) (1.86) (1.59) (0.70)  -
Municipal roads ............... -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0
 (1.39) (2.17) (0.65) (0.88) (0.61) (0.79) (1.56)  -
Water supply and 
sanitation ........................ -0.013 -0.009 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0
 (1.70) (1.15) (0.37) (0.96) (0.70) (0.42) (0.52)  -
Other infrastructure ......... 0.028 0.032 0.018 0.006 -0.010 0.007 -0.008 0
 (2.49) (2.91) (1.69) (0.68) (1.06) (0.79) (1.10)  -
 
It was not possible to estimate Model 4 with all municipality effects included 
(removing one to avoid perfect collinearity) using the SAS proc model procedure. 
A possible reason is the large number of parameters to be estimated and hence the 
large memory allocation required by SAS. However, the error10 encountered in 
trying to estimate this model points to a problem with the SAS software and it may 
be possible to estimate the model using a different econometric package, or a 
different version of the SAS software. This may be of interest to future research. 
Model 4 is therefore estimated including only significant municipality effects. The 
estimation is conducted in three steps using an economic relevance criterion to 
determine which municipality effects are significant; namely, a municipality effect 
is deemed significant if it is in absolute value at least as large as 50% of the 
relevant sector’s per median capita expenditure adjusted by the income index. 
These values, together with the mean expenditures are given in Table 6.5. The 
median and the mean values are fairly similar in magnitude, with the median values 
slightly lower. There is thus a higher probability of the effect being significant 
when the median is used as the critical value. Model 4 is calibrated in the way 
described above for municipality 1928 (Torsken) from step 2 onwards. 
 
Table 6.5. Mean and median values of per capita income index adjusted expenditure, by 
service sector 
Adjusted per capita expenditure by sector * Median Mean
0. Discretionary income  ......................................................... 0.890 1.072
1. Administration  .................................................................. 4.316 5.057
2. Primary schools  ................................................................ 10.816 11.048
3. Other education ................................................................. 1.218 1.275
4. Child care ......................................................................... 3.318 3.453
5. Health care ....................................................................... 2.117 2.426
6. Social services .................................................................. 1.440 1.514
7. Child protection ................................................................. 1.117 1.154
8. Care for the elderly and disabled ......................................... 14.293 14.825
9. Culture ............................................................................. 1.761 1.918
10. Municipal roads ............................................................... 0.775 0.877
11. Water supply and sanitation .............................................. 2.105 2.101
12. Other infrastructure .......................................................... 2.924 3.330
*The expenditures are calculated for the sample of 336 municipalities, where municipalities considered outliers in at 
least one of the eight years are excluded. Expenditures are divided by the income growth index given by equation (18), 
described in Section 4.4.  
                                                     
10 A segmentation violation in task [Model] . SAS version used is 9.2. 
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We find that when sector zero effects are tested in step 1, 215 significant fixed 
effects are revealed based on the median expenditure criterion. This is not 
surprising, however, as the net operating surplus can take on both positive and 
negative values, leading to the median being a poor criterion of significance. 
Instead we develop 2 additional versions of step1. First, only those sector 0 effects 
whose t-value exceeds a generous critical value of 1,5 are included in step 2 
together with the significant effects in other sectors whose significance is based on 
the median criterion. In the second variant all fixed effects are evaluated based on 
their t-values. Estimation results are reported in Appendix D. The final version of 
model 4 was estimated based on the effects revealed in step 2 with the additional 
effects revealed to be significant in step 3. The effects revealed significant in step 3 
are presented in Table D.10 in Appendix D. The parameters of interest are reported 
in Tables D.11 and D.12 in Appendix D. Most of the estimates are comparable to 
those of Model 7 or 8 where region effects are included, suggesting that economic 
regions are a good approximation of the municipality-specific effects. As in other 
models without time effects, the effect of the share of children on the minimum 
required child care expenditure is biased downwards, and is not significant. In the 
social services sector the effect of refugees without integration grants is 
underestimated. One reason for this is that there may be some municipalities whose 
effects are significant but that are not included in this sector. The small number of 
significant fixed effects in the sector care for the elderly and disabled results in 
most of the estimates being closer in magnitude to those of the baseline model than 
to the region effects model. 
 
Since many of the variables explaining the variation in the minimum required 
expenditures have only a small time variation, the first difference model (Model 6) 
produces biased results. Although these near time-invariant variables remain in the 
model, their estimates have inflated standard errors and hence low t-values. 
Correlation plots of these variables for the years 2001 and 2008 and selected 
estimates with standard errors are presented in Appendix B. 
 
Model 7 was first estimated with 45 regional dummy variables, omitting region 12 
(Oslo) as the base category. The results with regards to the effects of the factors 
influencing minimum required expenditures were generally consistent with model 
24. However, the estimate of the marginal effect of the share of children (1 – 5 
years of age) on the minimum required expenditure in the child care sector was 
negative and significant (–7.291). The negative sign is not consistent with 
theoretical expectations as an additional child is expected to increase, not decrease, 
the minimum required expenditure on child care. Model 7, therefore, appears to 
produce biased results, possibly due to the fact that time effects are not accounted 
for in this model’s specification. The estimate of the effect of small children on 
child care’s minimum spending may then be capturing unobserved time 
heterogeneity, which is not accounted for in this model. The problem of the 
negative effect of small children in the child care sector is also encountered by 
Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995). Similarly to Model 7, their study does not 
account for time heterogeneity; although a partial adjustment model is assumed, 
Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) do not explicitly model time effects.  
 
Furthermore, the standard errors on the region 23 (Lillehammer) estimates are 
inflated in every service sector in Model 7, suggesting a problem with this region’s 
inclusion in the model. On closer examination, it was found that only one of the 
three municipalities in this region was included in the data used for model 
estimation (municipality 0522), since the other two municipalities (0501 and 0521) 
were removed as outliers. Hence the dummy variable for region 23 had a value 
zero for all but 8 observations and was therefore approximately constant across 
observations leading to inflated standard errors. An alternate version of the model 
was therefore estimated, with municipalities 0501 and 0521 included in the sample. 
The regional effects are reported in Table E.3. in Appendix E and summarised in 
Table 6.6. The remaining parameters are reported in Tables 6.11 – 6.23. These are 
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mostly very close in magnitude to the estimates in Model 1, where no regional 
effects are included. This finding, combined with the fact that few regional effects 
are significant, suggests that a model with time effects, such as Model 2, is more 
appropriate than a model without time effects. The regions that have statistically 
significant effects on the minimum required expenditures in more than one service 
sector are: 34, 35 and 36 (Southern Norway), 44 (Bergen), 63 (Namsos), 72, 75, 
76, 82 and 83 (Northern Norway). It is indeed plausible that the minimum required 
expenditures in these regions are on average different from those in the Oslo 
region. 
Table 6.6. Significant region effects by service sector in model 7 
Economic region Number of sectors with significant effect 
Service sectors with 
significant effect
23. Lillehamer ............................ 1 6
34. Arendal ................................ 2 1 and 5
35. Kristiansand ......................... 4 4, 6, 9 and 11
36. Lister ................................... 13 All sectors
44. Bergen ................................. 3 0, 7 and 11
51. Sunnfjord (Førde/ Florø) ........ 1 6
53. Nordfjord .............................. 1 7
55. Ålesund ............................... 1 7
61. Trondheim ............................ 1 7
63. Namsos ............................... 2 0 and 7
71. Bodø ................................... 1 11
72. Narvik .................................. 2 0 and 7
75. Harstad ................................ 10 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9,10 and 11
76. Midt-Troms ........................... 4 2, 4, 10 and 11
81. Alta ..................................... 1 0
82. Hammerfest ......................... 2 4 and 6
83. Vadsø .................................. 10 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11
The effects are statistically significant at 10% significance level 
 
In order to account for possible interaction between time and regional 
heterogeneity, Model 8 is estimated. Regional and time effects are included in all 
13 sectors. The effects on the minimum required expenditures are reported in 
Section 6.2.1 and the marginal budget shares in Section 6.2.2. Importantly, the 
effect of the 1 – 5 year old children on the minimum expenditure in the child care 
sector is no longer negative as in Model 7, and is statistically significant. We 
observe an increase of NOK 58154 in the minimum required child care expenditure 
for an additional 1 – 5 year old child in 2008. The regional effects are reported in 
Table E.4. in Appendix E. Table 6.7 summarises statistically significant regions 
and the service sectors in which these effects apply. 
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Table 6.7. Significant region effects by service sector in model 8 
Labour market region Region number Number of sectors with significant effect 
Service sectors with 
significant effect
Eastern Norway  
Sør-Østfold ........................ 11 1 6
Oslo .................................. 12  base region
Vestfold ............................. 13 2 6,11
Kongsberg ......................... 14 2 3,7
Hallingdal .......................... 15 5 1,5,7,11,12
Valdres ............................. 21 3 3,6,11
Gudbrandsdalen ................ 22 6 1,4,7,8,10,12
Lillehammer ....................... 23 0 none
Gjøvik ............................... 24 1 6
Hamar ............................... 25 1 6
Kongsvinger ...................... 26 2 6,7
Elverum ............................. 27 3 6,7,10
Tynset/Røros ..................... 28 8 0,1,3,4,6,7,8,10
Southern Norway  
Nordvest-Telemark ............. 31 4 0,1,8,10
Øst-Telemark ..................... 32 0 none
Sør-Telemark ..................... 33 2 3,6
Arendal ............................. 34 3 5,6,11
Kristiansand ....................... 35 9 1,2,4,6,8,9,10,11,12
Lister ................................. 36 3 4,7,8
West Norway  
Stavanger .......................... 41 3 3,6,9
Haugesund ........................ 42 9 0,1,5,6,7,8,10,11,12
Sunnhordland .................... 43 1 4
Bergen .............................. 44 6 0,1,4,6,7,11
Sunnfjord (Førde/Florø) ...... 51 4 0,1,6,10
Sognefjord (Sogndal/Årdal) . 52 7 0,1,3,4,9,10,12
Nordfjord ........................... 53 2 7,11
Søndre Sunnmøre .............. 54 6 2,3,4,7,8,10
Ålesund ............................. 55 4 0,1,4,7
Molde ................................ 56 1 7
Nordmøre .......................... 57 5 0,1,5,6,10
Kristiansund ....................... 58 0 none
Mid-Norway  
Trondheim ......................... 61 6 0,6,7,8,10,11
Midt-Trøndelag .................. 62 1 11
Namsos ............................. 63 6 0,1,3,7,10,11
Ytre Helgeland ................... 64 6 0,1,6,10,11,12
Indre Helgeland .................. 65 0 none
Northern Norway  
Bodø ................................. 71 5 0,1,2,6,11
Narvik ............................... 72 2 0,7
Vesterålen ......................... 73 0 none
Lofoten .............................. 74 1 11
Harstad ............................. 75 4 2,3,8,10
Midt-Troms ........................ 76 5 0,6,7,10,12
Tromsø ............................. 77 6 0,2,7,8,9,11
Alta ................................... 81 3 3,9,12
Hammerfest ....................... 82 6 0,4,7,8,9,12
Vadsø ............................... 83 5 0,4,9,10,12
The effects are statistically significant at 10% significance level 
 
Finally, the partial adjustment model (Model 9) explicitly estimates the dynamics 
of adjustment of municipality expenditures to their equilibrium values. To facilitate 
convergence of the model’s parameters, a restriction is imposed on the constant 
term α00 in the residual sector’s minimum required expenditure (minimum savings). 
Although this parameter may be given different values, it is set to zero in Model 9. 
 
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) provide a detailed discussion of the meaning and 
expected sign of the parameters in sector 0’s minimum required expenditure α0. In 
KOMMODE and also in the models presented in this paper, α0 is composed of a 
constant term α00 and a change in real exogenous income from the previous year. 
Hence –α0 is the present value of changes in future exogenous income. The 
negative of the constant term -α00 captures the present value of a long-term growth 
trend in exogenous income. Historically this trend is positive in Norway, implying 
that α00 < 0. However, the Local Government Act contains a balanced budget rule 
that prohibits local governments to plan for persistent deficits, although temporary 
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deficits are allowed and observed in practice (Langørgen and Aaberge, 2003). 
Thus, although α00 < 0 may be an accurate description of the local governments’ 
saving behaviour at a point in time, in the long run equilibrium the balanced budget 
rule can be seen to restrict α00 to be non-negative. Since in Model 9 this parameter 
describes the long-run growth trend of the desired/ equilibrium spending uit*, it is 
reasonable for it to be set to zero. Nevertheless, other specifications are possible 
and may be explored in future studies.  
 
The adjusted R-Squared reported in Table 6.7 indicate that explanatory power of 
the model is fairly low, and hence conclusions should be drawn with care. It may 
be possible to improve the fit of the model by introducing municipality or region 
fixed effects in the desired expenditure. This is left to future work. The speed of 
adjustment parameter λ is estimated to be 0.16911, which implies a fairly slow 
adjustment to the equilibrium allocation. The effects on the equilibrium minimum 
required expenditures and marginal budget shares are reported in Tables 6.11 – 
6.23. Time effects are found in Table 6.10. 
 
6.2.1. Effects on minimum required expenditures 
Time effects estimated in models 2, 8 and 9 are reported in Tables 6.8 – 6.10. The 
marginal effects on the minimum required expenditures for the base year 2008, 
when the time effect is normalised to 1, are reported in Tables 6.11 – 6.23. The 
marginal effects on the minimum required expenditures for the years 2001 – 2007 
may be calculated by multiplying the 2008 parameter values found in Tables 6.11 – 
6.23 by the time effect in the corresponding year found in Tables 6.8 – 6.10. All 
estimate values are in 1000s Norwegian kroner (except in Tables 6.8 – 6.10) and all 
values in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute value. 
Table 6.8. Time effects in the time effect model (Model 2) 
Service sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0. Net operating result ....................... 0.605 0.881 1.006 0.682 0.550 0.958 0.498
 (9.20) (13.42) (10.37) (9.11) (7.61) (11.33) (9.08)
1. Administration  .............................. 0.506 0.371 0.522 0.587 0.594 0.558 0.728
 (19.41) (14.55) (19.95) (26.53) (28.59) (27.29) (36.40)
2. Primary schools  ............................ 0.640 0.689 0.732 0.754 0.785 0.811 0.888
 (58.90) (69.05) (67.17) (78.81) (86.87) (93.00) (96.96)
3. Other education ............................. 0.675 0.751 0.759 0.802 0.816 0.792 0.876
 (28.52) (33.04) (33.57) (36.98) (39.18) (35.67) (38.69)
4. Child care ..................................... 0.237 0.306 0.358 0.456 0.518 0.640 0.805
 (21.07) (27.40) (27.82) (39.85) (46.13) (66.33) (77.60)
5. Health care   0.416 0.513 0.560 0.628 0.644 0.604 0.755
 (13.28) (17.21) (18.21) (22.61) (26.05) (24.60) (31.17)
6. Social services .............................. 0.619 0.631 0.630 0.635 0.706 0.767 0.846
 (35.77) (40.75) (40.46) (41.44) (43.98) (44.34) (47.76)
7. Child protection ............................. 0.529 0.590 0.598 0.660 0.703 0.747 0.857
 (21.19) (23.83) (24.68) (30.40) (33.76) (36.22) (42.13)
8. Care for the elderly and disabled ..... 0.526 0.610 0.633 0.690 0.711 0.758 0.849
 (38.22) (48.36) (47.42) (58.60) (65.87) (75.25) (84.31)
9. Culture ......................................... 0.405 0.497 0.462 0.577 0.585 0.436 0.658
 (7.01) (9.44) (7.67) (11.28) (12.41) (8.72) (13.11)
10. Municipal roads ........................... 0.545 0.608 0.581 0.660 0.710 0.761 0.841
 (18.19) (20.05) (19.58) (23.58) (27.61) (28.68) (35.67)
11. Water supply and sanitation .......... 0.618 0.679 0.684 0.756 0.766 0.759 0.820
 (16.21) (18.65) (19.39) (22.28) (23.80) (23.66) (25.84)
12. Other infrastructure ...................... 0.501 0.560 0.529 0.647 0.629 0.498 0.744
 (8.24) (8.85) (8.23) (11.32) (10.92) (8.76) (13.20)
The 2008 time effects in all service sectors are normalised to 1.  
                                                     
11 The estimate is statistically significant with the t-value = 66.71. 
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Table 6.9. Time effects in the time and region effects model (Model 8) 
Service sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0. Net operating result  ................. 0.594 0.720 0.731 0.698 0.621 0.573 0.654
 (19.94) (23.35) (22.80) (22.88) (19.37) (15.35) (22.48)
1. Administration  ........................ 0.633 0.442 0.639 0.656 0.667 0.699 0.809
 (30.74) (20.46) (37.69) (36.80) (38.68) (37.39) (48.11)
2. Primary schools  ...................... 0.684 0.731 0.782 0.787 0.822 0.871 0.924
 (80.19) (89.89) (99.67) (101.60) (109.23) (120.77) (140.11)
3. Other education ....................... 0.770 0.859 0.870 0.894 0.905 0.894 0.941
 (23.53) (25.61) (26.67) (27.51) (28.66) (30.92) (32.90)
4. Child care ............................... 0.184 0.258 0.322 0.419 0.495 0.669 0.825
 (12.69) (18.69) (23.18) (33.51) (42.25) (71.74) (93.31)
5. Health care ............................. 0.500 0.604 0.680 0.695 0.724 0.766 0.853
 (16.08) (21.97) (25.65) (27.25) (29.17) (32.61) (41.17)
6. Social services ........................ 0.666 0.669 0.665 0.659 0.735 0.816 0.878
 (29.69) (31.67) (29.80) (30.45) (32.03) (37.61) (42.09)
7. Child protection ....................... 0.546 0.605 0.629 0.681 0.733 0.803 0.887
 (18.89) (21.90) (22.52) (27.61) (30.71) (33.95) (38.04)
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 0.552 0.640 0.673 0.713 0.737 0.817 0.880
 (45.30) (58.97) (63.47) (68.94) (76.78) (86.24) (100.31)
9. Culture ................................... 0.512 0.614 0.637 0.674 0.645 0.662 0.801
 (6.41) (7.82) (8.72) (9.40) (8.74) (9.20) (12.37)
10. Municipal roads ..................... 0.652 0.706 0.700 0.743 0.809 0.936 0.948
 (16.19) (19.75) (20.10) (23.22) (23.90) (24.30) (32.29)
11. Water supply and sanitation .... 0.686 0.754 0.780 0.823 0.846 0.904 0.896
 (18.30) (21.76) (21.50) (23.05) (23.52) (26.20) (27.94)
12. Other infrastructure ................ 0.735 0.791 0.895 0.753 0.887 0.804 0.832
 (10.19) (10.52) (10.80) (9.58) (10.81) (9.02) (10.31)
The 2008 time effects in all service sectors are normalised to 1.  
Table 6.10. Time effects in the partial adjustment model (Model 9) 
Service sector 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0. Net operating result  ................. 0.648 0.870 0.761 1.092 1.166 0.702
 (9.21) (7.09) (7.91) (9.57) (11.17) (7.68)
1. Administration  ........................ -0.009 0.687 0.380 0.413 0.558 0.784
 (0.33) (23.51) (14.03) (14.97) (15.27) (28.48)
2. Primary schools  ...................... 0.664 0.636 0.534 0.656 0.713 0.871
 (25.01) (26.43) (21.39) (24.85) (25.14) (35.21)
3. Other education ....................... 0.878 0.535 0.600 0.629 0.519 0.872
 (16.31) (12.63) (12.74) (16.57) (11.58) (17.31)
4. Child care ............................... 0.395 0.357 0.481 0.475 0.760 0.870
 (19.09) (21.49) (24.24) (26.09) (47.09) (54.15)
5. Health care ............................. 0.572 0.482 0.433 0.498 0.634 0.799
 (19.52) (17.98) (15.14) (17.40) (18.81) (26.14)
6. Social services ........................ 0.674 0.587 0.375 0.641 0.402 0.552
 (16.90) (15.45) (11.96) (18.18) (10.33) (13.17)
7. Child protection ....................... 0.528 0.455 0.555 0.598 0.666 0.851
 (10.92) (9.63) (12.65) (13.48) (17.86) (20.89)
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 0.613 0.432 0.528 0.524 0.707 0.812
 (28.00) (20.92) (22.34) (24.39) (30.95) (38.06)
9. Culture ................................... 0.545 0.401 0.459 0.554 0.728 0.861
 (12.13) (9.91) (10.27) (12.37) (13.92) (20.48)
10. Municipal roads ..................... 0.650 0.435 0.640 0.669 0.960 1.039
 (10.58) (7.58) (10.96) (11.94) (15.70) (20.13)
11. Water supply and sanitation .... 0.571 0.451 0.546 0.561 0.712 0.693
 (12.19) (10.61) (11.07) (11.29) (14.14) (16.05)
12. Other infrastructure ................ 0.676 0.576 0.699 0.700 0.958 1.202
 (7.80) (6.17) (8.63) (8.40) (11.14) (12.27)
The 2008 time effects in all service sectors are normalised to 1. Time effects in 2001 are 0 as this year is effectively 
removed from estimation since lagged expenditure and income are not defined in 2001. 
 
Most of the time effects are increasing as expected from 2001 to 2008. When a 
decrease in the time effect is observed, it may occur in different years in models 2 
and 8. The decreases in time effects that are common to both models are: a small 
decrease in 2002 in the administration sector and a decrease in the other education 
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sector in 2006, implying that the effects on the minimum required expenditures are 
smaller in these years. The culture sector exhibits decreasing time effects in 2005 
(Model 8) and in 2003 and 2006 (Model 2). The other infrastructure sector shows a 
small decrease in 2006. The partial adjustment model shows decreasing time 
effects in the primary schools sector for the years 2002 – 2004. The increase in the 
primary schools minimum required expenditures from 2005 onwards could be a 
result of education policies of the newly elected central government, Stoltenberg 
II12, which came into power in October 2005. The time effects are increasing in the 
child care sector and also increasing from 2006 in the care for the elderly and 
disabled sector. Other infrastructure and municipal roads sectors have higher time 
effects in 2007 than in 2008.  
 
The estimated marginal effects on minimum required expenditures are mostly 
reasonable. However, time effects in Model 2 appear to indicate a decrease in 
minimum fiscal surplus for the years 2004 to 2005 and in 2007. Model 8 shows 
decreasing time effects from 2004 to 2006. These results are unexpected and 
warrant further investigation. One possibility is that interactive time effects are not 
a good description of the dynamics in this sector. Some dynamic adjustment may 
be present in the net operating result, meaning that there may be some residual 
effects from the year before on the current year’s net operating result. If this is 
indeed the case, then the time effect for a specific year may be capturing some 
effects from the years before. The partial adjustment model (Model 9) shows that 
the speed of adjustment of the sector expenditures to their respective desired values 
is indeed relatively small (0.169), suggesting a fairly slow adjustment. However, 
another possible explanation for the decrease in minimum savings is a change in 
municipalities’ expectations. As the Stoltenberg II government came into power in 
Norway in 2005, municipality incomes saw a substantial increase and it is 
reasonable to suppose that the municipalities expected further income increases in 
the future, leading to higher spending on service provision and lower savings13. 
This is confirmed by the fact that growth in incomes has a positive and significant 
effect on the minimum savings in all models estimated; anticipating higher 
incomes in the future, municipalities can decrease their savings in the current 
period, knowing that they will be able to finance higher savings in the future.  
 
The effect of income growth on equilibrium savings is 5.014 in the partial 
adjustment model, implying that a 1 kroner increase in real income will increase 
savings by 5.014 kroners in the long-run. However, the short-run effect, 
comparable to the static models, is 0.847 (5.014 multiplied by the adjustment 
coefficient 0.169). That is each year municipalities allocate 84.7% of additional 
income to savings (a surprisingly large percentage), with the long-run equilibrium 
reached after approximately 6 years14.  
 
                                                     
12 Stoltenberg II, or Stoltenberg’s Second Cabinet, is the current government of Norway appointed on 
17 October 2005. It is a coalition between the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Centre 
Party. Stoltenberg I was the first cabinet of Jens Stoltenberg, which was in power from 2000 to 2001. 
13 An increase of NOK 5.4 billion in non-earmarked funds provided to municipalities in 2006 was 
promised by Jens Stoltenberg during his inaugural address (19 October 2005). 
14 The number of time periods it takes to reach equilibrium is given by the inverse of the speed of 
adjustment (1/0.169) since the adjustment is implicitly assumed to be uniform. Actual spending is 
assumed to approach the long-run equilibrium asymptotically, closing the gap by a fixed percentage 
(16.9%) each period. 
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Table 6.11. Sector 0  Net budget surplus: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index  Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ..................... -0.977 -1.841 - -11.839 -3.549 0.000
  - - - - (8.47) -
Growth in municipality 
incomes ....................... 0.533 0.595 0.516 0.553 0.567 5.014
 (29.33) (20.09) (20.23) (24.59) (17.30) (11.04)
 
In the administration sector, both the inverse population size and the index of 
farming industry have positive and significant effects on the minimum required 
expenditure. Minimum required expenditure on administration is higher for smaller 
municipalities, as  they use a larger share of resources on administration, 
suggesting that economies of scale play a significant role in this sector. The 
minimum required expenditures are increasing over time as expected, with the 
exception of a decrease in 2002. Both the effect of the inverse population size and 
index of farming industry are higher in model 2 and 8 than in the baseline model, 
suggesting that the baseline model underestimates these effects due to unobserved 
time variation in the minimum required expenditure. However, when compared to 
the cross-sectional estimates15 for the year 2008, the baseline model estimates are 
lower. The cross-sectional estimates of the effect of inverse population size and 
index of farming industry are 4.43 and 4.88 respectively.  
Table 6.12. Sector 1  Administration: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baseline model
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region 
effects ........................... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ....................... 2.058 1.968 - -5.099 1.253 6.080
 (31.47) (17.99) - (1.25) (5.84) (16.37)
Inverse population size ... 4.102 5.255 4.603 4.589 5.073 8.172
 (34.31) (44.93) (2.08) (30.77) (34.82) (18.70)
Index of farming industry . 3.634 4.997 -18.133 3.650 5.772 15.493
 (5.46) (6.35) (1.49) (3.60) (4.82) (6.91)
 
Primary schools are compulsory for children 6 – 15 years of age. Population shares 
of children of the primary school-going age have a positive and significant effect 
on the minimum required expenditure on primary schools, implying that service 
provision increases as a function of the number of children in this age group. 
Children aged 6 – 12 years receive less services than children aged 13 – 15 years. 
This difference is due to the fact that the latter group faces more extensive and 
demanding lessons, which requires teachers with higher qualifications. Table 6.13 
shows that the estimate of the effect of population share of 6 – 12 year old children 
is in fact lower than that of the 13 – 15 year olds. This difference is most 
pronounced in the model with both time and regional effects. Compared to the 
cross-sectional estimates, the baseline, time effects and time and regional effects 
models predict a smaller effect of the 6 – 12 year olds, but the effect of the 13 – 15 
year old children is larger than the cross-sectional estimate. 
 
                                                     
15 The latest cross-sectional estimates are presented in Langørgen et al. (forthcoming). All 
comparisons between cross-sectional estimates and those of the panel data models are based on the 
base year 2008, unless otherwise stated. 
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An extra kilometer to the municipal subdistrict increases the minimum required 
expenditure due to the fact that municipalities that are further from the district 
centre are more likely to have more schools locally (a decentralised school 
structure with relatively few pupils per school and small class sizes) so that pupils 
are not forced to travel long distances to school. The increase is NOK 1346 in the 
baseline model, marginally higher at NOK 1365 in the time effects model and only 
NOK 991 in the time and region effect model. The relatively lower effect of 
distance to centre of municipal subdistrict in models 7 and 8 may suggest that 
region effects are correlated with the distance variable and therefore account for 
some of the distance effect. Again economies of scale are present in this sector 
since class sizes are in general smaller in smaller municipalities, implying more 
teachers per student and therefore higher costs. Minimum required expenditures are 
increasing from 2001 to 2008 as expected. The effects of the inverse population 
size are only marginally higher in models 1, 2 and 8 than in the cross-sectional 
estimation. However, the effect of the 13 – 15 year old children is higher in all 
three models than the cross-sectional estimates, suggesting that the panel data 
models are able to capture more variation between these two effects.  
Table 6.13. Sector 2  Primary schools: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ........................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects ... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ....... Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ............................... 0.348 -0.676 - -5.777 -0.407 1.270
 (1.61) (2.69) - (1.75) (1.04) (1.40)
Population 6-12 years of age ... 52.391 50.451 30.324 54.294 44.327 82.177
 (22.92) (21.19) (9.65) (18.31) (14.58) (8.87)
Population 13-15 years of age . 64.720 86.446 19.465 68.390 78.142 67.213
 (14.84) (19.75) (5.98) (12.88) (15.01) (4.01)
Distance to centre of municipal 
sub-district ............................. 1.346 1.365 0.114 1.030 0.991 1.297
 (30.48) (31.95) (0.57) (16.24) (14.99) (8.19)
Inverse population size ........... 2.395 2.461 4.435 2.414 2.205 3.712
 (19.63) (23.06) (3.93) (16.01) (15.97) (11.44)
 
The service sector other education includes day care facilities for schoolchildren, 
music schools, special schools and adult education. Except for adult education, the 
relevant group that benefits from other education is the age group 6 – 15 years. 
Adult education is particularly directed toward recently domiciled refugees in the 
age group 20 – 59 years. Recently domiciled refugees include refugees who have 
resided in Norway less than five years. 
 
Table 6.14 shows that the minimum required expenditure for other education is 
positively and significantly affected by the number of full-time working women 
and refugees with integration grants. Both effects are increasing from 2001 to 
2008. In the time effects model an extra full-time working woman in the 
municipality’s population increases the minimum expenditure in the other 
education service sector by NOK 5680 in 2008. In the cross-sectional model this 
effect is significantly smaller: NOK 3570; and only slightly smaller in the time and 
regional effects model. The cross-sectional effect of the share of refugees is also 
smaller than in models 1, 2 and 7 (an additional refugee increases minimum 
required expenditure on other education by NOK 3237). 
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Table 6.14. Sector 3  Other education: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region 
effects ........................... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ....................... 0.478 0.445 - -0.677 0.306 0.762
 (10.44) (9.34) - (1.02) (3.35) (5.03)
Full-time working women 
20-44 years ................... 5.983 5.680 -0.889 5.213 5.276 7.261
 (9.14) (8.67) (0.75) (5.22) (5.37) (3.22)
Refugees with integration 
grants  ........................... 38.131 35.992 17.773 38.318 30.745 51.658
 (27.60) (21.97) (10.69) (19.34) (13.04) (10.15)
 
In the child care sector the service provision increases in the population share of 
children in pre-school age (1 – 5 years) but only in the models where time effects 
are included. The time effects model predicts that an extra child of age 1 – 5 years 
will increase the child care minimum expenditure by NOK 57137 in 2008, while in 
2001 the increase is a much smaller one of NOK 13541 (calculated by multiplying 
57137 by the 2001 time effect found in Table 6.12). The effects are NOK 58154 in 
2008 and NOK 10700 (calculated by multiplying 58154 by the 2001 time effect 
found in Table 6.9) in 2001 when both time and region effects are included. The 
cross-sectional estimate is a marginal increase of NOK 60310 in 2008 and NOK 
13880 in 2001. Thus, there is a large increase from 2001 to 2008 in the minimum 
required expenditures in the child care sector. This is suggestive of an increased 
priority placed on the child care sector during these 8 years. Model 1, 6 and 7 have 
poor explanatory power for this sector as both predict a negative (albeit not 
significant in Model 1) marginal effect of the population share of small children. 
Although all three models account for income growth, and models 6 and 7 account 
for municipality effects, they fails to explain the time effects, which seem to be 
important for this sector. Full-time working young women have a positive 
significant effect on the minimum child care expenditure since they are likely to 
require more child care such as kindergarten places for their children. 
Table 6.15. Sector 4  Child care: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region 
effects ........................... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ....................... 1.374 -1.331 - -1.236 -1.914 -0.239
 (9.25) (11.53) - (0.80) (9.30) (0.71)
Population 1-5 years of 
age ............................... -2.750 57.137 -14.335 -7.621 58.154 94.687
 (1.17) (31.03) (4.58) (2.43) (20.91) (13.64)
Full-time working women 
20-44 years ................... 25.818 29.149 20.317 28.678 28.197 26.022
 (19.12) (24.41) (11.62) (13.74) (14.23) (6.16)
 
Diseconomies of scale are present in the health sector as both the effect of the 
distance to the centre of municipal sub-district and the inverse population size have 
positive effects on the minimum required expenditure; that is the more dispersed 
the municipality’s settlement pattern and the smaller the population, the larger the 
minimum required expenditure on health care. A possible explanation is that 
patients in primary health care are entitled to have a physician within reasonable 
travelling distance, which increases the cost of providing health care in smaller 
municipalities. Similarly, to maintain a basic capacity of primary physicians in 
smaller municipalities the physician-patient ratio becomes relatively large, which 
increases the unit cost. The time effect as well as the time and regional effect 
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models provide smaller estimates of economies of scale than does cross-sectional 
estimation, indicating that the latter may be capturing additional effects of 
unobserved time heterogeneity, which is accounted for in models 2 and 8 through 
time effects.  
Table 6.16. Sector 5 Health care: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region 
effects ........................... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ....................... 1.076 1.023 - -1.906 0.770 2.855
 (27.60) (17.39) - (1.09) (6.52) (16.98)
Distance to centre of 
municipal sub-district ...... 0.230 0.269 0.019 0.123 0.104 0.403
 (8.40) (8.05) (0.26) (3.26) (2.20) (4.81)
Inverse population size ... 1.508 1.841 3.858 1.454 1.514 3.222
 (22.29) (27.67) (7.96) (18.91) (16.44) (18.17)
 
A large share of spending in the social assistance sector is cash transfers to support 
families with insufficient means from other sources of income. The sector also 
includes in-kind bennefits that aim to prevent alcohol and drugs abuse and other 
social problems. The potential recipients are either poor, unemployed, refugees or 
divorced/separated, or possess different combinations of those characteristics.  
 
The number of refugees both with and without integration grants have a significant 
and positive effect on minimum social assistance expenditure. As expected, a 
refugee who has lived in Norway for less than 5 years and for whom, therefore, the 
central government will pay an integration grant to the municipality, increases the 
minimum required expenditure by a larger amount (NOK 62154 in the time effect 
model and NOK 56033 in the time and region effect model) than a refugee without 
a grant (NOK 11038 and NOK 11129 respectively). This is a reasonable result 
since the refugees qualifying for an integration grant are likely to require more 
social assistance from the local government. This difference is even more 
pronounced in the cross-sectional estimates. Other target groups of social 
assistance, such as the divorced and separated, unemployed, poor and disablement 
pensioners all have significant positive effects on the minimum required 
expenditure in this sector, with the unemployed having a relatively larger effect, 
and the poor relatively smaller. In models 7 and 8, however, disablement 
pensioners have a relatively small effect, which is not statistically significant. Thus, 
when the regional variation is taken into account, the share of disablement 
pensioners appears to be less important for determining minimum required 
expenditure in social assistance.  
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Table 6.17. Sector 6  Social assistance: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference 
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustme
nt
Time effects ...................................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects .............. No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index .................. Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  .......................................... -0.325 -0.503 - -1.181 -0.718 -0.606
 (5.23) (7.28) - (2.68) (4.84) (2.43)
Refugees with integration grants  ........ 54.507 62.154 24.131 53.241 56.033 92.381
 (32.91) (30.40) (11.96) (23.88) (19.44) (10.64)
Refugees without integration grants  ... 10.791 11.038 65.349 12.870 11.129 9.494
 (8.04) (7.63) (2.22) (7.63) (6.49) (1.66)
Divorced/ separated 16-59 years ........ 10.567 11.955 1.227 13.048 13.486 22.284
 (11.66) (11.91) (0.59) (8.49) (8.09) (5.86)
Unemployed 16-59 years ................... 18.421 25.922 13.689 19.542 28.412 33.785
 (11.22) (10.74) (8.56) (8.80) (7.48) (4.57)
Number of poor ................................. 7.037 8.192 3.220 5.210 5.985 7.715
 (6.78) (7.18) (3.99) (3.96) (4.03) (1.78)
Disablement pensioners 18-49 years ... 10.968 13.303 -6.776 3.187 4.817 5.494
 (6.46) (6.87) (1.80) (1.01) (1.38) (0.71)
 
The child protection sector includes investigation of alleged child abuse, orphan 
homes, foster care, adoption services, and services aimed at supporting at-risk 
families so they can remain intact. Children less than 16 years of age are the 
primary target group for child protection. As expected children with a single parent 
have a positive marginal effect on the minimum expenditure, as do the poor. The 
models with time effects estimate that both effects are increasing over time. In 
contrast and somewhat surprisingly, cross-sectional estimations show a decrease in 
the marginal effect of share of children with a single parent, from 2007 to 2008. 
The downward bias in the 2008 estimate may be a consequence of unobserved time 
heterogeneity, which is taken into account by including time effects in the panel 
data models. Similarly, the share of poor estimate is much lower in the region 
effects model (Model 7), albeit not significant. It is also relatively low in model 8, 
and significant, suggesting that regional variation is accounting for what was 
previously supposed to be the effect of the poor on minimum expenditure in this 
sector.  
Table 6.18. Sector 7 Child protection: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects .................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region 
effects ............................ No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ........................ 0.312 0.291 - -0.133 0.476 0.935
 (7.75) (6.23) - (0.34) (4.90) (5.97)
Children 0-15 years with 
single mother/ father ........ 15.988 17.358 4.506 17.317 17.840 21.412
 (14.76) (13.12) (2.53) (10.02) (8.59) (6.05)
Number of poor ............... 5.472 7.053 -0.773 1.787 2.521 6.996
 (7.57) (8.62) (1.29) (1.90) (2.20) (2.45)
 
Care for the elderly and disabled includes nursing homes, ambulant nurses and 
home care. Since elderly people have a higher probability of becoming recipients 
of long-term care, spending needs are higher for the elderly than for younger 
people. Subsistence output is increasing with age, and is highest for the elderly 90 
years and above, with an additional person over the age of 90 increasing minimum 
expenditure by NOK 170567 in 2008 in the time and region effects model, while 
the increase for a marginal person of 67 – 79 years is significantly smaller (NOK 
41659). However, the group of mentally disabled, which by and large is a subgroup 
of the age group 0 – 66 years, is included to account for the additional cost from 
being mentally disabled. The cost is higher for those mentally disabled persons 
with intergovernmental grants than without; with model 8 showing the greatest 
variation between the effects of mentally disabled with and without grants. High 
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cost recipients have a very large effect in panel data and cross-sectional models. 
More dispersed municipalities and smaller municipalities face larger minimum 
required expenditure in this sector (diseconomies of scale are present). This effect, 
however, is smaller than in the cross-sectional model. 
Table 6.19. Sector 8  Care for the elderly and disabled: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ........................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects ... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ........ Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ............................... 2.545 1.615 - -9.911 0.302 7.059
 (12.85) (5.55) - (1.51) (0.68) (6.98)
Population 67-79 years of age . 32.120 43.453 30.424 38.273 41.659 74.510
 (10.78) (12.64) (5.35) (9.31) (8.77) (7.75)
Population 80-89 years of age . 65.407 69.540 23.296 62.307 67.917 55.329
 (13.39) (12.98) (2.73) (9.55) (9.22) (3.48)
Population 90 years and above. 182.429 179.428 75.810 179.381 170.567 236.207
 (13.18) (12.23) (5.15) (9.42) (7.74) (5.27)
High-cost recipients ................ 692.089 768.367 400.545 677.446 685.275 1 293.278
 (13.52) (15.85) (7.81) (10.27) (10.50) (8.37)
Mentally disabled 16 years and 
above without grant ................ 196.699 219.148 15.133 166.918 163.363 339.278
 (10.96) (12.01) (0.67) (6.59) (5.89) (5.66)
Mentally disabled 16 years and 
above with grant ..................... 547.640 618.183 -115.539 571.485 634.630 518.110
 (18.15) (17.94) (0.32) (12.13) (11.74) (4.82)
Distance to centre of municipal 
sub-district ............................. 0.429 0.542 0.295 0.277 0.245 1.400
 (5.09) (5.76) (0.95) (2.26) (1.63) (5.07)
Inverse population size ........... 2.096 1.990 7.799 2.314 1.894 3.313
 (10.99) (10.01) (4.19) (9.02) (6.75) (5.11)
 
The culture sector includes sports, arts, museums, libraries, cinemas and churches. 
According to the time effects model the minimum required expenditures in this 
sector have been increasing over the years 2001 – 2002 and 2004 – 2005, 
decreasing in 2006 and increasing again in 2007. The relatively smaller effect in 
2006 is also found in the cross-sectional estimation. However, when region effects 
are also included, a decrease in minimum required expenditure is observed from 
2004 to 2006, with an increase in 2007. Both models therefore seem to indicate that 
the sector was prioritised starting in 2007. Evidence of economies of scale is also 
found in this sector, with an additional person decreasing the unit costs of 
providing cultural services.  
Table 6.20. Sector 9  Culture: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ........................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects ... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ....... Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  ............................... 0.925 0.877 - -3.649 0.115 2.917
 (27.98) (16.63) - (1.47) (0.81) (17.97)
Inverse population size ........... 0.383 0.473 -0.004 0.410 0.455 0.793
 (7.71) (9.72) (0.01) (5.91) (6.59) (5.11)
 
The minimum expenditure on municipal roads is increasing with the amount of 
snowfall due to the costs linked to the snow clearing and road maintenance, and is 
also positively related to the length of municipal roads. All the models estimated, 
with the exception of the first-difference model, provide estimates that are similar 
in magnitude.  
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Table 6.21. Sector 10  Municipal roads: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ........................... No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects ... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ....... Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant ............................... 0.115 0.012 - -1.145 -0.070 0.289
 (5.99) (0.45) - (1.58) (1.51) (3.22)
Amount of snowfall ................. 0.079 0.088 0.023 0.053 0.056 0.130
 (16.57) (15.86) (6.12) (7.93) (7.76) (6.72)
Kilometers of municipal roads .. 21.130 24.238 -6.157 22.732 22.373 31.334
 (32.13) (31.24) (1.38) (24.98) (21.17) (13.79)
 
The water supply and sanitation minimum required expenditure is positively 
affected by the capacity for advanced purification and is subject to diseconomies of 
scale (smaller municipalities have higher minimum expenditures in this sector). 
Advanced purification refers to purification using chemical or biological methods, 
or a combination of the two.  
 
Both effects are lower in the time effects model than in cross-sectional estimations, 
and lower still in the model with both time and region effects. The minimum 
expenditures appear to be increasing over time. 
Table 6.22. Sector 11  Water supply and sanitation: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference 
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustmen
t
Time effects ................................ No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects ........ No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ............ Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  .................................... 1.264 1.100 - -0.642 1.098 2.452
 (28.88) (20.83) - (0.53) (9.40) (11.77)
Capacity of advanced purification .. 0.580 0.642 0.039 0.243 0.241 0.870
 (16.58) (15.99) (0.62) (3.62) (3.64) (6.91)
Inverse population size ................ 0.191 0.248 1.124 0.193 0.012 0.769
 (2.29) (3.11) (1.16) (1.90) (0.11) (3.40)
 
The other infrastructure sector includes residential and commercial infrastructure, 
land-use planning, environmental management and fire protection. Larger 
municipalities have smaller minimum expenditures in this sector as a significant 
positive effect of inverse population size indicates evidence of economies of scale. 
This effect is relatively larger in the models with time effects than the cross-
sectional estimates. The first-difference model has a large downward bias 
predicting a significant negative effect of inverse population size. 
Table 6.23. Sector 12  Other infrastructure: effects on minimum required expenditure 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference 
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjust-
ment
Time effects ................................ No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects ........ No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ............ Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant  .................................... 1.526 1.356 - -7.264 -0.079 3.335
 (22.60) (13.44) - (1.52) (0.36) (10.22)
Inverse population size ................ 1.037 1.112 -2.824 1.155 1.077 1.441
 (8.31) (9.45) (2.06) (7.36) (6.83) (5.32)
6.2.2. Effects on marginal budget shares 
The marginal budget shares are posited to depend on three factors common to all 
sectors: average education level, share of socialist politicians in the municipal 
government, and the share of residents in the densely populated areas.  
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Average education is found to have a positive effect on the budget shares of other 
education, child care, social services, child protection, culture, other infrastructure 
and net operating result (saving). The effect is negative for primary schools. This is 
surprising as one expects municipalities with higher average education level to 
prioritise education. This is indeed the case for other education with a positive 
marginal budget share in this sector in all model versions. The partial adjustment 
model gives the opposite prediction: the effect on the primary schools marginal 
budget share is positive, and negative for other education. Neither of these is 
significant, however. The effect is also negative for the administration sector, 
indicating that this sector is under-prioritised in municipalities with higher average 
level of education. These conclusions are consistent with those based on the cross-
sectional estimation. This is expected as marginal budget shares are assumed to be 
constant over time; and the time effects on the marginal budget share parameters in 
Model 3 are found to be mostly insignificant with the exception of the child care 
service sector.  
Table 6.24. Effects of the average education level on the marginal budget shares 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ............................ No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects .... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ........ Yes No Yes Yes No No
Administration ......................... -0.048 -0.039 0.050 -0.005 -0.016 -0.000
 (14.64) (13.31) (2.38) (1.99) (5.67) (0.03)
Primary schools ...................... -0.032 -0.012 0.048 -0.008 -0.006 0.012
 (10.33) (4.56) (3.42) (2.02) (1.96) (1.27)
Other education ...................... 0.010 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.004
 (6.86) (8.78) (0.69) (1.94) (7.75) (1.24)
Child care ............................... 0.047 0.011 -0.001 0.012 0.008 -0.011
 (13.67) (6.03) (0.12) (2.09) (5.22) (2.03)
Health care ............................. -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.005
 (4.65) (4.52) (0.20) (0.63) (2.36) (0.93)
Social services ........................ 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.007 -0.003
 (5.17) (6.32) (0.81) (1.67) (4.99) (0.77)
Child protection ....................... 0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.004
 (2.44) (1.48) (0.70) (0.13) (0.29) (0.94)
Care for the elderly and 
disabled ................................. -0.032 -0.029 0.010 -0.002 -0.013 0.022
 (5.54) (5.17) (0.43) (0.95) (2.59) (1.38)
Culture ................................... 0.008 0.009 0.017 -0.000 0.005 -0.007
 (5.18) (6.29) (2.42) (0.63) (4.04) (1.46)
Municipal roads ....................... -0.002 -0.001 -0.010 -0.000 0.000 -0.002
 (2.81) (1.57) (2.19) (0.49) (0.46) (0.78)
Water supply and sanitation ..... -0.006 -0.000 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002 0.007
 (1.99) (0.09) (2.63) (1.41) (0.99) (1.16)
Other infrastructure ................. 0.025 0.024 0.055 -0.001 0.006 0.004
 (7.37) (7.78) (2.68) (1.01) (1.90) (0.29)
Net operating surplus ............... 0.025 0.024 -0.147 0.002 0.004 -0.026
 
In agreement with Borge (1995) we expect the socialist parties to prefer a larger 
local public sector, which would imply a lower share of income allocated to 
savings. This is indeed the case in models 1, 2 and 8 where the effect of the 
socialist share on the marginal budget share of net operating surplus is negative. 
The effect is also negative in the primary schools sector, child care, culture, 
municipal roads and water supply and sanitation. However the effects on primary 
schools and culture are not statistically significant at 5% significance level. The 
effect on health care is positive in the baseline and time effects models but 
becomes negative when region effects are introduced. The effect on the care for the 
elderly and disables is relatively large and significant in all models except model 9, 
implying that the socialist parties place a high priority on care for the elderly. 
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Table 6.25. Effects of the socialist share on the marginal budget shares 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference 
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ................................. No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects ......... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ............. Yes No Yes Yes No No
Administration .............................. 0.007 0.004 -0.029 0.001 0.004 0.016
 (0.95) (0.66) (0.58) (0.21) (0.54) (0.61)
Primary schools ........................... -0.016 -0.006 0.042 -0.001 -0.011 0.004
 (2.05) (0.97) (1.41) (0.49) (1.64) (0.17)
Other education ........................... 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.012
 (1.49) (2.24) (0.16) (1.39) (1.77) (1.33)
Child care .................................... -0.021 -0.011 0.112 -0.007 -0.014 0.040
 (2.25) (3.11) (3.81) (1.69) (3.32) (3.07)
Health care .................................. 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.017 -0.020
 (0.75) (0.40) (0.26) (1.68) (4.19) (1.90)
Social services ............................. 0.022 0.018 0.039 -0.001 -0.001 -0.021
 (5.16) (5.62) (2.10) (0.86) (0.13) (1.87)
Child protection ............................ 0.004 0.002 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.002
 (1.26) (0.78) (1.35) (0.58) (0.39) (0.26)
Care for the elderly and disabled ... 0.029 0.012 0.197 0.007 0.025 -0.023
 (2.16) (1.12) (3.80) (1.32) (2.17) (0.60)
Culture ........................................ -0.003 -0.003 0.041 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011
 (0.72) (0.83) (2.42) (0.89) (0.13) (0.84)
Municipal roads ............................ -0.008 -0.007 -0.019 0.001 0.000 -0.009
 (4.13) (4.09) (1.65) (1.39) (0.26) (1.15)
Water supply and sanitation .......... -0.032 -0.024 -0.036 -0.005 -0.013 -0.009
 (4.46) (4.31) (1.47) (1.65) (2.13) (0.58)
Other infrastructure ...................... 0.040 0.031 0.118 0.004 0.028 0.018
 (5.79) (5.09) (2.14) (1.26) (4.41) (0.51)
Net operating surplus .................... -0.031 -0.025 -0.487 0.005 -0.008 0.000
 
Densely populated municipalities appear to prioritise other education, social 
services, child protection, culture, municipal roads and water supply and sanitation. 
However, administration, primary schools, child care, care for the elderly and 
disabled and other infrastructure receive a smaller priority in densely populated 
areas. Health care appears to be prioritised in densely populated areas when only 
time heterogeneity is assumed. However, in the presence of regional differences, 
health care is seen to be under-prioritised in densely populated areas. 
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Table 6.26. Effects of the share of residents in densely populated areas on the marginal budget 
shares 
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects 
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects ............................ No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects .... No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index ........ Yes No Yes Yes No No
Administration ...................... -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.042
 (2.39) (1.59) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27) (2.17)
Primary schools ................... -0.002 -0.007 -0.032 -0.002 -0.028 -0.008
 (0.39) (1.78) (1.67) (0.82) (5.44) (0.52)
Other education ................... 0.008 0.005 -0.013 0.002 0.001 -0.002
 (2.95) (2.53) (1.33) (1.70) (0.59) (0.32)
Child care ............................. -0.013 -0.008 -0.032 -0.009 -0.001 -0.023
 (2.12) (3.41) (1.56) (1.95) (0.19) (2.67)
Health care ........................... 0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.022
 (1.59) (1.06) (0.76) (1.54) (2.05) (3.13)
Social services ..................... 0.010 0.005 -0.025 0.002 0.006 0.013
 (3.48) (2.17) (2.30) (1.49) (2.04) (1.91)
Child protection .................... 0.016 0.014 -0.009 0.003 0.009 0.004
 (7.77) (7.89) (1.00) (1.89) (4.24) (0.63)
Care for the elderly and 
disabled ................................ -0.003 -0.001 -0.187 0.002 -0.006 -0.126
 (0.30) (0.16) (5.42) (0.71) (0.73) (4.66)
Culture .................................. 0.024 0.017 -0.054 0.005 0.013 -0.005
 (8.13) (7.22) (5.57) (1.99) (4.80) (0.70)
Municipal roads .................... 0.012 0.011 -0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.010
 (9.19) (9.57) (0.50) (1.93) (3.51) (2.06)
Water supply and sanitation 0.035 0.026 0.009 0.007 0.013 -0.001
 (7.03) (6.59) (0.60) (1.97) (3.00) (0.10)
Other infrastructure .............. -0.060 -0.049 -0.074 -0.002 -0.011 0.006
 (11.47) (10.98) (2.50) (0.96) (2.23) (0.26)
Net operating surplus ........... -0.018 -0.008 0.435 -0.008 0.007 0.218
 
It may also be of interest to examine the changes over time in the average 
minimum required expenditures and average marginal budget shares. The average 
marginal budget shares are calculated using the parameter estimates from Tables 
6.24 – 6.26 and the intercept parameters not reported here, such that βit is the 
average marginal budget share in sector i and year t given by:  
(6.1) 
βit = 1Kt βi 0 + βij vjktj =1
3

k=1
Kt
 
 
where υ1kt is average education in municipality k in year t, υ2kt is the socialists 
share in municipality k in year t and υ3kt is the share of residents in densely 
populated areas in municipality k in year t. Kt is the number of municipalities in the 
sample for year t.  
 
Table 6.27 summarises the average budget shares based on the time effects Model 
2 estimation. Although the budget shares are relatively stable over time, the 
administration, primary schools, health care and care for the elderly and disabled 
sectors show a slight decrease in their respective budget shares over time. 
However, other education, social assistance, culture and other infrastructure appear 
to have received a higher priority in the later years. Child protection, municipal 
roads and water supply and sanitation have very stable budget shares with no or 
slight change over time. Model 8 gives similar conclusions but with even smaller 
variation in the average budget shares over time. The other infrastructure average 
marginal budget share is almost constant over time in Model 8. 
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Table 6.27. Model 2: average marginal budget shares by year and service sector 
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus ........ 0.145 0.146 0.148 0.149 0.150 0.152 0.153 0.157
Administration .................. 0.142 0.140 0.138 0.135 0.132 0.130 0.127 0.123
Primary schools ............... 0.110 0.109 0.109 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.105 0.104
Other education ............... 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
Child care ........................ 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.056
Health care ...................... 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.062
Social assistance ............. 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013
Child protection ................ 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013
Care for the elderly and 
disabled .......................... 0.200 0.198 0.196 0.195 0.193 0.191 0.189 0.186
Culture ............................ 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.076
Municipal roads ................ 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Water supply and 
sanitation ......................... 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.044
Other infrastructure .......... 0.116 0.117 0.118 0.120 0.122 0.123 0.125 0.126
Number of observations .... 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
Sum ................................ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 6.28. Model 8: average marginal budget shares by year and service sector 
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus .................... 0.207 0.207 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.209 0.209 0.210
Administration .............................. 0.112 0.111 0.110 0.109 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.104
Primary schools ........................... 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.084
Other education ........................... 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
Child care .................................... 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.061
Health care .................................. 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050
Social assistance ......................... 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013
Child protection ............................ 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Care for the elderly and disabled ... 0.192 0.191 0.190 0.190 0.189 0.188 0.187 0.185
Culture ........................................ 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.074
Municipal roads ............................ 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Water supply and sanitation .......... 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
Other infrastructure ...................... 0.130 0.130 0.131 0.131 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132
Number of observations ................ 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
Sum ............................................ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
 
The average minimum required expenditures are calculated using the parameter 
estimates from Tables 6.8 – 6.23 such that in Model 8 α iRt is the average minimum 
required expenditure in sector i, region R and year t given by:  
(6.2) 
α iRt =
1
KRt
α i 0 + α ij zjkt + ρiR
j =1
r

k=1
KRt τ it
  ρi12 = 0  
 
and  in Model 2 the average minimum required expenditure for sector i and year t 
is 
(6.3) 
α it =
1
Kt
α i 0 + α ij zjkt
j =1
r

k=1
Kt τ it
 
 
where zjkt (j=1,...,r) are the variables assumed to affect the minimum required 
expenditures in a particular service sector for municipality k in year t, ρiR is the 
marginal effect of region R compared to region 12 on the minimum required 
expenditure in sector i, KRt is the number of municipalities in region R in year t, Kt 
is the number of municipalities in the sample for year t, and τit is the year t time 
effect on the minimum required expenditure in sector i . 
 
In order to see the changes in the minimum required expenditures in all regions, the 
average minimum required expenditure 

α it  is calculated over all municipalities: 
(6.4) 

α it =
1
Kt
α i 0 + α ij zjkt + ρiR
j =1
r

k=1
Kt τ it
 
 
    ρi12 = 0  
 
where Kt is the total number of municipalities in year t. 
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However, these values are not meaningful, as minimum required expenditures 
exhibit significant regional differences. The average minimum required 
expenditure on other infrastructure is negative for all the years as a result of the 
fact that minimum required expenditures in some regions are higher and some 
lower than the expenditures in the Oslo region. Since the average minimum 
required expenditure on other infrastructure is fairly low in the Oslo region, regions 
that have even lower minimum spending are predicted to have negative spending. 
However, it is the relative and not absolute magnitudes of minimum required 
expenditures between regions that are of interest.  
 
The average minimum required expenditures are increasing over time as a result of 
the significant time effects as well as increasing income, with child care and care 
for the elderly and disabled showing particularly high increases. The average 
minimum required expenditure in the culture service sector has increased 
significantly from 2001 to 2008, as well as from 2007 to 2008 showing an 
increased priority placed on culture.  
Table 6.29. Model 2: average minimum required expenditures by year and service sector 
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus ............. -1.254 -1.573 -1.572 -0.898 -0.642 -0.166 -0.997 -1.442
Administration ........................ 1.876 1.379 1.944 2.204 2.231 2.095 2.742 3.766
Primary schools ..................... 5.948 6.487 6.969 7.221 7.519 7.756 8.417 9.362
Other education ..................... 0.676 0.782 0.795 0.826 0.839 0.803 0.867 0.992
Child care .............................. 1.016 1.306 1.480 1.835 2.051 2.554 3.139 3.976
Health care ............................ 0.718 0.888 0.968 1.087 1.116 1.048 1.308 1.731
Social assistance ................... 0.887 0.987 1.084 1.067 1.143 1.106 1.098 1.243
Child protection ...................... 0.567 0.628 0.660 0.732 0.783 0.835 0.950 1.102
Care for the elderly and 
disabled ................................ 6.743 7.840 8.123 8.905 9.270 9.917 11.287 13.447
Culture .................................. 0.408 0.501 0.466 0.582 0.590 0.439 0.665 1.010
Municipal roads ...................... 0.317 0.354 0.328 0.391 0.394 0.409 0.497 0.606
Water supply and sanitation .... 0.913 1.006 1.011 1.126 1.143 1.127 1.227 1.501
Other infrastructure ................ 0.829 0.929 0.878 1.077 1.047 0.829 1.240 1.667
Number of observations .......... 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
Table 6.30. Model 8 Average minimum required expenditures by year and service sector for the 
Oslo region 
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus ............. -2.136 -2.355 -2.222 -1.997 -1.787 -1.196 -2.181 -2.848
Administration ....................... 1.275 0.888 1.281 1.313 1.332 1.393 1.606 1.974
Primary schools .................... 5.202 5.644 6.131 6.262 6.570 6.936 7.274 7.737
Other education .................... 0.658 0.766 0.790 0.804 0.818 0.816 0.847 0.894
Child care ............................. 0.808 1.124 1.369 1.723 2.010 2.758 3.382 4.174
Health care ........................... 0.495 0.598 0.672 0.686 0.714 0.754 0.839 0.981
Social assistance .................. 0.775 0.896 1.003 0.997 1.080 1.110 1.070 1.152
Child protection ..................... 0.635 0.701 0.737 0.806 0.873 0.960 1.053 1.184
Care for the elderly and 
disabled ............................... 4.605 5.357 5.589 5.960 6.206 6.863 7.476 8.649
Culture ................................. 0.087 0.104 0.108 0.114 0.109 0.111 0.134 0.167
Municipal roads ..................... 0.114 0.141 0.113 0.136 0.103 0.163 0.159 0.201
Water supply and sanitation ... 0.916 1.002 1.025 1.091 1.124 1.211 1.200 1.339
Other infrastructure ............... 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.036 0.042 0.037 0.038 0.044
Number of observations ......... 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
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Table 6.31. Model 8 Average minimum required expenditures by year and service sector 
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus ............ -3.260 -3.748 -3.648 -3.328 -2.869 -2.095 -3.536 -4.868
Administration ...................... 1.656 1.161 1.685 1.741 1.780 1.863 2.165 2.677
Primary schools ................... 5.785 6.258 6.767 6.856 7.161 7.585 7.984 8.534
Other education ................... 0.592 0.689 0.702 0.707 0.715 0.699 0.717 0.765
Child care ............................ 0.641 0.891 1.074 1.346 1.560 2.126 2.547 3.162
Health care .......................... 0.617 0.746 0.841 0.861 0.898 0.951 1.060 1.242
Social assistance ................. 0.821 0.913 1.013 0.981 1.053 1.031 0.988 1.078
Child protection .................... 0.511 0.564 0.602 0.660 0.720 0.795 0.872 0.979
Care for the elderly and 
disabled .............................. 5.833 6.769 7.111 7.581 7.926 8.847 9.690 11.15
Culture ................................ 0.039 0.046 0.048 0.051 0.050 0.054 0.066 0.082
Municipal roads .................... 0.215 0.234 0.224 0.252 0.256 0.289 0.325 0.352
Water supply and sanitation .. 0.776 0.852 0.880 0.932 0.960 1.019 1.013 1.132
Other infrastructure .............. -0.046 -0.048 -0.053 -0.043 -0.049 -0.041 -0.041 -0.049
Number of observations ........ 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
 
Comparing the baseline model (1) with the preferred panel data models (time 
effects and time and region effects models 2, 7, 8), some key differences are 
observed. In the administration sector, the effects on the minimum required 
expenditure are much lower in the baseline model than in the time effects and time 
and region effects models, implying that not including time and/or regional effects 
in the model specification produces estimates that are biased downwards in this 
sector. In the primary schools sector the baseline model predicts a higher effect of 
the 6 – 12 year old children than models with time effects, but underestimates the 
effect of 13 – 15 year olds. Furthermore, the effect of the distance to the district 
centre is much lower in the model with both time and region effects both in this 
sector and in health care, suggesting that the economies of scale are captured by 
region effects when regional heterogeneity is accounted for. Similarly, the effect of 
refugees on the minimum spending on other education is lower in the model with 
time and region effects and highest in the baseline model. This suggests that 
introducing time effects into the model removes some of the upward bias on the 
estimates, and the same is true to an even greater degree for the regional effects. 
The most significant difference between the models is observed in the child care 
sector. The effect of small children is negative and not significant in the baseline 
model, which is in conflict with theoretical expectations. This effect is largest in 
the model with time and regional effects, with the time effects model predicting a 
slightly lower estimate. In fact the effect is only positive in the models where time 
effects are included, suggesting that omitting time effects produces biased results, 
particularly apparent in the child care sector. This is not surprising as we indeed 
expect the minimum required expenditure on child care to be increasing over the 
years, not only due to income growth but also due to policy measures that affect all 
municipalities.  
 
In the social assistance sector the marginal effect of refugees with and without 
integration grants is lower in the baseline model. The baseline model also 
underestimates the effect of the unemployed and the divorced and separated on the 
social assistance minimum spending and the effect of children with a single parent 
on the minimum child protection spending. However, the effect of the poor is 
overestimated by the baseline model both in the social assistance and the child 
protection sectors. The effect of the disablement pensioners is small and not 
significant in the time and region effects model, but higher and significant when 
region effects are not included.  
 
The baseline model underestimates the effect of the 67 – 79 year olds on minimum 
care for the elderly and disabled spending, and overestimates the effect of the share 
of people of age 90 years and above. Thus the difference between the effects of 
these two age groups is inflated in the baseline model. The economies of scale 
effect in culture and effect of road length in the municipal roads sector are also 
lower in the baseline model. The effects of snowfall in the municipal roads sector, 
and purification capacity and inverse population size in the water supply and 
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sanitation sector are lowest in the model with both time and region effects and 
highest in the model with only time effects.  
 
The effects of average education, the composition of the local council and the 
population density are generally lower in the model with time and region effects 
than in the baseline model. The share of socialists has a negative effect on the 
health care and social services marginal budget shares in the time and region 
effects model. The effect is however not significant in the social services sector. 
The health care marginal budget shares are also negative in densely populated areas 
according to the models with region and both time and region effects. A 
particularly surprising result is that the marginal budget share of primary schools 
spending is relatively large and negative in the time and region effect model for 
municipalities with higher average education. The result is surprising since one 
expects that primary education is prioritised by municipalities where the level of 
average education is higher. The model with time and region effects also shows a 
higher savings (net operating result) in densely populated areas, while the effect is 
opposite in the other models. 
 
Finally, the partial adjustment model yields some interesting results. However, 
these are not directly comparable to the estimates in other models as this model 
estimates the effects on the desired or equilibrium minimum required expenditures 
and marginal budget shares. The effects on the equilibrium minimum spending are 
generally higher in the partial adjustment model than in the baseline, time and fixed 
effects models. This is in line with the underlying assumptions of the partial 
adjustment model, where only a fraction of the optimal spending is achieved in 
each period as spending is relatively slow to adjust to its optimal level due to 
adjustment sluggishness (speed of adjustment is 0.169).  
 
One can, however, calculate the estimated effects on the actual expenditure from 
the long-run values and the partial adjustment coefficient. The partial adjustment 
model may be written as: 
(6.5) 
uit = λα it + λβi yt − α it
i =0
12  + 1− λ( ) ytyt −1 uit −1 + λε it  
 
which is directly comparable to Model 2 with λ =1. 
 
Hence multiplying the coefficients in Tables 6.11 – 6.26 by 0.169 yields effects on 
actual minimum expenditure comparable to the other models where adjustment is 
by definition instantaneous. However, even after this correction, the effects yielded 
by the Partial Adjustment Model are notably higher than those in the static models, 
suggesting that the Partial Adjustment Model may need to be extended to better 
meet theoretical expectations.  
7. Conclusion 
The primary focus of this paper is estimating a Linear Expenditure System model 
in a dynamic context. Although panel data methods such as fixed effects and 
random effects are well-documented in the literature, it is less so for their 
application to a system of equations estimated in structural form. This paper 
proposes specifying each equation in the system to include fixed effects, time 
effects and/or a combination of the two. These models are then estimated by the 
maximum likelihood method. The model with both time and fixed effects performs 
well in explaining the behaviour of local governments over the years analysed. The 
fact that this model produces markedly different results from the benchmark model 
with no time or fixed effects suggests that local government spending is subject to 
both time and economic region unobserved heterogeneity beyond that due to 
average income growth. This finding has important implications for policy 
conclusions with respect to the effect of different service target groups and 
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technology factors on the service sector minimum required expenditures. The 
pitfalls of relying on the benchmark’s model’s estimates are particularly evident in 
the child care service sector, where the benchmark model predicts a theoretically 
unjustifiable negative effect of the share of small children on the minimum child 
care spending. The models with time effects, however predict the expected positive 
and significant effect. In the model where both time and region effects are 
included, an additional child increases minimum spending by NOK 10700 in 2001 
and NOK 58154 in 2008. The estimates are particularly sensitive to the inclusion of 
time effects, suggesting that time heterogeneity is large, while municipality 
heterogeneity is significant but relatively smaller.  
 
The average minimum required expenditures are increasing over time as a result of 
the significant time effects as well as increasing income, with child care and care 
for the elderly and disabled showing particularly high increases. This is consistent 
with the observed increase in average spending in these sectors. The average 
minimum required expenditure in the culture service sector has also increased 
significantly from 2001 to 2008, as well as from 2007 to 2008 showing an 
increased priority placed on culture. In the care for the elderly and disabled sector, 
subsistence output is increasing with age and the sector is prioritised by local 
councils with the larger share of socialists. However, the share of socialists has a 
negative effect on the share of the budget allocated to health care in the time and 
region effects model. The health care marginal budget shares are also negative in 
densely populated areas according to the models with region and both time and 
region effects. A particularly surprising result is that the marginal budget share of 
primary schools spending is relatively large and negative in the time and region 
effect model for municipalities with higher average education level. The result is 
surprising since one expects that primary education is prioritised by municipalities 
with higher average education.  
 
In addition to the fixed and time effects models, a dynamic partial adjustment 
model is estimated, relaxing the assumption that municipality expenditures adjust 
instantaneously from one year to the next. In contrast to the other models, the 
partial adjustment model shows a positive, instead of negative, effect of average 
education on the marginal budget share in the primary schools sector. Thus, in 
equilibrium, the sign of this effect conforms to theoretical expectations. The model 
also shows a relatively slow speed of adjustment of municipality spending to its 
optimal level and relatively higher effects on the optimal minimum spending and 
marginal budget shares. Although this model yields some important insights into 
the dynamics of local governments‘ spending behaviour, it has low explanatory 
power and can be developed further. First, it is possible to estimate the model 
assuming that the speed of adjustment varies across service sectors. It is also 
possible to specify the speed of adjustment parameter as a function of explanatory 
variables, for example municipality size, given by the inverse population size 
variable. Second, the assumption on the minimum savings specification should be 
examined further, and a positive long-term growth trend in the real income (α00 < 0) 
considered as an alternative to the current zero long-term growth assumption. 
Third, the partial adjustment model may be extended to include municipality or 
region fixed effects in the optimal expenditure specification. Finally, as an 
alternative to fixed effects estimation, a random coefficient model may also be 
considered in future work, where the minimum required expenditure parameters 
can be assumed to be random draws from a Normal distribution. However, this 
assumption requires careful consideration as it is difficult to specify the correct 
distribution from which the random parameters originate.  
 
Based on the results discussed in this paper, panel data methods are found to be 
very well suited to the analysis of local government behaviour in Norway over 
time, as unobserved time and municipality heterogeneity play an important role in 
the changes in spending patterns. Moreover, the observed sluggishness of 
adjustment over time suggests that a combination of fixed and time effects with a 
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dynamic partial adjustment is a promising specification, which should be 
developed in future work on the subject. 
  
Documents 6/2011 Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context
Statistics Norway 55
Bibliography 
Aaberge, R., Bhuller, M., Langørgen, A. and M. Mogstad (2010): “The 
Distributional Impact of Public Services When Needs Differ”, IZA Discussion 
Paper 4826, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), http://ftp.iza.org/dp4826.pdf, 
accessed 12 April 2010. 
 
Aaberge, R. and A. Langørgen (2003): “Fiscal and spending behaviour of local 
governments: Identification of price effects when prices are not observed”, Public 
Choice, Vol. 117, 125 – 161. 
 
Aaberge, R. and A. Langørgen (2006): “Measuring the Benefits from Public 
Services: The Effects of Local Government Spending on the Distribution of 
Income in Norway”, The Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 52, No. 1, 61 – 83. 
 
Ahangarani, P. M. (1999): “Demand system estimation with panel data”, www-
scf.usc.edu/~mashayek/paper/AIDSpaper.pdf, accessed 2 April 2010.  
 
Allers, M. (2007): “Deriving spending needs from local government budget data: 
an alternative approach”, Paper to be presented at the IIPF Congress in Warwick, 
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name 
=IIPF63&paper_id=55, accessed 20 November 2009.  
 
Allers, M. A. and J. P. Elhorst (2007): “Independent Behaviour of Local 
Governments: Dutch Evidence Using a Linear Expenditure System”, Paper 
prepared for presentation at the Spatial Econometrics Conference in Cambridge 11-
14th July and the 47th Congress of the European Regional Science Association in 
Paris, August 29th to September 2rd 2007, https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIPF63&paper_id=54, accessed 20 
February 2010.  
 
Arellano, M. (2003): Panel Data Econometrics. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Arellano, M. and B. Honoré (2000): “Panel Data Models: Some Recent 
Developments”, Working paper 0016, ftp://ftp.cemfi.es/wp/00/0016.pdf, accessed 
2 March 2010.  
 
Bai, J. (2006): “Panel Data Models with Interactive Fixed Effects”, www.atl-
res.com/macro/papers/Bai%20paper.pdf , accessed 20 February 2010.   
 
Balestra, P. and S. Negassi (1992): “A Random Coefficient Simultaneous Equation 
System with an Application to Direct Foreign Investment by French Firms”, 
Empirical Economics, Vol. 17, 205 – 220.  
 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005): Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd ed. John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd., Chichester. 
 
Beck, N. (2004): “Longitudinal (Panel and Time Series Cross-Section Data”, Note, 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/Beck%20Notes/longitude20041short.pdf, accessed 
30 March 2010.  
 
Beck, N. (2006): “Time-Series-Cross-Section Methods”, Draft of June 5, 2006, 
http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2576/beck.pdf, accessed 30 March 2010.  
 
Biørn, E. (1999): “Estimating Regression Systems from Unbalanced Panel Data: A 
Stepwise Maximum Likelihood Procedure”, Department of Economics, University 
of Oslo, Memorandum No. 20. 
 
  
Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context Documents 6/2011
56 Statistics Norway
Bhuller, M. (2009): “Inndeling av Norge i arbeidsmarkedregioner”, Statistisk 
sentralbyrå, Notat 2009/24, 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/00/20/notat_200924/notat_200924.pdf , accessed 9 
April 2010.  
 
Borge, L-E., Rattsø, J. and R. Sørensen (1995): “Local government service 
production: The politics of allocative sluggishness”, Public Choice, Vol. 82, 135 – 
157.  
 
Borge, L-E. (1995): “Economic and political determinants of fee income in 
Norwegian local governments”, Public Choice, Vol. 83, 353 – 373.  
 
Chamberlain, G. (1980): "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review 
of Economic Studies, Vol. 47,  NO.1, 225-238. 
 
Elhorst, J. P. (2003): “Specification and Estimation of Spacial Panel Data Models”, 
International Regional Science Review, Vol, 26, No. 3, 244 – 268. 
 
Greene, W. (2001):"Estimating Econometric Models with Fixed Effects", New 
York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper 
Series 01-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business. 
 
Greene, W. H. (2003): Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
 
Gujarati, D.N. (2003): Basic Econometrics, 4th ed. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Hausman, J. A. and W. E. Taylor (1981): “Panel data and unobservable individual 
effects”, Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 6, 1377 – 1398.  
 
Honoré, B. E. (2002): “Nonlinear Models with Panel Data”, Portuguese Economic 
Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 163 – 179.  
 
Hsiao, C: (1975): “Some estimation methods for a Random Coefficient Model”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 43, No. 2, 305 – 325.  
 
Hsiao, C. (1985): “Benefits and limitations of panel data”, Econometric Reviews, 
Vol, 4, No. 1, 121 – 174.  
 
Hsiao, C. (2003): Analysis of Panel Data, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Hsiao, C. and M. H. Pesaran (2004): “Random Coefficient Panel Data Models”, 
CESifo working paper 1233,  
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/ cesifo1_wp1233.pdf, accessed 9 April 
2010.  
 
Hübler, O. (2006): “Multilevel and nonlinear models”, Allgemeines Statistisches 
Archiv, Vol. 90, 121 – 136.  
 
Langørgen, A., Galloway, T. A., Mogstad, M. and R. Aaberge (2005): 
“Sammenlikning av simultane og partielle analyser av kommunenes økonomiske 
atferd”, Rapporter 2005/25, Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
 
Langørgen, A., Pedersen, S. and R. Aaberge (2010): “Stabilitet i kommunenes 
økonomiske atferd 2001-2008”, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Rapport 25/2010 
 
McCloskey, D. N. and S. T: Ziliak (1996): “The Standard Error of Regressions”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIV, 97 – 114. 
 
  
Documents 6/2011 Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context
Statistics Norway 57
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (2009): “Rapport fra 
Det tekniske beregningsutvalg for kommunal og fylkeskommunal økonomi”, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd/dep/443466/Teknisk-beregningsutvalg-for-
kommunal-og.html , accessed 3 November 2009.  
 
Neyman, J. and E. L. Scott (1948): “Consistent estimates based on partially 
consistent observations”, Econometrica, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1 – 32. 
 
Norges offentlige utredninger NOU (2005/18): “Fordeling, forenkling, forbedring - 
Inntektssytemet for kommuner og fylkeskommuner”, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/NOU/20052005/018/PDFS/NOU2005200500180
00DDDPDFS.pdf, accessed 4 January 2010.  
 
Pedersen, S. (2008): “Kommunenes økonomiske atferd 2001 - 2007”, Notater 
2008/60, Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
 
Pinheiro, J. C. and D. M. Bates (2000): Mixed Effects Models in S and S-Plus, 
Springer, New York.  
 
Polacheck, S. W. and M-K. Kim (1994): “Panel estimates of the gender earnings 
gap: individual-specific intercept and individual-specific slope models”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 61, 23 – 42.  
 
Pollak, R. A. and T: J. Wales (1981): “Demographic Variables in Demand 
Analysis”, Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 6, 1533 – 1551.  
 
Rongen, G. (1995): “Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway”, 
European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 11, 253 – 264.  
 
Statistics Norway (2009a): “Culture Statistics 2007”, 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subject/07/nos_cultural/nos_d410_en/nos_d410_en.pdf, 
accessed 4 January 2010.  
 
Statistics Norway (2009b): “Kulturstatistikk 2008”, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KKD/Kultur/Rapporter%20og%20utredninger/K
ulturstatistikk2008-nos_d429.pdf, accessed 2 April 2010.  
 
Stoltenberg, J. (2005): “The Stoltenberg II Government’s inaugural address to the 
Storting”, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/stat
sminister_jens_stoltenberg/2005/the-stoltenberg-ii-governments-
inaugural.html?id=420704, accessed 20 April 2010. 
 
Terzi, S. (1992): “Simultaneous Equations with Random Coefficients: Estimating 
the Structural Form”, Statistical Methods and Applications, Vol. 1, No. 2, 275 – 
286.  
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002a): Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002b): Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2nd 
ed. South-Western, div. of Thomson Learning. 
 
  
Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context Documents 6/2011
58 Statistics Norway
Appendix A: Outlier municipalities and income index 
derivation 
Table A.1. Municipalities that are outliers in 1 year or more 
No. Name no. yrs out 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0104 ......Moss 3 1 1  1 
0105 ......Sarpsborg 1 1   
0111 ......Hvaler 3 1 1  1 
0121 ......Rømskog 3 1 1 1 
0301 ......Oslo 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0402 ......Kongsvinger 1   1
0434 ......Engerdal 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0441 ......Os 1 1   
0501 ......Lillehammer 3 1 1 1   
0511 ......Dovre 1 1   
0512 ......Lesja 1 1   
0514 ......Lom 1 1   
0515 ......Vågå 1 1   
0520 ......Ringebu 1  1 
0521 ......Øyer 1  1 
0544 ......Øystre Slidre 2 1  1 
0545 ......Vang 1 1   
0619 ......Ål 5 1 1 1 1 1
0632 ......Rollag 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
0821 ......Bø 1 1  
0830 ......Nissedal 1  1 
0831 ......Fyresdal 1   1
0834 ......Vinje 1 1   
0928 ......Birkenes 1 1   
0935 ......Iveland 1  1 
0938 ......Bygland 1 1   
0941 ......Bykle 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1021 ......Marnardal 2 1  1 
1026 ......Åseral 5 1 1 1 1  1
1027 ......Audnedal 2 1   1
1029 ......Lindesnes 1   1
1046 ......Sirdal 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1129 ......Forsand 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1133 ......Hjelmeland 1  1 
1151 ......Utsira 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1219 ......Bømlo 1 1   
1224 ......Kvinnherad 2 1   1
1227 ......Jondal 1 1   
1232 ......Eidfjord 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1233 ......Ulvik 5 1 1 1 1  1 
1242 ......Samnanger 1 1   
1243 ......Os 1 1   
1252 ......Modalen 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1256 ......Meland 1  1 
1259 ......Øygarden 1 1  
1265 ......Fedje 1   1
1411 ......Gulen 1  1 
1412 ......Solund 1 1   
1417 ......Vik 3 1  1 1
1418 ......Balestrand 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1419 ......Leikanger 1   1
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1421 ......Aurland 2 1 1  
1424 ......Årdal 1 1   
1431 ......Jølster 1 1  
1433 ......Naustdal 1 1   
1438 ......Bremanger 2  1 1
1503 ......Kristiansund 1  1 
1524 ......Norddal 1  1 
1534 ......Haram 2 1   1
1535 ......Vestnes 2 1 1   
1546 ......Sandøy 1   1
1547 ......Aukra 1   1
1554 ......Averøy 1  1 
1569 ......Aure 1 1   
1573 ......Smøla 3 1 1 1   
1617 ......Hitra 1   1
1664 ......Selbu 1 1   
1665 ......Tydal 2 1 1   
1721 ......Verdal 1 1   
1739 ......Røyrvik 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
1740 ......Namskogan 3 1 1 1  
1749 ......Flatanger 1  1 
1755 ......Leka 1  1 
1805 ......Narvik 1  1 
1811 ......Bindal 1 1   
1822 ......Leirfjord 4 1 1 1 1 
1826 ......Hattfjelldal 2  1 1
1827 ......Dønna 1 1   
1828 ......Nesna 1 1   
1832 ......Hemnes 1  1 
1833 ......Rana 1  1 
1834 ......Lurøy 4 1 1  1 1
1835 ......Træna 3 1 1   1
1836 ......Rødøy 3 1 1 1  
1840 ......Saltdal 1 1   
1842 ......Skjerstad 2 1 1   
1853 ......Evenes 1   1
1856 ......Røst 1 1   
1857 ......Værøy 1 1   
1859 ......Flakstad 1 1  
1911 ......Kvæfjord 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1919 ......Gratangen 1 1   
1920 ......Lavangen 1 1   
1923 ......Salangen 4 1 1  1 1
1929 ......Berg 3 1 1 1  
1939 ......Storfjord 1  1 
1943 ......Kvænangen 1 1   
2003 ......Vadsø 2 1 1 
2014 ......Loppa 2 1 1   
2015 ......Hasvik 1  1 
2017 ......Kvalsund 1  1 
2021 ......Karasjok 3 1 1 1   
2027 ......Unjárga Nesseby 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 Total by year (103 municipalities) 
243 30 28 25 28 30 26 45 31
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Table A.2. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income used in calculating the income index for an 
unbalanced panel data set where only municipalities that are considered outliers in at least 1 
year are excluded 
Year Observations Obs excl. missing Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 ................  332 329 32.837 7.322 21.68 62.415
2002 ................  331 329 34.173 7.551 23.372 66.779
2003 ................  331 329 36.554 7.803 22.768 72.80
2004 ................  331 330 38.237 8.144 25.22 77.791
2005 ................  331 330 40.175 8.371 26.946 77.785
2006 ................  330 329 44.792 9.428 30.675 81.98
2007 ................  330 329 46.976 10.425 32.543 87.118
2008 ................  330 328 50.054 11.25 34.736 92.316
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner.  
Table A.3. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income, used in calculating the income index for an 
unbalanced panel data set where municipalities that are considered outliers in at least 2 years 
are excluded 
Year Observations 
Obs excl. 
missing Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 ................  392 389 33.807 7.900 21.68 62.415
2002 ................  391 388 35.19 8.194 23.372 66.779
2003 ................  391 389 37.786 8.740 22.768 72.80
2004 ................  391 390 39.445 8.963 25.22 77.791
2005 ................  391 390 41.385 9.2 26.946 77.785
2006 ................  389 388 46.20 10.405 30.675 86.914
2007 ................  389 388 48.437 11.487 32.543 89.032
2008 ................  388 385 51.577 12.4 33.949 96.907
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner.  
Table A.4. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income used in calculating the income index for a 
balanced panel data set where municipalities that are considered outliers in at least 1 year are 
excluded as well as municipalities that have missing data in some of the years 
Year Observations Obs excl. missing Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 .............  315 315 32.808 7.276 21.68 62.415
2002 .............  315 315 34.242 7.561 23.372 66.779
2003 .............  315 315 36.629 7.873 22.768 72.80
2004 .............  315 315 38.33 8.243 25.22 77.791
2005 .............  315 315 40.288 8.483 26.946 77.785
2006 .............  315 315 44.89 9.528 30.675 81.98
2007 .............  315 315 47.079 10.544 32.543 87.118
2008 .............  315 315 50.132 11.402 34.736 92.316
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner.  
Table A.5. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income used in calculating the income index for a 
balanced panel data set where municipalities that are considered outliers in at least 2 years are 
excluded as well as municipalities that have missing data in some of the years 
Year Observations Obs excl. missing Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 .............  370 370 33.786 7.885 21.68 62.415
2002 .............  370 370 35.285 8.233 23.372 66.779
2003 .............  370 370 37.872 8.818 22.768 72.80
2004 .............  370 370 39.529 9.048 25.22 77.791
2005 .............  370 370 41.506 9.279 26.946 77.785
2006 .............  370 370 46.34 10.499 30.675 86.914
2007 .............  370 370 48.567 11.611 32.543 89.032
2008 .............  370 370 51.688 12.501 33.949 96.907
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner.  
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Table A.6. List of municipalities that have missing values for some of the years for the variables included 
in the model 
Number Name Years missing 
0216  Nesodden 2 002 
0430  Stor-Elvdal 2 002,2003 
0513  Skjåk 2 002 
0718  Ramnes 2 001 
1101  Eigersund 2 005 
1102  Sandnes 2 005 
1154  Vindafjord 2 001,2002,2003,2005 
1159  Ølen 2 002,2003,2004,2005 
1160  Vindafjord 2 006 
1201  Bergen 2 001 
1211  Etne 2 001 
1214  Ølen 2 001 
1216  Sveio 2 005 
1219  Bømlo 2 005 
1244  Austevoll 2 001,2002 
1503  Kristiansund 2 007 
1505  Kristiansund 2 008 
1556  Frei 2 007 
1569  Aure 2 001,2002,2003,2005 
1572  Tustna 2 001,2002,2003,2004,2005 
1576  Aure 2 006 
1842  Skjerstad 2 001,2002,2003,2004 
1856  Røst 2 002,2003 
1871  Andøy 2 003,2004 
1874  Moskenes 2 002,2003,2008 
1928  Torsken 2 003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008 
1939  Storfjord 2 008 
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Appendix B: Time-invariant variables and correlation 
plots 
Table B1 Model 6 version A – inflated standard errors 
Sector Variable (first difference) Estimate Std error t-value
Budget surplus ....... Growth in municipality incomes 0.516 0.026 20.23
    
Administration ........ Inverse population size  4.603 2.217 2.08
 Index of farming industry -18.133 12.195 -1.49
    
Primary schools ...... Population share 6-12 years of age 30.324 3.143 9.65
 Population share 13-15 years of age 19.465 3.256 5.98
 Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.114 0.199 0.57
 Inverse population size 4.435 1.129 3.93
    
Other education ...... Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years -0.889 1.188 -0.75
 Refugees with integration grants  17.773 1.662 10.69
    
Child care .............. Population share 1-5 years of age -14.335 3.127 -4.58
 Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years 20.317 1.748 11.62
    
Health care ............ Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.019 0.075 0.26
 Inverse population size 3.858 0.485 7.96
    
Social services ....... Refugees with integration grants  24.131 2.018 11.96
 Refugees without integration grants  65.349 29.465 2.22
 Share of divorced/ separated 16-59 years 1.227 2.067 0.59
 Unemployed 16-59 years share of total population  13.689 1.599 8.56
 Number of poor share of total population 3.220 0.806 3.99
 Share of disablement pensioners 18-49 years -6.776 3.771 -1.80
    
Child protection ...... Share of children 0-15 years with single mother/ father 4.506 1.783 2.53
 Number of poor share of total population -0.773 0.600 -1.29
    
Care for the ............ Population share 67-79 years of age 30.424 5.689 5.35
elderly and ............. Population share 80-89 years of age 23.296 8.525 2.73
disabled ................. Population share 90 years and above 75.810 14.710 5.15
 High-cost recipients share of total population 400.545 51.283 7.81
 Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above without grant 15.133 22.623 0.67
 Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above  with grant -115.539 365.50 -0.32
 Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.295 0.312 0.95
 Inverse population size 7.799 1.861 4.19
    
Culture .................. Inverse population size -0.004 0.555 -0.01
    
Municipal roads ...... Amount of snowfall 0.023 0.004 6.12
 Kilometers of municipal roads -6.157 4.476 -1.38
    
Water supply .......... Capacity of advanced purification 0.039 0.064 0.62
and sanitation ......... Inverse population size 1.124 0.969 1.16
    
Other infrastructure . Inverse population size -2.824 1.370 -2.06
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Correlation plots 
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Appendix C: Residual plots 
Model 2 (A) 
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Model 7(A) 
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Model 8 (A) 
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Residual plots by sector 
Model 2 
(A)
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Model 7 (A)   
 
)
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Model 8 (A)   
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Residual plots for Model 2 by year and by sector 
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Appendix D Finding significant fixed effects in Model 4 
Table D. 1. Municipality dummy numbers 
 
Dummy 
number Name 
Municipality 
# 
1 Halden 0101 
2 Fredrikstad 0106 
3 Aremark 0118 
4 Marker 0119 
5 Trøgstad 0122 
6 Spydeberg 0123 
7 Askim 0124 
8 Eidsberg 0125 
9 Skiptvet 0127 
10 Rakkestad 0128 
11 Råde 0135 
12 Rygge 0136 
13 Våler 0137 
14 Hobøl 0138 
15 Vestby 0211 
16 Ski 0213 
17 Ås 0214 
18 Frogn 0215 
19 Nesodden 0216 
20 Oppegård 0217 
21 Bærum 0219 
22 Asker 0220 
23 
Aurskog-
Høland 0221 
24 Sørum 0226 
25 Fet 0227 
26 Rælingen 0228 
27 Enebakk 0229 
28 Lørenskog 0230 
29 Skedsmo 0231 
30 Nittedal 0233 
31 Gjerdrum 0234 
32 Ullensaker 0235 
33 Nes 0236 
34 Eidsvoll 0237 
35 Nannestad 0238 
36 Hurdal 0239 
37 Hamar 0403 
38 Ringsaker 0412 
39 Løten 0415 
40 Stange 0417 
41 Nord-Odal 0418 
42 Sør-Odal 0419 
43 Eidskog 0420 
44 Grue 0423 
45 Åsnes 0425 
46 Våler 0426 
47 Elverum 0427 
48 Trysil 0428 
49 Åmot 0429 
50 Stor-Elvdal 0430 
51 Rendalen 0432 
52 Tolga 0436 
53 Tynset 0437 
54 Alvdal 0438 
55 Folldal 0439 
56 Gjøvik 0502 
57 Skjåk 0513 
58 Nord-Fron 0516 
59 Sel 0517 
60 Sør-Fron 0519 
61 Gausdal 0522 
62 Østre Toten 0528 
63 Vestre Toten 0529 
64 Jevnaker 0532 
65 Lunner 0533 
66 Gran 0534 
67 Søndre Land 0536 
68 Nordre Land 0538 
69 Sør-Aurdal 0540 
70 Etnedal 0541 
71 Nord-Aurdal 0542 
72 Vestre Slidre 0543 
73 Drammen 0602 
74 Kongsberg 0604 
75 Ringerike 0605 
76 Hole 0612 
77 Flå 0615 
78 Nes 0616 
79 Gol 0617 
80 Hemsedal 0618 
81 Hol 0620 
82 Sigdal 0621 
83 Krødsherad 0622 
84 Modum 0623 
85 Øvre Eiker 0624 
86 Nedre Eiker 0625 
87 Lier 0626 
88 Røyken 0627 
89 Hurum 0628 
90 Flesberg 0631 
91 
Nore og 
Uvdal 0633 
92 Borre 0701 
93 Holmestrand 0702 
94 Tønsberg 0704 
95 Sandefjord 0706 
96 Larvik 0709 
97 Svelvik 0711 
98 Sande 0713 
99 Hof 0714 
100 Re 0716 
101 Ramnes 0718 
102 Andebu 0719 
103 Stokke 0720 
104 Nøtterøy 0722 
105 Tjøme 0723 
106 Lardal 0728 
107 Porsgrunn 0805 
108 Skien 0806 
109 Notodden 0807 
110 Siljan 0811 
111 Bamble 0814 
112 Kragerø 0815 
113 Drangedal 0817 
114 Nome 0819 
115 Sauherad 0822 
116 Tinn 0826 
117 Hjartdal 0827 
118 Seljord 0828 
119 Kviteseid 0829 
120 Tokke 0833 
121 Risør 0901 
122 Grimstad 0904 
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123 Arendal 0906 
124 Gjerstad 0911 
125 Vegårdshei 0912 
126 Tvedestrand 0914 
127 Froland 0919 
128 Lillesand 0926 
129 Åmli 0929 
130 
Evje og 
Hornnes 0937 
131 Valle 0940 
132 Kristiansand 1001 
133 Mandal 1002 
134 Farsund 1003 
135 Flekkefjord 1004 
136 Vennesla 1014 
137 Songdalen 1017 
138 Søgne 1018 
139 Lyngdal 1032 
140 Hægebostad 1034 
141 Kvinesdal 1037 
142 Eigersund 1101 
143 Sandnes 1102 
144 Stavanger 1103 
145 Haugesund 1106 
146 Sokndal 1111 
147 Lund 1112 
148 Bjerkreim 1114 
149 Hå 1119 
150 Klepp 1120 
151 Time 1121 
152 Gjesdal 1122 
153 Sola 1124 
154 Randaberg 1127 
155 Strand 1130 
156 Suldal 1134 
157 Sauda 1135 
158 Finnøy 1141 
159 Rennesøy 1142 
160 Kvitsøy 1144 
161 Bokn 1145 
162 Tysvær 1146 
163 Karmøy 1149 
164 Vindafjord 1154 
165 Ølen 1159 
166 Vindafjord 1160 
167 Bergen 1201 
168 Etne 1211 
169 Ølen 1214 
170 Sveio 1216 
171 Stord 1221 
172 Fitjar 1222 
173 Tysnes 1223 
174 Odda 1228 
175 Ullensvang 1231 
176 Granvin 1234 
177 Voss 1235 
178 Kvam 1238 
179 Fusa 1241 
180 Austevoll 1244 
181 Sund 1245 
182 Fjell 1246 
183 Askøy 1247 
184 Vaksdal 1251 
185 Osterøy 1253 
186 Radøy 1260 
187 Lindås 1263 
188 Austrheim 1264 
189 Masfjorden 1266 
190 Flora 1401 
191 Hyllestad 1413 
192 Høyanger 1416 
193 Sogndal 1420 
194 Lærdal 1422 
195 Luster 1426 
196 Askvoll 1428 
197 Fjaler 1429 
198 Gaular 1430 
199 Førde 1432 
200 Vågsøy 1439 
201 Selje 1441 
202 Eid 1443 
203 Hornindal 1444 
204 Gloppen 1445 
205 Stryn 1449 
206 Molde 1502 
207 Ålesund 1504 
208 Kristiansund 1505 
209 Vanylven 1511 
210 Sande 1514 
211 Herøy 1515 
212 Ulstein 1516 
213 Hareid 1517 
214 Volda 1519 
215 Ørsta 1520 
216 Ørskog 1523 
217 Stranda 1525 
218 Stordal 1526 
219 Sykkylven 1528 
220 Skodje 1529 
221 Sula 1531 
222 Giske 1532 
223 Rauma 1539 
224 Nesset 1543 
225 Midsund 1545 
226 Fræna 1548 
227 Eide 1551 
228 Frei 1556 
229 Gjemnes 1557 
230 Tingvoll 1560 
231 Sunndal 1563 
232 Surnadal 1566 
233 Rindal 1567 
234 Halsa 1571 
235 Tustna 1572 
236 Aure 1576 
237 Trondheim 1601 
238 Hemne 1612 
239 Snillfjord 1613 
240 Frøya 1620 
241 Ørland 1621 
242 Agdenes 1622 
243 Rissa 1624 
244 Bjugn 1627 
245 Åfjord 1630 
246 Roan 1632 
247 Osen 1633 
248 Oppdal 1634 
249 Rennebu 1635 
250 Meldal 1636 
251 Orkdal 1638 
252 Røros 1640 
253 Holtålen 1644 
254 
Midtre 
Gauldal 1648 
255 Melhus 1653 
256 Skaun 1657 
257 Klæbu 1662 
258 Malvik 1663 
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259 Steinkjer 1702 
260 Namsos 1703 
261 Meråker 1711 
262 Stjørdal 1714 
263 Frosta 1717 
264 Leksvik 1718 
265 Levanger 1719 
266 Mosvik 1723 
267 Verran 1724 
268 Mandalseid 1725 
269 Inderøy 1729 
270 Snåsa 1736 
271 Lierne 1738 
272 Grong 1742 
273 Høylandet 1743 
274 Overhalla 1744 
275 Fosnes 1748 
276 Vikna 1750 
277 Nærøy 1751 
278 Bodø 1804 
279 Sømna 1812 
280 Brønnøy 1813 
281 Vega 1815 
282 Vevelstad 1816 
283 Herøy 1818 
284 Alstahaug 1820 
285 Vefsn 1824 
286 Grane 1825 
287 Meløy 1837 
288 Gildeskål 1838 
289 Beiarn 1839 
290 Fauske 1841 
291 Sørfold 1845 
292 Steigen 1848 
293 Hamarøy 1849 
294 Tysfjord 1850 
295 Lødingen 1851 
296 Tjeldsund 1852 
297 Ballangen 1854 
298 Vestvågøy 1860 
299 Vågan 1865 
300 Hadsel 1866 
301 Bø 1867 
302 Øksnes 1868 
303 Sortland 1870 
304 Andøy 1871 
305 Moskenes 1874 
306 Harstad 1901 
307 Tromsø 1902 
308 Skånland 1913 
309 Bjarkøy 1915 
310 Ibestad 1917 
311 Bardu 1922 
312 Målselv 1924 
313 Sørreisa 1925 
314 Dyrøy 1926 
315 Tranøy 1927 
316 Torsken 1928 
317 Lenvik 1931 
318 Balsfjord 1933 
319 Karlsøy 1936 
320 Lyngen 1938 
321 Kåfjord 1940 
322 Skjervøy 1941 
323 Nordreisa 1942 
324 Vardø 2002 
325 Hammerfest 2004 
326 Kautokeino 2011 
327 Alta 2012 
328 Måsøy 2018 
329 Nordkapp 2019 
330 Porsanger 2020 
331 Lebesby 2022 
332 Gamvik 2023 
333 Berlevåg 2024 
334 Tana 2025 
335 Båtsfjord 2028 
336 Sør-Varanger 2030 
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Table D.2.  Step 1.1:finding the significant fixed effects by iteratively testing each municipality in all 12 
sectors simultaneously . Significance criteria: 50% of median adjusted sector expenditure 
Parameter Estimate 
theta1_103 2.404057 
theta1_129 -2.66378 
theta1_131 2.290095 
theta1_149 -3.2466 
theta1_160 -3.93952 
theta1_161 -3.55073 
theta1_176 -2.19223 
theta1_180 2.270809 
theta1_192 3.127054 
theta1_195 -2.41826 
theta1_236 3.447772 
theta1_247 -2.31918 
theta1_248 -2.39635 
theta1_253 2.215618 
theta1_291 2.414206 
theta1_292 4.084143 
theta1_293 2.966558 
theta1_294 2.949771 
theta1_295 2.703473 
theta1_296 2.968162 
theta1_309 3.628285 
theta1_315 3.794161 
theta1_316 7.930382 
theta1_319 3.212174 
theta1_321 4.829273 
theta1_326 2.547324 
theta1_331 4.548194 
theta1_332 3.259316 
theta1_38 -2.58827 
theta1_43 3.171417 
theta1_5 -2.82006 
theta1_57 -3.04013 
theta1_81 -4.94442 
theta1_82 -3.62313 
theta1_9 -3.44967 
  
theta2_316 6.342183 
  
theta3_112 0.698214 
theta3_130 -0.86624 
theta3_131 1.013903 
theta3_149 -0.65107 
theta3_162 0.645201 
theta3_193 -0.69541 
theta3_204 1.252457 
theta3_212 0.738463 
theta3_213 0.720791 
theta3_216 0.722032 
theta3_225 0.970766 
theta3_227 0.985286 
theta3_261 0.694881 
theta3_280 0.756862 
theta3_282 -0.71083 
theta3_292 0.678692 
theta3_309 0.772991 
theta3_310 1.156009 
theta3_316 1.221829 
theta3_327 0.736867 
theta3_334 0.661489 
theta3_58 -0.68513 
theta3_77 -0.83687 
theta3_81 -0.94337 
theta3_82 -0.75033 
theta3_83 -0.62043 
theta3_91 -1.39847 
Parameter Estimate
theta4_21 -2.07514
theta4_316 3.915541
theta4_321 2.395222
theta4_326 2.080152
theta4_329 1.957284
theta4_332 1.746173
theta4_77 -2.52762
theta4_81 -2.32969
  
theta5_106 -1.05959
theta5_110 -1.21387
theta5_137 -1.18654
theta5_156 -2.07
theta5_160 -2.01137
theta5_161 -1.627
theta5_186 1.424814
theta5_188 1.293389
theta5_192 1.097574
theta5_194 1.546095
theta5_198 1.531417
theta5_204 1.085437
theta5_225 1.636792
theta5_236 1.540516
theta5_247 -1.05927
theta5_248 -1.28538
theta5_272 1.615199
theta5_273 1.126029
theta5_292 1.289591
theta5_294 1.54802
theta5_295 1.194185
theta5_298 1.458837
theta5_316 1.130055
theta5_320 1.388373
theta5_326 2.982329
theta5_327 1.264381
theta5_329 1.595299
theta5_330 1.113504
theta5_334 1.739266
theta5_335 1.206732
theta5_38 -1.66219
theta5_43 2.192481
theta5_49 -1.26666
theta5_52 1.462753
theta5_70 -1.47176
theta5_77 -1.58851
theta5_81 -1.70193
theta5_83 -1.80093
theta5_9 -2.14543
theta5_91 -1.55885
  
theta6_100 0.763381
theta6_124 1.180949
theta6_16 0.77392
theta6_167 1.126614
theta6_17 -0.93898
theta6_171 0.783714
theta6_199 0.762514
theta6_247 1.111636
theta6_284 1.171212
theta6_290 0.95498
theta6_317 -1.20385
theta6_324 0.93081
theta6_328 -1.07171
theta6_331 0.765217
theta6_43 0.977553
Parameter Estimate
theta6_44 1.151028
theta6_45 0.846589
theta6_50 1.179623
theta6_52 1.269983
theta6_58 -0.82491
theta6_80 -0.78239
theta6_81 -1.21995
theta6_84 -0.74826
  
theta7_11 0.562993
theta7_129 0.619829
theta7_130 -0.56771
theta7_131 -0.56336
theta7_140 -0.71193
theta7_158 1.003216
theta7_160 -0.81661
theta7_174 0.67088
theta7_176 -0.65609
theta7_185 0.67363
theta7_187 0.671623
theta7_198 0.758549
theta7_218 -0.73307
theta7_229 0.683547
theta7_239 0.931053
theta7_250 0.587988
theta7_261 -0.65074
theta7_263 0.692625
theta7_281 0.817853
theta7_282 -0.62124
theta7_283 1.184047
theta7_286 -0.63074
theta7_316 1.061718
theta7_323 0.693972
theta7_331 0.587057
theta7_55 -0.56089
theta7_57 -0.7997
theta7_78 0.823883
theta7_91 1.032027
  
theta8_316 7.589541
theta8_331 8.089162
theta8_77 -8.28568
theta8_81 -7.59881
  
theta9_100 1.01388
theta9_110 -1.01464
theta9_118 0.923678
theta9_120 1.244113
theta9_124 -0.89083
theta9_131 1.914893
theta9_135 0.88411
theta9_137 -1.10925
theta9_141 1.26723
theta9_149 -1.20403
theta9_15 -1.01588
theta9_174 1.288746
theta9_176 -0.89274
theta9_192 1.78163
theta9_203 -1.35044
theta9_21 -1.09607
theta9_216 -1.24239
theta9_224 0.966738
theta9_229 1.01988
theta9_23 -1.01279
theta9_242 -1.03744
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theta9_245 -1.19931 
theta9_247 -1.45589 
theta9_25 -0.89443 
theta9_252 1.387739 
theta9_260 1.049503 
theta9_282 0.93606 
theta9_286 -1.24486 
theta9_29 -1.38128 
theta9_293 1.18994 
theta9_294 1.085808 
theta9_295 1.282079 
theta9_3 1.695476 
theta9_30 -1.4425 
theta9_316 2.293634 
theta9_321 1.290059 
theta9_322 1.520106 
theta9_323 0.891887 
theta9_326 1.738271 
theta9_328 -1.08181 
theta9_329 1.621966 
theta9_331 1.972695 
theta9_332 1.144739 
theta9_336 2.082639 
theta9_37 -0.94503 
theta9_38 -1.58528 
theta9_39 -1.31639 
theta9_43 1.56987 
theta9_61 -0.98052 
theta9_64 -1.07913 
theta9_65 -1.33154 
theta9_70 -0.88242 
theta9_72 -0.92107 
theta9_77 -2.95127 
theta9_79 -0.89704 
theta9_81 -2.38197 
theta9_83 -1.03935 
theta9_89 -0.92963 
theta9_9 -1.16864 
  
theta10_116 -0.41599 
theta10_131 0.693728 
theta10_135 0.493697 
theta10_148 -0.43757 
theta10_149 -0.58219 
theta10_159 0.46295 
theta10_160 -0.57921 
theta10_189 -0.88912 
theta10_191 0.406919 
theta10_215 0.44846 
theta10_218 0.489732 
theta10_225 0.388109 
theta10_238 -0.51054 
theta10_245 -0.57854 
theta10_248 -0.48088 
theta10_279 -0.42923 
theta10_282 -0.69048 
theta10_289 0.505231 
theta10_291 0.877839 
theta10_292 0.3897 
theta10_301 0.640167 
theta10_309 0.84836 
theta10_310 0.715607 
theta10_313 0.63757 
theta10_315 0.865825 
theta10_316 1.3887 
theta10_317 0.525375 
theta10_319 0.899104 
theta10_320 0.395722 
theta10_321 0.557889 
theta10_322 0.59834
theta10_324 -0.4604
theta10_325 0.657532
theta10_331 1.121825
theta10_332 0.679638
theta10_333 -0.47974
theta10_38 -0.39369
theta10_49 -0.49275
theta10_50 -0.45041
theta10_51 -0.55062
theta10_55 -0.66427
theta10_57 -0.91424
theta10_61 -0.4643
theta10_64 -0.38908
theta10_65 -0.43242
theta10_77 -0.87967
theta10_81 -0.62981
theta10_83 -0.5096
theta10_9 -0.4905
theta10_91 -0.43558
  
theta11_105 1.570932
theta11_113 -1.13633
theta11_121 1.397151
theta11_126 1.746544
theta11_129 -1.32254
theta11_140 -2.03057
theta11_148 -1.13767
theta11_156 -2.48381
theta11_160 -2.60046
theta11_171 1.626438
theta11_182 -1.76152
theta11_189 -1.23077
theta11_203 -1.50873
theta11_217 2.244192
theta11_230 1.060146
theta11_233 -1.23731
theta11_236 1.068391
theta11_24 -1.2123
theta11_246 1.480379
theta11_259 1.351866
theta11_260 1.162224
theta11_262 -1.06232
theta11_266 -1.18993
theta11_272 1.128706
theta11_276 1.287011
theta11_286 -1.15916
theta11_287 -1.07203
theta11_289 -1.11993
theta11_291 -1.11112
theta11_294 1.497659
theta11_305 -1.22923
theta11_309 1.239804
theta11_312 1.150815
theta11_316 2.589788
theta11_318 -1.40946
theta11_319 1.241107
theta11_329 1.317011
theta11_331 1.362959
theta11_332 1.562619
theta11_334 1.413035
theta11_47 -1.47334
theta11_64 -1.0799
theta11_65 -1.19759
theta11_69 1.11716
theta11_71 1.160781
theta11_72 1.066333
theta11_80 2.266015
theta11_9 -1.40978
theta11_90 1.071149
  
theta12_103 1.806263
theta12_110 -2.1854
theta12_114 2.435614
theta12_117 -2.32232
theta12_12 1.697484
theta12_120 2.963367
theta12_131 1.638038
theta12_137 -1.89879
theta12_141 2.570161
theta12_144 -1.69412
theta12_149 -3.43906
theta12_15 -1.51954
theta12_153 -1.71347
theta12_174 2.348354
theta12_175 2.279476
theta12_176 -1.95005
theta12_179 -1.91504
theta12_184 2.399103
theta12_189 -2.09002
theta12_193 -1.62494
theta12_194 3.11192
theta12_216 -1.50363
theta12_227 -1.73945
theta12_236 2.334612
theta12_238 -2.20622
theta12_239 2.501142
theta12_245 -1.7439
theta12_260 1.844493
theta12_261 -2.24588
theta12_271 3.715081
theta12_272 1.912137
theta12_282 -2.9557
theta12_295 2.235561
theta12_296 1.837957
theta12_3 1.656567
theta12_301 1.547405
theta12_309 -3.06046
theta12_316 3.557688
theta12_320 1.818825
theta12_321 2.008455
theta12_322 2.652602
theta12_323 1.501828
theta12_326 2.471078
theta12_328 -1.63554
theta12_331 1.665773
theta12_333 -3.80595
theta12_335 -1.76931
theta12_38 -3.03992
theta12_39 -1.65795
theta12_4 -1.69906
theta12_40 -1.77555
theta12_43 1.908517
theta12_46 3.153131
theta12_5 -1.94082
theta12_56 -1.75913
theta12_57 -3.71838
theta12_62 -2.11997
theta12_64 -1.75334
theta12_65 -2.64933
theta12_78 2.634668
theta12_80 2.521675
theta12_81 -2.44852
theta12_83 -3.79524
theta12_9 -3.14685
theta12_99 -1.60724
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Table D.3.  Step 1.2 : inding the significant fixed effects by iteratively testing each municipality in each 
sector separately. Significance criteria: 50% of median adjusted sector expenditure 
Parameter Estimate 
theta1_49 2.675429 
theta1_77 2.447552 
theta1_129 -2.61258 
theta1_161 -2.80228 
theta1_292 2.561889 
theta1_293 2.174959 
theta1_296 2.944082 
theta1_315 3.031456 
theta1_316 2.325234 
theta1_321 2.178223 
  
theta3_69 -0.72318 
theta3_91 -0.89141 
theta3_108 0.653298 
theta3_112 0.790381 
theta3_130 -0.86873 
theta3_131 0.902343 
theta3_162 0.619189 
theta3_189 0.740446 
theta3_193 -0.67446 
theta3_204 1.084486 
theta3_212 0.682027 
theta3_213 0.7749 
theta3_216 0.790045 
theta3_225 0.679343 
theta3_227 1.12961 
theta3_261 0.769137 
theta3_280 0.682911 
theta3_282 -0.62712 
theta3_310 1.106615 
theta3_326 -1.13103 
  
theta5_52 1.18638 
theta5_70 -1.11806 
theta5_79 1.313334 
theta5_117 1.279862 
theta5_119 1.308152 
theta5_141 -1.28824 
theta5_156 -1.52663 
theta5_161 -1.18956 
theta5_173 1.229448 
theta5_186 1.291621 
theta5_188 1.152739 
theta5_189 1.397765 
theta5_194 1.116138 
theta5_198 1.145146 
theta5_272 1.067865 
theta5_282 1.185119 
theta5_291 -1.3611 
theta5_296 -1.3892 
theta5_316 -1.90145 
theta5_326 1.717065 
theta5_328 1.221282 
theta5_333 1.438533 
theta5_335 1.484908 
  
theta6_16 0.76074 
theta6_17 -0.91809 
theta6_44 1.00963 
theta6_45 0.759663 
theta6_50 1.189923 
 
Parameter Estimate 
theta6_52 1.084153 
theta6_80 -0.77019 
theta6_81 -0.89684 
theta6_84 -0.72857 
theta6_89 0.788844 
theta6_124 1.297489 
theta6_167 0.949125 
theta6_190 -0.76672 
theta6_247 1.318633 
theta6_284 1.184726 
theta6_290 0.875752 
theta6_317 -1.18945 
theta6_324 0.803027 
theta6_328 -0.94841 
  
theta7_5 0.574164 
theta7_55 -0.56491 
theta7_57 -0.59888 
theta7_78 0.781906 
theta7_81 0.664595 
theta7_83 0.654688 
theta7_91 1.22706 
theta7_129 0.672908 
theta7_130 -0.65441 
theta7_131 -0.65921 
theta7_140 -0.67016 
theta7_158 0.917371 
theta7_160 -0.71154 
theta7_176 -0.58503 
theta7_185 0.648741 
theta7_187 0.602232 
theta7_189 0.568557 
theta7_198 0.615895 
theta7_217 -0.58095 
theta7_218 -0.71089 
theta7_229 0.607823 
theta7_239 0.840565 
theta7_250 0.635286 
theta7_260 -0.5905 
theta7_263 0.745341 
theta7_271 -0.592 
theta7_281 0.745883 
theta7_283 1.203853 
theta7_286 -0.57212 
theta7_296 -0.70757 
theta7_329 -0.61393 
  
theta9_3 1.305605 
theta9_54 0.912712 
theta9_57 1.050132 
theta9_77 -1.10134 
theta9_80 -0.89288 
theta9_84 1.050792 
theta9_131 1.384572 
theta9_147 0.903929 
theta9_161 1.060093 
theta9_194 -1.12884 
theta9_225 -0.98143 
theta9_247 -1.17927 
theta9_252 1.557777 
theta9_261 1.101456 
theta9_267 -1.04635 
theta9_282 1.863152 
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theta9_305 -0.9662 
theta9_319 -0.97212 
theta9_330 -1.01706 
theta9_336 1.306519 
  
theta10_48 0.430449 
theta10_51 -0.51072 
theta10_55 -0.48696 
theta10_57 -0.5422 
theta10_129 0.48258 
theta10_131 0.49746 
theta10_159 0.503876 
theta10_173 0.47712 
theta10_176 0.526341 
theta10_189 -0.61743 
theta10_193 0.516093 
theta10_218 0.549219 
theta10_253 -0.41456 
theta10_282 -0.64367 
theta10_285 0.398382 
theta10_288 -0.40124 
theta10_291 0.617929 
theta10_300 -0.45889 
theta10_301 0.467864 
theta10_309 0.51387 
theta10_310 0.614615 
theta10_313 0.490303 
theta10_314 0.396658 
theta10_315 0.628729 
theta10_317 0.513632 
theta10_319 0.563562 
theta10_324 -0.52513 
theta10_325 0.744901 
theta10_326 -0.75253 
theta10_331 0.611699 
  
theta11_24 -1.19743 
theta11_47 -1.38467 
theta11_55 1.076062 
theta11_72 1.224848 
theta11_75 -1.25027 
theta11_80 2.443337 
theta11_105 1.588572 
theta11_121 1.28425 
theta11_126 1.745308 
theta11_129 -1.19009 
theta11_140 -2.0513 
theta11_156 -2.10452 
theta11_160 -1.96153 
theta11_171 1.360916 
theta11_182 -1.38481 
theta11_203 -1.07476 
theta11_217 2.131248 
theta11_246 1.655787 
theta11_259 1.058892 
theta11_262 -1.11148 
theta11_276 1.43714 
theta11_277 1.068457 
theta11_287 -1.11591 
theta11_288 -1.22303 
theta11_289 -1.33623 
theta11_290 -1.22585 
theta11_291 -1.54209 
theta11_293 -1.30073 
theta11_305 -1.36397 
theta11_309 1.133231 
theta11_316 1.277997 
theta11_318 -1.38101 
theta11_322 -1.46219 
  
theta12_46 2.64055 
theta12_57 -2.01023 
theta12_70 1.921818 
theta12_77 2.569448 
theta12_78 2.433505 
theta12_79 1.808474 
theta12_80 3.095128 
theta12_83 -2.11764 
theta12_91 2.715081 
theta12_114 1.613251 
theta12_117 -2.04918 
theta12_120 1.56106 
theta12_144 -1.93198 
theta12_156 1.485173 
theta12_157 2.050122 
theta12_158 -1.49348 
theta12_160 3.254111 
theta12_175 1.634188 
theta12_184 1.548583 
theta12_194 2.734418 
theta12_237 1.478127 
theta12_239 2.892337 
theta12_247 1.885476 
theta12_261 -1.61098 
theta12_271 2.919608 
theta12_282 -3.01394 
theta12_291 -1.49728 
theta12_294 -1.86956 
theta12_309 -4.7214 
theta12_315 -1.65668 
theta12_331 -1.4713 
theta12_332 -1.47994 
theta12_333 -3.13194 
theta12_335 -1.65296 
theta12_336 -1.80781 
  
theta0_2 -1.08427 
theta0_3 -1.85679 
theta0_4 1.065492 
theta0_5 1.448805 
theta0_6 0.502213 
theta0_7 0.620795 
theta0_9 3.212049 
theta0_10 -0.50797 
theta0_11 -0.45135 
theta0_12 -0.8952 
theta0_13 0.565355 
theta0_15 1.350448 
theta0_18 -0.52221 
theta0_19 0.473782 
theta0_21 1.540622 
theta0_23 1.517267 
theta0_25 0.840511 
theta0_26 1.082202 
theta0_28 -0.45771 
theta0_29 1.430644 
theta0_30 1.744571 
theta0_34 0.714256 
theta0_37 1.570725 
theta0_38 3.220085 
theta0_39 1.992623 
theta0_40 1.280709 
theta0_42 0.952414 
theta0_43 -2.5243 
theta0_44 -0.51509 
theta0_46 -0.90824 
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theta0_47 0.784008 
theta0_48 0.561184 
theta0_49 0.965651 
theta0_52 -1.49464 
theta0_54 -0.535 
theta0_55 1.31035 
theta0_56 1.071145 
theta0_57 2.481737 
theta0_58 1.009483 
theta0_59 -0.46032 
theta0_61 1.956757 
theta0_62 1.768722 
theta0_64 1.721936 
theta0_65 2.530854 
theta0_66 0.719493 
theta0_67 0.723852 
theta0_68 0.649073 
theta0_69 -1.40252 
theta0_70 1.195802 
theta0_71 -0.97487 
theta0_72 0.836836 
theta0_73 -1.28805 
theta0_76 1.605037 
theta0_77 3.335019 
theta0_78 -0.9109 
theta0_80 -1.26168 
theta0_81 3.170913 
theta0_82 1.513362 
theta0_83 2.665912 
theta0_86 0.517231 
theta0_89 1.029835 
theta0_90 -0.98953 
theta0_92 -0.89099 
theta0_93 -1.21688 
theta0_96 -0.65276 
theta0_97 -1.00515 
theta0_99 0.548412 
theta0_100 -0.86821 
theta0_103 -1.44984 
theta0_106 0.788311 
theta0_107 -0.4936 
theta0_109 -0.7943 
theta0_110 1.764727 
theta0_114 -1.3054 
theta0_117 1.039107 
theta0_118 -1.37758 
theta0_120 -1.65463 
theta0_121 -0.49379 
theta0_122 -0.57739 
theta0_124 2.011116 
theta0_125 1.127203 
theta0_129 0.5623 
theta0_131 -3.38981 
theta0_135 -1.46442 
theta0_137 1.79168 
theta0_138 1.059496 
theta0_139 0.761058 
theta0_140 0.728076 
theta0_141 -1.34219 
theta0_144 0.560805 
theta0_145 -1.13697 
theta0_147 -0.7315 
theta0_148 1.542388 
theta0_149 2.592547 
theta0_150 0.969751 
theta0_152 1.003066 
theta0_153 0.783099 
theta0_154 1.118718 
theta0_155 0.639283 
theta0_156 1.036514 
theta0_158 -0.85289 
theta0_159 -1.49675 
theta0_160 2.338303 
theta0_161 0.893329 
theta0_164 0.595244 
theta0_168 0.887902 
theta0_170 0.653876 
theta0_171 -0.81488 
theta0_174 -2.05132 
theta0_175 -1.25682 
theta0_176 1.847951 
theta0_178 -0.95782 
theta0_179 1.094608 
theta0_180 -1.28312 
theta0_182 1.298062 
theta0_184 -0.77795 
theta0_186 -0.62131 
theta0_188 -0.63852 
theta0_189 2.003406 
theta0_190 -1.23224 
theta0_191 -1.04553 
theta0_192 -2.77074 
theta0_193 1.215782 
theta0_194 -0.98964 
theta0_195 0.522417 
theta0_196 -0.44554 
theta0_198 -1.59018 
theta0_199 -0.53516 
theta0_203 1.892306 
theta0_204 -0.94715 
theta0_205 -0.46038 
theta0_206 -0.61526 
theta0_213 0.710306 
theta0_215 -1.12145 
theta0_216 1.814372 
theta0_217 -1.15547 
theta0_218 -1.25263 
theta0_219 -0.66539 
theta0_221 0.794129 
theta0_224 -1.34555 
theta0_225 -1.09943 
theta0_227 1.843773 
theta0_229 -0.87869 
theta0_230 -0.63382 
theta0_233 0.980511 
theta0_234 -0.93491 
theta0_236 -2.37316 
theta0_238 1.624696 
theta0_241 -0.85586 
theta0_242 1.122105 
theta0_245 2.063861 
theta0_246 0.887386 
theta0_247 2.273133 
theta0_248 1.596903 
theta0_249 1.15039 
theta0_250 0.455395 
theta0_251 1.471437 
theta0_252 -1.81495 
theta0_253 -1.32105 
theta0_254 -1.02625 
theta0_255 0.838881 
theta0_259 -1.46131 
theta0_260 -1.78362 
theta0_261 0.670739 
theta0_262 -0.65558 
theta0_264 -0.89529 
theta0_266 1.001853 
theta0_269 0.454789 
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theta0_271 -2.06453 
theta0_272 -1.13246 
theta0_273 -0.47732 
theta0_275 -0.87427 
theta0_277 -0.7015 
theta0_279 1.164979 
theta0_281 0.827389 
theta0_282 0.960478 
theta0_286 1.156234 
theta0_288 0.515526 
theta0_289 -0.64542 
theta0_290 -0.50994 
theta0_292 -1.8741 
theta0_293 -1.99079 
theta0_294 -2.10157 
theta0_295 -2.13101 
theta0_296 -2.23417 
theta0_300 0.952365 
theta0_301 -1.4465 
theta0_302 -0.93668 
theta0_307 -0.65346 
theta0_308 0.844743 
theta0_309 -0.56257 
theta0_311 -1.43473 
theta0_312 -0.91633 
theta0_313 -0.86962 
theta0_314 0.770876 
theta0_315 -0.99681 
theta0_316 -4.65528 
theta0_317 -0.88818 
theta0_318 0.948898 
theta0_319 -1.89237 
theta0_320 -1.60093 
theta0_321 -2.79152 
theta0_322 -2.51557 
theta0_323 -1.34995 
theta0_324 1.127504 
theta0_326 -3.57345 
theta0_328 0.865011 
theta0_329 -2.26257 
theta0_330 -0.48776 
theta0_331 -4.00124 
theta0_332 -2.27405 
theta0_333 1.167172 
theta0_334 -0.65499 
theta0_335 0.603645 
theta0_336 -2.49253 
 
 
  
Documents 6/2011 Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context
Statistics Norway 139
Table D.4. Step 1.3 : finding the significant fixed effects by iteratively testing each municipality in each 
sector separately. Significance criteria: Significance criteria : t-value >=1.5 
Parameter Estimate t-value
theta0_124 2.011 2.99
theta0_137 1.792 2.88
theta0_149 2.593 1.61
theta0_15 1.350 1.92
theta0_156 1.037 2.18
theta0_160 2.338 2.97
theta0_161 0.893 1.70
theta0_176 1.848 2.45
theta0_189 2.003 5.00
theta0_203 1.892 1.74
theta0_21 1.541 1.85
theta0_216 1.814 2.57
theta0_227 1.844 3.52
theta0_245 2.064 1.89
theta0_247 2.273 3.29
theta0_266 1.002 1.52
theta0_333 1.167 1.71
theta0_38 3.220 2.45
theta0_39 1.993 1.82
theta0_49 0.966 1.84
theta0_55 1.310 2.44
theta0_57 2.482 1.68
theta0_61 1.957 3.16
theta0_65 2.531 3.15
theta0_70 1.196 1.88
theta0_77 3.335 5.18
theta0_81 3.171 7.67
theta0_82 1.513 2.28
theta0_83 2.666 2.38
theta0_9 3.212 2.76
   
theta1_11 0.858 1.74
theta1_124 0.701 1.55
theta1_131 0.630 2.04
theta1_140 1.113 3.22
theta1_158 1.554 2.38
theta1_170 0.465 1.50
theta1_22 1.425 2.89
theta1_234 0.894 1.75
theta1_242 1.071 1.72
theta1_246 1.382 3.11
theta1_253 1.933 4.95
theta1_277 0.756 1.50
theta1_286 1.401 1.98
theta1_288 0.907 2.42
theta1_289 0.630 1.55
theta1_290 1.386 1.52
theta1_291 1.174 3.04
theta1_292 2.562 4.68
theta1_293 2.175 4.45
theta1_294 1.591 4.72
theta1_296 2.944 7.83
theta1_297 1.914 5.15
theta1_300 1.129 2.79
theta1_305 1.707 3.22
theta1_309 2.128 4.24
theta1_315 3.031 5.64
theta1_321 2.178 3.85
theta1_331 1.496 2.68
theta1_332 0.824 2.76
theta1_333 1.593 4.56
theta1_47 0.873 1.64
theta1_49 2.675 5.30
 
 
Parameter Estimate t-value 
theta1_60 1.095 2.45 
theta1_77 2.448 8.16 
theta1_80 0.947 1.68 
theta1_90 1.452 3.06 
theta1_91 1.207 2.55 
   
theta2_110 1.330 2.32 
theta2_120 1.817 4.26 
theta2_124 0.925 2.78 
theta2_129 1.189 3.93 
theta2_138 0.645 1.54 
theta2_141 1.118 2.95 
theta2_160 2.108 4.93 
theta2_161 1.031 1.55 
theta2_176 1.401 2.98 
theta2_197 1.157 2.19 
theta2_198 0.824 2.17 
theta2_200 1.479 4.90 
theta2_229 1.126 3.39 
theta2_239 1.354 2.80 
theta2_246 0.956 3.48 
theta2_247 1.595 4.93 
theta2_266 0.839 2.31 
theta2_270 1.033 2.05 
theta2_275 1.023 1.84 
theta2_281 0.714 1.82 
theta2_288 1.254 3.07 
theta2_291 2.713 5.77 
theta2_308 1.635 1.74 
theta2_311 1.951 5.04 
theta2_321 2.870 4.03 
theta2_326 2.494 4.38 
theta2_330 2.893 5.91 
theta2_334 1.252 2.82 
theta2_43 1.138 1.58 
theta2_54 0.895 2.37 
theta2_55 1.247 3.48 
theta2_58 1.240 1.59 
theta2_72 1.154 2.68 
theta2_88 2.014 5.38 
theta2_90 0.656 1.71 
   
theta3_108 0.653 1.57 
theta3_112 0.790 1.62 
theta3_121 0.588 1.82 
theta3_131 0.902 4.93 
theta3_156 0.402 1.51 
theta3_162 0.619 2.05 
theta3_189 0.740 3.77 
theta3_19 0.459 3.93 
theta3_191 0.507 1.82 
theta3_204 1.084 7.38 
theta3_212 0.682 3.32 
theta3_213 0.775 5.26 
theta3_216 0.790 2.39 
theta3_225 0.679 3.67 
theta3_227 1.130 5.10 
theta3_229 0.320 2.78 
theta3_23 0.523 2.43 
theta3_230 0.446 4.76 
theta3_238 0.556 2.86 
theta3_24 0.336 1.83 
theta3_261 0.769 2.93 
theta3_269 0.489 3.35 
theta3_279 0.346 1.56 
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theta3_280 0.683 2.30
theta3_283 0.609 2.74
theta3_285 0.407 3.16
theta3_292 0.402 2.35
theta3_293 0.277 2.15
theta3_295 0.252 2.38
theta3_309 0.463 4.99
theta3_310 1.107 10.71
theta3_328 0.477 2.12
theta3_334 0.354 1.64
theta3_52 0.335 1.50
theta3_67 0.206 2.99
theta3_72 0.396 7.80
theta3_96 0.588 1.69
   
theta4_116 1.214 2.90
theta4_136 1.054 3.78
theta4_14 0.340 1.76
theta4_145 0.752 2.75
theta4_151 0.413 1.54
theta4_153 1.028 4.19
theta4_155 0.804 3.59
theta4_159 0.756 3.61
theta4_160 1.178 4.25
theta4_162 0.922 3.09
theta4_181 0.536 1.56
theta4_182 1.243 6.43
theta4_183 0.822 4.49
theta4_191 0.866 1.50
theta4_212 0.900 7.61
theta4_221 0.797 2.71
theta4_222 0.314 1.62
theta4_225 0.958 1.87
theta4_227 0.504 1.88
theta4_229 0.992 3.37
theta4_247 1.205 2.64
theta4_248 0.719 1.70
theta4_262 0.572 1.66
theta4_264 0.857 2.59
theta4_276 0.887 3.96
theta4_296 0.789 2.31
theta4_30 0.644 2.81
theta4_317 0.823 2.12
theta4_32 0.346 2.26
theta4_321 1.407 3.70
theta4_326 0.933 2.04
theta4_329 1.472 2.20
theta4_33 0.394 1.56
theta4_332 1.066 3.39
theta4_335 0.895 1.77
theta4_42 0.687 1.56
theta4_6 0.379 1.90
   
theta5_116 0.992 3.03
theta5_117 1.280 6.11
theta5_118 0.654 1.55
theta5_119 1.308 2.99
theta5_13 0.803 2.16
theta5_173 1.229 2.12
theta5_186 1.292 2.15
theta5_188 1.153 3.71
theta5_189 1.398 7.78
theta5_194 1.116 2.39
theta5_198 1.145 4.61
theta5_216 0.414 1.60
theta5_217 0.659 2.60
theta5_218 0.674 1.82
theta5_225 0.626 1.66
theta5_240 0.513 2.00 
theta5_25 0.505 1.54 
theta5_261 0.409 1.51 
theta5_264 0.699 1.73 
theta5_268 0.670 3.29 
theta5_270 0.489 2.29 
theta5_272 1.068 1.90 
theta5_273 0.976 2.96 
theta5_279 0.566 2.48 
theta5_281 0.483 3.10 
theta5_282 1.185 6.46 
theta5_292 0.431 1.65 
theta5_293 0.301 1.94 
theta5_294 0.708 3.80 
theta5_298 1.023 4.19 
theta5_299 0.340 2.11 
theta5_317 0.662 1.60 
theta5_318 1.011 2.20 
theta5_320 0.809 2.96 
theta5_326 1.717 9.78 
theta5_327 0.555 2.46 
theta5_328 1.221 7.24 
theta5_333 1.439 5.59 
theta5_334 0.944 1.89 
theta5_335 1.485 5.84 
theta5_43 0.655 3.22 
theta5_50 0.824 3.18 
theta5_52 1.186 1.86 
theta5_71 0.605 3.05 
theta5_79 1.313 3.78 
   
theta6_100 0.656 2.33 
theta6_104 0.294 1.70 
theta6_108 0.421 2.28 
theta6_124 1.297 6.14 
theta6_126 0.388 2.22 
theta6_131 0.554 2.86 
theta6_16 0.761 3.57 
theta6_167 0.949 1.72 
theta6_171 0.651 2.01 
theta6_176 0.408 1.57 
theta6_199 0.690 3.48 
theta6_2 0.625 2.42 
theta6_225 0.330 2.24 
theta6_230 0.466 1.82 
theta6_247 1.319 3.48 
theta6_278 0.363 1.81 
theta6_284 1.185 4.50 
theta6_287 0.509 1.69 
theta6_290 0.876 2.44 
theta6_291 0.283 1.55 
theta6_294 0.586 2.99 
theta6_324 0.803 5.69 
theta6_329 0.398 2.23 
theta6_331 0.487 1.96 
theta6_333 0.408 2.45 
theta6_37 0.619 1.97 
theta6_43 0.708 3.35 
theta6_44 1.010 6.10 
theta6_45 0.760 3.12 
theta6_49 0.533 2.01 
theta6_50 1.190 3.65 
theta6_52 1.084 4.34 
theta6_55 0.372 4.07 
theta6_59 0.576 1.55 
theta6_70 0.326 2.03 
theta6_89 0.789 6.35 
theta6_96 0.546 1.78 
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theta7_10 0.471 2.58
theta7_115 0.395 2.47
theta7_119 0.377 2.20
theta7_129 0.673 8.09
theta7_137 0.478 1.80
theta7_14 0.448 2.05
theta7_142 0.545 2.34
theta7_15 0.450 1.97
theta7_158 0.917 3.82
theta7_174 0.554 4.52
theta7_185 0.649 1.93
theta7_186 0.221 1.60
theta7_187 0.602 2.65
theta7_189 0.569 3.20
theta7_191 0.445 2.91
theta7_198 0.616 3.16
theta7_229 0.608 7.54
theta7_239 0.841 9.12
theta7_243 0.469 1.77
theta7_250 0.635 4.31
theta7_263 0.745 3.48
theta7_266 0.460 2.78
theta7_27 0.347 1.77
theta7_281 0.746 3.68
theta7_283 1.204 12.40
theta7_309 0.399 3.51
theta7_323 0.552 2.51
theta7_324 0.185 1.60
theta7_331 0.365 1.97
theta7_335 0.223 1.74
theta7_5 0.574 2.90
theta7_59 0.215 2.46
theta7_70 0.285 2.10
theta7_78 0.782 6.24
theta7_81 0.665 3.54
theta7_83 0.655 5.69
theta7_91 1.227 10.87
theta7_93 0.467 2.02
   
theta8_125 4.655 3.40
theta8_140 1.766 2.24
theta8_141 3.806 3.21
theta8_180 1.910 1.57
theta8_184 3.637 5.55
theta8_191 2.215 1.94
theta8_192 1.552 2.85
theta8_203 3.100 3.27
theta8_210 4.546 7.29
theta8_225 2.203 2.11
theta8_233 2.567 1.76
theta8_254 1.767 2.01
theta8_257 1.921 1.95
theta8_266 2.599 4.66
theta8_268 2.288 1.97
theta8_271 2.784 3.61
theta8_281 4.653 3.75
theta8_282 5.073 7.20
theta8_288 3.546 4.57
theta8_289 1.569 1.50
theta8_300 2.613 3.62
theta8_302 2.238 2.12
theta8_304 1.971 2.75
theta8_306 2.638 3.36
theta8_308 2.780 3.05
theta8_309 1.400 1.92
theta8_312 1.638 2.46
theta8_314 2.861 2.60
theta8_324 3.251 3.69 
theta8_331 3.386 5.09 
theta8_44 2.732 3.14 
theta8_48 1.930 1.56 
theta8_69 2.192 2.82 
theta8_75 1.718 1.83 
   
theta9_10 0.469 1.51 
theta9_118 0.579 4.09 
theta9_120 0.450 2.38 
theta9_131 1.385 8.00 
theta9_135 0.583 1.84 
theta9_144 0.756 3.43 
theta9_147 0.904 2.73 
theta9_153 0.477 2.12 
theta9_156 0.876 6.87 
theta9_160 0.451 2.52 
theta9_161 1.060 6.52 
theta9_162 0.554 1.73 
theta9_174 0.591 2.03 
theta9_190 0.413 1.56 
theta9_192 0.695 1.53 
theta9_2 0.451 1.54 
theta9_202 0.652 1.59 
theta9_218 0.521 2.17 
theta9_229 0.527 1.76 
theta9_230 0.696 1.56 
theta9_252 1.558 3.89 
theta9_261 1.101 3.41 
theta9_275 0.619 2.20 
theta9_277 0.683 2.01 
theta9_282 1.863 7.99 
theta9_293 0.754 2.10 
theta9_296 0.505 3.04 
theta9_3 1.306 4.92 
theta9_50 0.377 1.64 
theta9_54 0.913 3.30 
theta9_57 1.050 4.12 
theta9_59 0.750 2.53 
theta9_83 0.451 1.94 
theta9_84 1.051 1.87 
theta9_91 0.400 2.45 
theta9_95 0.656 1.96 
theta9_99 0.823 1.78 
theta9_329 0.473 1.91 
theta9_331 0.398 1.66 
theta9_333 0.353 1.76 
theta9_336 1.307 6.82 
   
theta10_129 0.483 3.69 
theta10_131 0.497 6.62 
theta10_135 0.352 2.58 
theta10_140 0.191 2.60 
theta10_146 0.229 1.55 
theta10_159 0.504 4.17 
theta10_161 0.167 1.65 
theta10_173 0.477 3.64 
theta10_176 0.526 8.28 
theta10_181 0.299 1.79 
theta10_191 0.230 2.92 
theta10_193 0.516 2.14 
theta10_195 0.226 1.70 
theta10_198 0.226 3.89 
theta10_203 0.369 2.00 
theta10_215 0.372 4.51 
theta10_218 0.549 6.72 
theta10_220 0.298 2.90 
theta10_226 0.258 1.69 
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theta10_271 0.137 2.91
theta10_285 0.398 3.08
theta10_287 0.317 2.10
theta10_289 0.368 4.24
theta10_291 0.618 4.51
theta10_299 0.218 1.53
theta10_301 0.468 3.49
theta10_309 0.514 4.27
theta10_310 0.615 5.55
theta10_313 0.490 2.46
theta10_314 0.397 1.76
theta10_315 0.629 5.59
theta10_317 0.514 3.65
theta10_319 0.564 4.19
theta10_320 0.183 1.85
theta10_325 0.745 6.05
theta10_331 0.612 4.54
theta10_332 0.273 3.49
theta10_48 0.430 3.28
   
theta11_105 1.589 2.95
theta11_121 1.284 1.90
theta11_126 1.745 3.85
theta11_128 0.800 4.23
theta11_130 0.903 3.48
theta11_138 0.919 2.43
theta11_171 1.361 2.24
theta11_18 0.779 1.91
theta11_217 2.131 5.54
theta11_241 0.786 2.24
theta11_246 1.656 4.52
theta11_259 1.059 5.16
theta11_267 0.684 2.02
theta11_276 1.437 3.36
theta11_294 0.867 3.30
theta11_30 0.938 1.78
theta11_309 1.133 1.88
theta11_312 0.889 2.63
theta11_332 1.042 3.08
theta11_54 0.775 1.79
theta11_59 0.760 1.61
theta11_70 0.818 5.78
theta11_72 1.225 2.29 
theta11_80 2.443 5.66 
theta11_94 0.962 2.60 
   
theta12_114 1.613 1.84 
theta12_116 1.459 3.14 
theta12_12 1.163 3.12 
theta12_120 1.561 4.88 
theta12_130 0.699 2.30 
theta12_156 1.485 7.13 
theta12_157 2.050 8.96 
theta12_160 3.254 5.65 
theta12_175 1.634 4.17 
theta12_18 0.566 1.51 
theta12_184 1.549 3.23 
theta12_194 2.734 5.76 
theta12_217 1.278 1.80 
theta12_237 1.478 2.42 
theta12_239 2.892 6.51 
theta12_247 1.885 5.51 
theta12_266 0.767 1.76 
theta12_271 2.920 6.44 
theta12_272 0.982 2.66 
theta12_275 0.946 2.39 
theta12_296 1.117 2.50 
theta12_301 0.997 1.66 
theta12_305 1.429 2.57 
theta12_320 0.780 1.53 
theta12_46 2.641 5.30 
theta12_49 0.839 1.60 
theta12_70 1.922 4.20 
theta12_72 1.101 1.72 
theta12_77 2.569 8.15 
theta12_78 2.434 4.36 
theta12_79 1.808 5.88 
theta12_80 3.095 12.59 
theta12_81 1.205 2.05 
theta12_91 2.715 5.28 
theta12_92 0.829 1.92 
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Table D. 5. Summary of the number of significant effects in estimating model 4 
Service sector 
Number of 
significant fixed 
effects (12 sectors 
simultaneously 
tested)
Number of 
significant fixed 
effects (13 sectors 
simultaneously 
tested)
Number of significant 
fixed effects (13 sectors 
separately tested). 
Significance criterion: 
50% median adjusted 
expenditure
Number of significant 
fixed effects (13 sectors 
separately tested). 
Significance criterion: t-
value >= 1,5
0. Budget surplus ............ 0 328 215 30
1. Administration ............. 35 310 10 37
2. Primary schools .......... 1 273 0 35
3. Other education .......... 27 283 20 37
4. Child care ................... 8 288 1 37
5. Health care ................. 40 310 23 45
6. Social assistance ........ 23 256 19 37
7. Child protection ........... 29 274 31 38
8. Care for the elderly and 
disabled ......................... 4 286 0 34
9. Culture ....................... 59 316 20 41
10. Municipal roads ......... 50 309 30 38
11. Water supply and 
sanitation ....................... 49 303 33 25
12. Other infrastructure .... 65 319 35 35
     
Total without sector 0 ...... 390 n/a 222 439
Total with sector 0 ........... 390 3 855 437 469
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Table D. 6. Step 2.1: Model 4 estimates with the significant fixed effects found in step 1.1 
 Estimate t-value
theta1_103 1.207 1.40
theta1_129 -2.146 -6.03
theta1_131 2.447 5.92
theta1_149 -0.918 -1.05
theta1_160 -2.345 -6.48
theta1_161 -3.065 -7.28
theta1_176 -1.289 -1.75
theta1_180 0.536 0.78
theta1_192 1.780 2.63
theta1_195 -1.263 -2.43
theta1_236 2.739 0.24
theta1_247 -1.591 -3.64
theta1_248 -0.579 -0.51
theta1_253 1.719 5.79
theta1_291 2.014 5.56
theta1_292 3.246 6.95
theta1_293 2.630 4.72
theta1_294 2.725 7.69
theta1_295 1.303 1.92
theta1_296 3.140 9.20
theta1_309 2.263 5.07
theta1_315 3.908 8.38
theta1_316 6.463 0.18
theta1_319 2.233 3.50
theta1_321 2.690 5.38
theta1_326 1.029 1.81
theta1_331 3.856 1.35
theta1_332 1.977 4.17
theta1_38 -0.693 -0.54
theta1_43 0.481 0.55
theta1_5 -1.356 -2.99
theta1_57 -1.173 -1.26
theta1_81 -0.771 -0.30
theta1_82 -1.580 -3.87
theta1_9 -1.224 -1.16
theta2_316 3.917 0.09
theta3_112 0.792 1.98
theta3_130 -0.749 -3.49
theta3_131 0.999 3.69
theta3_149 -0.270 -0.63
theta3_162 0.684 3.41
theta3_193 -0.585 -1.66
theta3_204 1.231 10.32
theta3_212 0.754 4.67
theta3_213 0.828 7.62
theta3_216 0.816 3.13
theta3_225 0.760 4.65
theta3_227 1.130 5.70
theta3_261 0.802 3.52
theta3_280 0.672 3.42
theta3_282 -0.397 -1.25
theta3_292 0.576 4.34
theta3_309 0.857 7.35
theta3_310 1.309 16.06
theta3_316 0.868 0.14
theta3_327 0.499 1.67
theta3_334 0.454 1.22
theta3_58 -0.529 -1.37
theta3_77 -0.259 -0.65
theta3_81 -0.345 -0.50
theta3_82 -0.473 -0.82
theta3_83 -0.356 -0.96
theta3_91 -0.961 -3.31
theta4_21 -1.962 -3.31
theta4_316 2.793 0.16
 
 Estimate t-value 
theta4_321 1.844 2.72 
theta4_326 1.498 1.43 
theta4_329 1.677 1.68 
theta4_332 1.676 2.65 
theta4_77 -1.573 -1.35 
theta4_81 -1.062 -0.36 
theta5_106 -0.678 -1.72 
theta5_110 -0.273 -0.64 
theta5_137 -0.526 -0.59 
theta5_156 -1.659 -4.45 
theta5_160 -1.285 -3.19 
theta5_161 -1.461 -8.46 
theta5_186 1.325 2.60 
theta5_188 1.203 4.97 
theta5_192 0.264 0.59 
theta5_194 1.325 3.28 
theta5_198 1.080 6.52 
theta5_204 0.666 1.70 
theta5_225 0.814 2.88 
theta5_236 1.007 0.14 
theta5_247 -0.893 -2.75 
theta5_248 -0.364 -0.43 
theta5_272 1.257 2.88 
theta5_273 0.936 3.80 
theta5_292 0.739 3.55 
theta5_294 1.022 6.89 
theta5_295 0.424 0.82 
theta5_298 1.169 7.11 
theta5_316 0.116 0.01 
theta5_320 0.806 3.40 
theta5_326 2.209 6.68 
theta5_327 0.894 5.29 
theta5_329 0.831 2.29 
theta5_330 0.178 0.45 
theta5_334 1.134 2.68 
theta5_335 1.359 5.47 
theta5_38 -0.734 -0.70 
theta5_43 0.982 5.31 
theta5_49 -0.715 -1.27 
theta5_52 1.069 2.59 
theta5_70 -1.309 -3.53 
theta5_77 -0.424 -0.90 
theta5_81 -0.038 -0.02 
theta5_83 -0.887 -1.17 
theta5_9 -1.098 -0.84 
theta5_91 -0.759 -1.46 
theta6_100 0.756 3.48 
theta6_124 1.338 8.56 
theta6_16 0.789 5.45 
theta6_167 1.016 2.84 
theta6_17 -0.779 -3.81 
theta6_171 0.738 3.20 
theta6_199 0.728 5.01 
theta6_247 1.189 3.11 
theta6_284 1.172 6.00 
theta6_290 0.880 3.05 
theta6_317 -1.155 -5.94 
theta6_324 0.751 6.52 
theta6_328 -1.099 -3.07 
theta6_331 0.732 0.96 
theta6_43 0.832 2.42 
theta6_44 1.121 8.99 
theta6_45 0.856 4.53 
theta6_50 1.198 3.71 
theta6_52 1.193 5.75 
theta6_58 -0.684 -2.92 
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theta6_80 -0.593 -2.00
theta6_81 -1.078 -0.64
theta6_84 -0.726 -5.00
theta7_11 0.526 1.28
theta7_129 0.719 8.16
theta7_130 -0.613 -1.90
theta7_131 -0.589 -1.19
theta7_140 -0.551 -2.30
theta7_158 0.945 5.52
theta7_160 -0.685 -0.84
theta7_174 0.590 5.87
theta7_176 -0.557 -2.75
theta7_185 0.645 2.69
theta7_187 0.598 3.83
theta7_198 0.614 4.23
theta7_218 -0.739 -2.13
theta7_229 0.571 8.75
theta7_239 0.903 12.61
theta7_250 0.702 6.50
theta7_261 -0.494 -1.52
theta7_263 0.702 4.34
theta7_281 0.754 4.88
theta7_282 -0.367 -1.22
theta7_283 1.256 16.57
theta7_286 -0.436 -1.94
theta7_316 0.919 0.10
theta7_323 0.605 3.31
theta7_331 0.580 0.69
theta7_55 -0.517 -2.42
theta7_57 -0.678 -1.99
theta7_78 0.824 7.92
theta7_91 1.203 8.77
theta8_316 4.386 0.06
theta8_331 6.132 4.74
theta8_77 -2.942 -2.60
theta8_81 -1.633 -0.27
theta9_100 0.531 1.97
theta9_110 -0.077 -0.15
theta9_118 0.503 5.39
theta9_120 0.787 5.92
theta9_124 -0.540 -1.82
theta9_131 1.568 2.94
theta9_135 0.664 2.85
theta9_137 -0.375 -0.57
theta9_141 0.416 1.80
theta9_149 -0.022 -0.03
theta9_15 -0.225 -0.51
theta9_174 0.787 3.24
theta9_176 -0.519 -2.34
theta9_192 0.990 3.28
theta9_203 -0.879 -3.04
theta9_21 -0.646 -1.24
theta9_216 -0.830 -1.64
theta9_224 0.198 0.81
theta9_229 0.505 2.38
theta9_23 -0.232 -0.42
theta9_242 -0.255 -0.72
theta9_245 -0.160 -0.87
theta9_247 -1.173 -5.62
theta9_25 -0.406 -0.50
theta9_252 1.444 5.30
theta9_260 0.928 1.77
theta9_282 1.456 6.00
theta9_286 -0.588 -1.38
theta9_29 -0.511 -1.78
theta9_293 0.997 2.92
theta9_294 0.843 3.41
theta9_295 0.578 1.07
theta9_3 1.417 7.18
theta9_30 -0.736 -2.57 
theta9_316 1.331 0.07 
theta9_321 0.178 0.35 
theta9_322 0.600 2.70 
theta9_323 0.106 0.21 
theta9_326 0.758 2.96 
theta9_328 -0.474 -1.78 
theta9_329 0.877 4.66 
theta9_331 1.731 1.83 
theta9_332 0.681 2.12 
theta9_336 1.361 10.79 
theta9_37 -0.177 -0.40 
theta9_38 -0.702 -0.91 
theta9_39 -0.600 -0.99 
theta9_43 0.061 0.07 
theta9_61 -0.355 -0.72 
theta9_64 -0.187 -0.35 
theta9_65 -0.521 -0.62 
theta9_70 -0.790 -4.11 
theta9_72 -0.726 -2.61 
theta9_77 -1.466 -5.01 
theta9_79 -0.802 -4.34 
theta9_81 -0.380 -0.21 
theta9_83 -0.007 -0.01 
theta9_89 -0.623 -1.39 
theta9_9 -0.052 -0.04 
theta10_116 -0.200 -2.46 
theta10_131 0.753 7.03 
theta10_135 0.413 4.33 
theta10_148 -0.239 -2.05 
theta10_149 -0.204 -0.46 
theta10_159 0.410 5.23 
theta10_160 -0.210 -0.66 
theta10_189 -0.579 -2.13 
theta10_191 0.219 3.87 
theta10_215 0.373 7.01 
theta10_218 0.523 7.72 
theta10_225 0.132 0.52 
theta10_238 -0.306 -1.54 
theta10_245 -0.225 -1.48 
theta10_248 -0.184 -0.88 
theta10_279 -0.331 -2.62 
theta10_282 -0.325 -2.16 
theta10_289 0.500 4.43 
theta10_291 0.876 7.44 
theta10_292 0.215 0.95 
theta10_301 0.560 4.95 
theta10_309 0.837 6.06 
theta10_310 0.777 10.38 
theta10_313 0.539 3.18 
theta10_315 0.836 10.32 
theta10_316 1.167 0.17 
theta10_317 0.556 4.57 
theta10_319 0.779 5.74 
theta10_320 0.257 3.20 
theta10_321 0.275 3.30 
theta10_322 0.320 2.82 
theta10_324 -0.446 -2.54 
theta10_325 0.726 7.38 
theta10_331 1.048 3.36 
theta10_332 0.549 7.16 
theta10_333 -0.346 -3.76 
theta10_38 -0.126 -0.31 
theta10_49 -0.307 -2.56 
theta10_50 -0.363 -1.01 
theta10_51 -0.520 -3.29 
theta10_55 -0.495 -3.30 
theta10_57 -0.586 -4.85 
theta10_61 -0.272 -1.04 
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theta10_64 -0.112 -0.61
theta10_65 -0.212 -1.04
theta10_77 -0.315 -1.13
theta10_81 0.053 0.13
theta10_83 -0.154 -0.64
theta10_9 -0.101 -0.14
theta10_91 -0.055 -0.24
theta11_105 1.584 4.75
theta11_113 -1.009 -1.45
theta11_121 1.197 3.06
theta11_126 1.695 5.98
theta11_129 -1.299 -1.52
theta11_140 -1.859 -2.59
theta11_148 -0.781 -2.08
theta11_156 -2.063 -3.20
theta11_160 -1.731 -2.58
theta11_171 1.444 4.14
theta11_182 -1.289 -5.91
theta11_189 -0.984 -4.49
theta11_203 -1.193 -2.12
theta11_217 2.302 9.71
theta11_230 0.938 0.77
theta11_233 -0.926 -1.76
theta11_236 0.745 0.07
theta11_24 -1.177 -12.35
theta11_246 1.604 6.95
theta11_259 1.102 8.92
theta11_260 1.093 2.37
theta11_262 -1.031 -0.81
theta11_266 -1.222 -2.12
theta11_272 0.837 1.14
theta11_276 1.442 5.41
theta11_286 -0.776 -0.92
theta11_287 -0.902 -1.24
theta11_289 -1.275 -1.27
theta11_291 -1.285 -2.86
theta11_294 1.430 7.70
theta11_305 -1.216 -1.99
theta11_309 0.790 1.78
theta11_312 0.923 4.05
theta11_316 2.104 0.12
theta11_318 -1.287 -5.50
theta11_319 1.000 1.71
theta11_329 0.811 0.99
theta11_331 1.227 0.64
theta11_332 1.085 2.56
theta11_334 1.072 0.70
theta11_47 -1.258 -0.76
theta11_64 -0.613 -0.82
theta11_65 -0.799 -0.83
theta11_69 0.741 1.95
theta11_71 0.838 1.72
theta11_72 1.074 2.45
theta11_80 2.507 7.31
theta11_9 -0.747 -0.34
theta11_90 0.894 1.91
theta12_103 1.024 0.99
theta12_110 -0.565 -0.72
theta12_114 1.460 2.86
theta12_117 -2.204 -6.04
theta12_12 1.078 4.91
theta12_120 1.954 7.84
theta12_131 0.610 0.62 
theta12_137 -0.783 -0.63 
theta12_141 1.568 2.24 
theta12_144 -1.531 -3.38 
theta12_149 -1.561 -0.38 
theta12_15 -0.263 -0.17 
theta12_153 -0.845 -0.89 
theta12_174 1.487 3.37 
theta12_175 1.838 7.06 
theta12_176 -1.526 -3.74 
theta12_179 -1.060 -0.99 
theta12_184 1.545 5.13 
theta12_189 -1.411 -2.29 
theta12_193 -0.631 -0.75 
theta12_194 2.805 9.01 
theta12_216 -0.881 -0.97 
theta12_227 -0.415 -0.26 
theta12_236 1.707 0.99 
theta12_238 -1.269 -1.93 
theta12_239 3.382 11.56 
theta12_245 0.114 0.13 
theta12_260 1.618 2.31 
theta12_261 -2.225 -4.53 
theta12_271 2.432 7.62 
theta12_272 1.288 3.30 
theta12_282 -2.989 -5.25 
theta12_295 0.823 1.26 
theta12_296 1.454 4.63 
theta12_3 1.265 3.27 
theta12_301 0.793 1.78 
theta12_309 -4.315 -7.39 
theta12_316 1.448 0.04 
theta12_320 0.946 2.34 
theta12_321 0.122 0.14 
theta12_322 0.927 1.81 
theta12_323 0.136 0.28 
theta12_326 1.147 2.01 
theta12_328 -1.763 -3.18 
theta12_331 0.527 0.45 
theta12_333 -3.700 -9.44 
theta12_335 -1.661 -2.81 
theta12_38 -1.529 -0.80 
theta12_39 -0.391 -0.23 
theta12_4 -0.484 -0.90 
theta12_40 -0.948 -0.91 
theta12_43 -0.371 -0.36 
theta12_46 2.599 8.37 
theta12_5 -1.018 -0.65 
theta12_56 -0.686 -0.70 
theta12_57 -2.628 -5.05 
theta12_62 -1.145 -0.63 
theta12_64 -0.481 -0.36 
theta12_65 -1.248 -0.72 
theta12_78 2.472 5.97 
theta12_80 3.242 17.39 
theta12_81 0.455 0.13 
theta12_83 -2.287 -2.86 
theta12_9 -1.470 -0.87 
theta12_99 -1.154 -1.33 
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Table D.7. Step 2.2: Model 4 estimates with the significant fixed effects found in step 1.2 
 Estimate t-value
theta1_49 2.563 5.86
theta1_77 2.128 6.11
theta1_129 -2.194 -1.72
theta1_161 -2.908 -5.40
theta1_292 2.527 5.18
theta1_293 1.887 4.38
theta1_296 2.199 3.16
theta1_315 3.503 6.04
theta1_316 2.116 0.60
theta1_321 2.119 4.46
theta3_69 -0.728 -1.24
theta3_91 -0.887 -4.45
theta3_108 0.732 2.22
theta3_112 0.837 2.45
theta3_130 -0.735 -3.51
theta3_131 0.880 4.74
theta3_162 0.670 3.40
theta3_189 0.719 3.44
theta3_193 -0.517 -1.38
theta3_204 1.183 10.61
theta3_212 0.744 4.79
theta3_213 0.801 7.54
theta3_216 0.815 3.32
theta3_225 0.648 4.44
theta3_227 1.100 7.10
theta3_261 0.854 3.42
theta3_280 0.632 3.21
theta3_282 -0.371 -0.88
theta3_310 1.239 15.51
theta3_326 -0.993 -2.53
theta4_316 2.390 0.52
theta5_52 1.184 2.73
theta5_70 -0.912 -3.04
theta5_79 1.375 5.47
theta5_117 1.192 7.50
theta5_119 1.324 4.44
theta5_141 -1.251 -4.22
theta5_156 -1.642 -3.93
theta5_161 -1.136 -5.12
theta5_173 1.146 1.90
theta5_186 1.287 2.80
theta5_188 1.194 5.94
theta5_189 1.404 9.01
theta5_194 1.267 3.55
theta5_198 1.064 7.44
theta5_272 1.053 3.13
theta5_282 1.285 4.45
theta5_291 -1.317 -3.07
theta5_296 -1.025 -3.17
theta5_316 -1.432 -0.58
theta5_326 1.363 6.10
theta5_328 1.357 9.12
theta5_333 1.675 6.61
theta5_335 1.710 7.71
theta6_16 0.766 5.03
theta6_17 -0.755 -3.59
theta6_44 1.084 8.48
theta6_45 0.846 4.26
theta6_50 1.131 4.58
theta6_52 1.106 5.67
theta6_80 -0.665 -2.13
theta6_81 -0.935 -2.80
theta6_84 -0.609 -4.02
theta6_89 0.851 9.19
theta6_124 1.358 9.18
 
 Estimate t-value 
theta6_167 0.991 2.56 
theta6_190 -0.656 -5.14 
theta6_247 1.258 3.34 
theta6_284 1.197 5.90 
theta6_290 0.855 2.30 
theta6_317 -1.163 -6.08 
theta6_324 0.790 6.94 
theta6_328 -0.911 -3.25 
theta7_5 0.546 3.76 
theta7_55 -0.467 -2.19 
theta7_57 -0.581 -1.80 
theta7_78 0.853 8.31 
theta7_81 0.529 2.95 
theta7_83 0.613 3.11 
theta7_91 1.325 14.55 
theta7_129 0.671 4.11 
theta7_130 -0.577 -1.69 
theta7_131 -0.449 -2.15 
theta7_140 -0.491 -1.83 
theta7_158 0.872 4.76 
theta7_160 -0.583 -1.63 
theta7_176 -0.549 -2.96 
theta7_185 0.605 2.67 
theta7_187 0.592 3.59 
theta7_189 0.615 4.40 
theta7_198 0.551 3.81 
theta7_217 -0.545 -1.10 
theta7_218 -0.743 -2.38 
theta7_229 0.534 8.59 
theta7_239 0.873 12.42 
theta7_250 0.655 6.03 
theta7_260 -0.629 -1.77 
theta7_263 0.633 3.96 
theta7_271 -0.412 -1.73 
theta7_281 0.858 5.63 
theta7_283 1.249 16.26 
theta7_286 -0.452 -3.63 
theta7_296 -0.648 -2.15 
theta7_329 -0.668 -2.16 
theta9_3 1.252 6.46 
theta9_54 0.832 4.17 
theta9_57 0.787 2.10 
theta9_77 -0.586 -1.93 
theta9_80 -0.448 -1.20 
theta9_84 0.999 2.02 
theta9_131 1.421 9.04 
theta9_147 0.940 3.53 
theta9_161 0.777 5.64 
theta9_194 -0.666 -7.50 
theta9_225 -0.861 -2.89 
theta9_247 -0.752 -5.15 
theta9_252 1.457 4.95 
theta9_261 1.032 3.69 
theta9_267 -0.948 -1.93 
theta9_282 1.831 7.00 
theta9_305 -0.851 -2.59 
theta9_319 -0.737 -1.50 
theta9_330 -0.990 -3.67 
theta9_336 1.083 7.65 
theta10_48 0.435 5.06 
theta10_51 -0.492 -2.77 
theta10_55 -0.466 -3.09 
theta10_57 -0.491 -3.68 
theta10_129 0.381 1.08 
theta10_131 0.711 11.90 
theta10_159 0.419 5.21 
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theta10_173 0.408 3.40
theta10_176 0.533 10.83
theta10_189 -0.483 -1.72
theta10_193 0.504 2.65
theta10_218 0.526 8.80
theta10_253 -0.379 -2.85
theta10_282 -0.337 -1.90
theta10_285 0.455 5.00
theta10_288 -0.265 -1.98
theta10_291 0.703 4.64
theta10_300 -0.348 -3.87
theta10_301 0.487 5.41
theta10_309 0.645 7.14
theta10_310 0.678 8.88
theta10_313 0.557 3.78
theta10_314 0.504 2.71
theta10_315 0.851 9.23
theta10_317 0.546 4.52
theta10_319 0.603 5.74
theta10_324 -0.442 -2.41
theta10_325 0.790 8.69
theta10_326 -0.748 -3.94
theta10_331 0.662 6.47
theta11_24 -1.212 -11.67
theta11_47 -1.294 -0.79
theta11_55 0.959 1.37
theta11_72 1.132 3.63
theta11_75 -1.267 -2.08
theta11_80 2.360 6.11
theta11_105 1.655 4.56
theta11_121 1.151 2.61
theta11_126 1.739 5.47
theta11_129 -1.306 -0.91
theta11_140 -1.998 -2.62
theta11_156 -2.265 -3.63
theta11_160 -1.238 -2.28
theta11_171 1.404 3.82
theta11_182 -1.224 -5.33
theta11_203 -0.957 -2.14
theta11_217 2.247 7.52
theta11_246 1.520 6.92
theta11_259 1.104 8.33
theta11_262 -1.070 -0.96
theta11_276 1.348 4.81
theta11_277 0.901 1.70
theta11_287 -1.028 -1.29
theta11_288 -1.420 -3.44 
theta11_289 -1.351 -1.71 
theta11_290 -1.206 -1.18 
theta11_291 -1.713 -2.66 
theta11_293 -1.331 -2.14 
theta11_305 -1.586 -2.86 
theta11_309 0.482 1.13 
theta11_316 0.801 0.19 
theta11_318 -1.432 -5.57 
theta11_322 -1.592 -2.89 
theta12_46 2.696 8.64 
theta12_57 -1.560 -3.57 
theta12_70 1.853 5.92 
theta12_77 2.207 6.33 
theta12_78 2.558 6.02 
theta12_79 2.068 10.00 
theta12_80 2.939 9.59 
theta12_83 -1.785 -2.81 
theta12_91 2.593 6.40 
theta12_114 1.580 2.94 
theta12_117 -1.595 -3.92 
theta12_120 1.508 6.17 
theta12_144 -1.569 -3.27 
theta12_156 0.345 1.56 
theta12_157 1.929 13.40 
theta12_158 -0.859 -1.53 
theta12_160 0.898 2.23 
theta12_175 1.843 6.60 
theta12_184 1.514 4.84 
theta12_194 2.374 7.37 
theta12_237 1.602 4.59 
theta12_239 3.121 10.04 
theta12_247 1.458 5.43 
theta12_261 -1.121 -3.74 
theta12_271 2.389 7.35 
theta12_282 -2.075 -4.07 
theta12_291 -1.676 -3.69 
theta12_294 -1.859 -4.45 
theta12_309 -4.687 -10.67 
theta12_315 -0.584 -1.07 
theta12_331 -1.856 -8.96 
theta12_332 -1.679 -5.47 
theta12_333 -2.715 -6.09 
theta12_335 -1.456 -2.20 
theta12_336 -0.823 -0.59 
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Table D. 8. Step 2.3: Model 4 estimates with the sector 0 significant fixed effects found in step 1.3 and the 
other effects found in step 1.2 
 Estimate t-value
theta0_124 1.364 2.33
theta0_137 1.901 3.33
theta0_149 2.528 1.94
theta0_15 1.173 1.81
theta0_156 -0.383 -0.57
theta0_160 2.437 2.64
theta0_161 0.837 1.36
theta0_176 2.345 2.65
theta0_189 2.071 1.89
theta0_203 1.811 1.60
theta0_21 1.643 2.19
theta0_216 1.682 1.55
theta0_227 1.508 2.40
theta0_245 2.142 1.89
theta0_247 2.243 1.65
theta0_266 1.676 2.64
theta0_333 2.053 2.91
theta0_38 3.127 2.60
theta0_39 1.901 1.98
theta0_49 1.601 3.24
theta0_55 1.319 0.81
theta0_57 2.602 1.05
theta0_61 1.990 3.49
theta0_65 2.535 3.42
theta0_70 1.952 1.63
theta0_77 4.432 4.21
theta0_81 3.545 4.48
theta0_82 1.999 3.32
theta0_83 2.132 2.02
theta0_9 3.619 3.27
theta1_49 2.627 5.95
theta1_77 2.541 4.25
theta1_129 -2.216 -1.69
theta1_161 -2.893 -5.06
theta1_292 2.520 5.25
theta1_293 1.870 4.31
theta1_296 2.176 3.08
theta1_315 3.469 6.06
theta1_316 2.067 0.57
theta1_321 2.108 4.46
theta3_69 -0.717 -1.27
theta3_91 -0.906 -4.30
theta3_108 0.730 2.25
theta3_112 0.838 2.32
theta3_130 -0.733 -3.59
theta3_131 0.873 4.50
theta3_162 0.670 3.37
theta3_189 0.691 2.30
theta3_193 -0.528 -1.40
theta3_204 1.188 10.69
theta3_212 0.744 4.76
theta3_213 0.807 7.57
theta3_216 0.809 2.08
theta3_225 0.667 4.54
theta3_227 1.092 4.91
theta3_261 0.848 3.40
theta3_280 0.635 3.18
theta3_282 -0.377 -0.84
theta3_310 1.239 15.43
theta3_326 -0.987 -2.49
theta4_316 2.421 0.52
theta5_52 1.178 2.67
theta5_70 -0.873 -2.11
theta5_79 1.366 5.41
 
 Estimate t-value 
theta5_117 1.182 7.45 
theta5_119 1.317 4.36 
theta5_141 -1.246 -4.22 
theta5_156 -1.623 -3.38 
theta5_161 -1.132 -4.17 
theta5_173 1.142 1.84 
theta5_186 1.280 2.75 
theta5_188 1.187 5.87 
theta5_189 1.448 4.51 
theta5_194 1.261 3.47 
theta5_198 1.059 7.28 
theta5_272 1.049 3.11 
theta5_282 1.241 4.25 
theta5_291 -1.327 -3.00 
theta5_296 -1.030 -3.14 
theta5_316 -1.447 -0.57 
theta5_326 1.369 6.01 
theta5_328 1.340 8.99 
theta5_333 1.660 6.02 
theta5_335 1.684 7.14 
theta6_16 0.767 5.07 
theta6_17 -0.764 -3.62 
theta6_44 1.086 8.50 
theta6_45 0.851 4.31 
theta6_50 1.134 4.72 
theta6_52 1.112 5.67 
theta6_80 -0.661 -2.09 
theta6_81 -0.955 -2.21 
theta6_84 -0.600 -3.98 
theta6_89 0.855 9.25 
theta6_124 1.342 8.77 
theta6_167 0.981 2.46 
theta6_190 -0.661 -5.22 
theta6_247 1.239 2.78 
theta6_284 1.197 5.94 
theta6_290 0.848 2.29 
theta6_317 -1.164 -6.14 
theta6_324 0.802 7.02 
theta6_328 -0.887 -3.19 
theta7_5 0.553 3.81 
theta7_55 -0.473 -0.87 
theta7_57 -0.592 -1.63 
theta7_78 0.853 8.32 
theta7_81 0.525 2.64 
theta7_83 0.606 3.05 
theta7_91 1.338 14.63 
theta7_129 0.680 4.03 
theta7_130 -0.575 -1.70 
theta7_131 -0.434 -2.00 
theta7_140 -0.480 -1.76 
theta7_158 0.877 4.71 
theta7_160 -0.560 -1.35 
theta7_176 -0.547 -2.40 
theta7_185 0.609 2.68 
theta7_187 0.593 3.60 
theta7_189 0.597 2.03 
theta7_198 0.558 3.82 
theta7_217 -0.545 -1.09 
theta7_218 -0.733 -2.28 
theta7_229 0.541 8.67 
theta7_239 0.883 12.61 
theta7_250 0.655 6.04 
theta7_260 -0.630 -1.77 
theta7_263 0.647 4.08 
theta7_271 -0.407 -1.71 
theta7_281 0.861 5.64 
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theta7_283 1.248 16.32
theta7_286 -0.450 -3.60
theta7_296 -0.638 -2.10
theta7_329 -0.674 -2.16
theta9_3 1.240 6.45
theta9_54 0.822 4.16
theta9_57 0.894 2.32
theta9_77 -0.428 -1.40
theta9_80 -0.465 -1.23
theta9_84 0.997 2.03
theta9_131 1.409 8.98
theta9_147 0.932 3.51
theta9_161 0.767 4.81
theta9_194 -0.678 -7.65
theta9_225 -0.866 -2.95
theta9_247 -0.710 -4.19
theta9_252 1.450 4.97
theta9_261 1.024 3.68
theta9_267 -0.951 -1.93
theta9_282 1.752 6.49
theta9_305 -0.866 -2.61
theta9_319 -0.736 -1.49
theta9_330 -0.992 -3.69
theta9_336 1.083 7.69
theta10_48 0.430 5.05
theta10_51 -0.493 -2.82
theta10_55 -0.457 -2.95
theta10_57 -0.468 -2.98
theta10_129 0.378 1.03
theta10_131 0.700 11.52
theta10_159 0.423 5.30
theta10_173 0.408 3.39
theta10_176 0.563 11.42
theta10_189 -0.481 -1.34
theta10_193 0.503 2.65
theta10_218 0.535 8.91
theta10_253 -0.370 -2.80
theta10_282 -0.344 -1.91
theta10_285 0.454 4.97
theta10_288 -0.271 -2.06
theta10_291 0.693 4.63
theta10_300 -0.353 -3.97
theta10_301 0.478 5.32
theta10_309 0.641 7.13
theta10_310 0.673 8.90
theta10_313 0.562 3.84
theta10_314 0.508 2.67
theta10_315 0.854 9.29
theta10_317 0.542 4.52
theta10_319 0.598 5.69
theta10_324 -0.446 -2.45
theta10_325 0.790 8.66
theta10_326 -0.757 -3.97
theta10_331 0.657 6.46
theta11_24 -1.216 -11.66
theta11_47 -1.299 -0.82
theta11_55 0.974 0.94
theta11_72 1.132 3.59
theta11_75 -1.272 -2.04
theta11_80 2.341 5.97
theta11_105 1.646 4.53
theta11_121 1.149 2.59
theta11_126 1.739 5.48 
theta11_129 -1.309 -0.90 
theta11_140 -1.997 -2.49 
theta11_156 -2.240 -3.51 
theta11_160 -1.209 -2.22 
theta11_171 1.400 3.75 
theta11_182 -1.225 -5.30 
theta11_203 -0.945 -1.83 
theta11_217 2.238 7.42 
theta11_246 1.515 6.91 
theta11_259 1.100 8.27 
theta11_262 -1.073 -0.96 
theta11_276 1.341 4.80 
theta11_277 0.911 1.72 
theta11_287 -1.019 -1.26 
theta11_288 -1.416 -3.43 
theta11_289 -1.350 -1.61 
theta11_290 -1.210 -1.16 
theta11_291 -1.710 -2.54 
theta11_293 -1.330 -2.08 
theta11_305 -1.607 -2.81 
theta11_309 0.454 1.05 
theta11_316 0.754 0.18 
theta11_318 -1.424 -5.54 
theta11_322 -1.606 -2.93 
theta12_46 2.691 8.65 
theta12_57 -1.321 -3.00 
theta12_70 1.993 4.02 
theta12_77 2.691 6.21 
theta12_78 2.554 5.98 
theta12_79 2.062 9.94 
theta12_80 2.905 9.34 
theta12_83 -1.693 -2.65 
theta12_91 2.627 6.40 
theta12_114 1.579 2.94 
theta12_117 -1.609 -3.94 
theta12_120 1.519 6.23 
theta12_144 -1.559 -3.25 
theta12_156 0.363 1.33 
theta12_157 1.934 13.39 
theta12_158 -0.893 -1.58 
theta12_160 0.844 1.89 
theta12_175 1.816 6.44 
theta12_184 1.509 4.82 
theta12_194 2.357 7.26 
theta12_237 1.612 4.60 
theta12_239 3.082 9.81 
theta12_247 1.612 3.28 
theta12_261 -1.134 -3.75 
theta12_271 2.376 7.29 
theta12_282 -2.165 -4.14 
theta12_291 -1.679 -3.61 
theta12_294 -1.875 -4.44 
theta12_309 -4.712 -10.75 
theta12_315 -0.613 -1.12 
theta12_331 -1.865 -8.96 
theta12_332 -1.706 -5.47 
theta12_333 -2.727 -6.18 
theta12_335 -1.461 -2.18 
theta12_336 -0.830 -0.59 
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Table D. 9. Step 2.4: Model 4 estimates with all significant fixed effects found in step 1.3
 Estimate t-value
theta0_124 1.738 1.33
theta0_137 1.973 3.13
theta0_149 2.446 1.8
theta0_15 1.364 1.77
theta0_156 1.282 1.45
theta0_160 4.317 1.82
theta0_161 2.547 4.46
theta0_176 1.739 1.41
theta0_189 1.192 1.16
theta0_203 1.987 1.38
theta0_21 1.777 2.21
theta0_216 1.817 1.2
theta0_227 1.590 1.89
theta0_245 1.965 1.75
theta0_247 2.832 1.49
theta0_266 0.705 0.47
theta0_333 2.965 0.82
theta0_38 3.393 2.77
theta0_39 2.142 2.1
theta0_49 1.425 2.61
theta0_55 0.484 0.56
theta0_57 2.872 1.74
theta0_61 2.279 3.85
theta0_65 2.556 3.39
theta0_70 1.668 0.57
theta0_77 4.979 4.83
theta0_81 2.598 4.26
theta0_82 1.461 2.32
theta0_83 2.758 2.33
theta0_9 3.572 2.89
theta1_11 0.673 2.05
theta1_124 0.770 1.05
theta1_131 2.516 7.03
theta1_140 1.278 3.66
theta1_158 1.425 2.79
theta1_170 0.358 1.7
theta1_22 1.118 3.81
theta1_234 0.789 2.19
theta1_242 1.006 2.44
theta1_246 1.723 3.96
theta1_253 1.775 6.59
theta1_277 1.027 2.05
theta1_286 1.356 2.75
theta1_288 1.370 3.11
theta1_289 1.169 3.25
theta1_290 1.111 1.49
theta1_291 2.289 6.37
theta1_292 3.069 7.08
theta1_293 2.920 4.6
theta1_294 1.946 8.17
theta1_296 3.531 6.51
theta1_297 1.695 5.88
theta1_300 0.858 1.84
theta1_305 1.639 4.19
theta1_309 2.531 4.52
theta1_315 3.571 8.02
theta1_321 2.834 5.89
theta1_331 2.806 3.51
theta1_332 1.210 3.14
theta1_333 2.316 3
theta1_47 0.624 1.69
theta1_49 2.824 5.6
theta1_60 1.061 3.39
theta1_77 2.815 6.77
 
 
 Estimate t-value 
theta1_80 1.628 3.53 
theta1_90 1.569 3.61 
theta1_91 2.347 5.2 
theta2_110 1.295 3.44 
theta2_120 2.150 6.71 
theta2_124 0.934 2.2 
theta2_129 1.251 2.44 
theta2_138 0.495 1.54 
theta2_141 1.499 5.06 
theta2_160 2.253 5.55 
theta2_161 1.751 2.27 
theta2_176 1.124 2.18 
theta2_197 0.950 2.27 
theta2_198 1.612 2.45 
theta2_200 1.467 6.86 
theta2_229 1.580 2.16 
theta2_239 1.746 4.51 
theta2_246 1.231 5.84 
theta2_247 1.682 5.78 
theta2_266 1.407 2.57 
theta2_270 1.357 2.7 
theta2_275 1.480 3.63 
theta2_281 1.838 5.01 
theta2_288 1.692 4.6 
theta2_291 2.690 6.84 
theta2_308 1.828 1.64 
theta2_311 1.923 7.51 
theta2_321 2.871 3.47 
theta2_326 2.869 5.69 
theta2_330 2.730 7.14 
theta2_334 1.591 3.64 
theta2_43 1.410 2.7 
theta2_54 1.261 3.87 
theta2_55 1.035 2.61 
theta2_58 1.148 2.41 
theta2_72 1.459 3.82 
theta2_88 1.844 7.63 
theta2_90 0.971 2.55 
theta3_108 0.718 2.27 
theta3_112 0.827 2.72 
theta3_121 0.692 3.64 
theta3_131 1.358 7.47 
theta3_156 0.549 1.99 
theta3_162 0.694 2.84 
theta3_189 0.841 3.9 
theta3_19 0.606 7.75 
theta3_191 0.497 0.98 
theta3_204 1.238 13.03 
theta3_212 0.688 3.16 
theta3_213 0.824 8.48 
theta3_216 0.830 2.57 
theta3_225 0.808 2.57 
theta3_227 1.120 5.42 
theta3_229 0.417 1.54 
theta3_23 0.428 3.19 
theta3_230 0.593 8.18 
theta3_238 0.646 5.39 
theta3_24 0.339 2.49 
theta3_261 0.918 3.05 
theta3_269 0.584 6.1 
theta3_279 0.369 1.82 
theta3_280 0.701 4.13 
theta3_283 0.526 2.21 
theta3_285 0.454 4.56 
theta3_292 0.622 5.54 
theta3_293 0.571 3.04 
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theta3_295 0.242 3.28
theta3_309 0.942 9.92
theta3_310 1.420 19.99
theta3_328 0.463 2.84
theta3_334 0.542 2.4
theta3_52 0.559 3.4
theta3_67 0.220 4.66
theta3_72 0.669 14.49
theta3_96 0.664 2.37
theta4_116 1.364 2.82
theta4_136 0.963 3.77
theta4_14 0.616 1.51
theta4_145 0.857 3.17
theta4_151 0.706 2.76
theta4_153 1.479 4.72
theta4_155 0.819 4.08
theta4_159 1.276 5.79
theta4_160 1.381 3.19
theta4_162 1.265 2.41
theta4_181 0.790 2.24
theta4_182 1.678 9.35
theta4_183 0.885 4.97
theta4_191 1.136 1.56
theta4_212 1.160 6.18
theta4_221 0.873 3.26
theta4_222 0.502 2.87
theta4_225 1.419 2.34
theta4_227 0.458 1.29
theta4_229 1.156 1.67
theta4_247 0.954 2
theta4_248 0.662 1.64
theta4_262 0.795 2.61
theta4_264 0.829 2.02
theta4_276 0.580 2.61
theta4_296 1.476 2.51
theta4_30 0.809 2.6
theta4_317 0.867 1.02
theta4_32 0.424 2.91
theta4_321 1.544 2.43
theta4_326 1.045 1.71
theta4_329 1.779 3.39
theta4_33 0.319 1.34
theta4_332 1.587 2.9
theta4_335 1.299 1.98
theta4_42 0.450 1.18
theta4_6 0.260 1.37
theta5_116 1.188 6.35
theta5_117 1.285 10.04
theta5_118 0.724 2.29
theta5_119 1.280 5.13
theta5_13 0.796 4
theta5_173 1.164 2.01
theta5_186 1.280 3.2
theta5_188 1.159 6.69
theta5_189 1.500 7.15
theta5_194 1.309 4.55
theta5_198 1.227 1.99
theta5_216 0.561 2.27
theta5_217 0.850 4.79
theta5_218 0.684 2.52
theta5_225 0.950 1.81
theta5_240 0.584 4.27
theta5_25 0.481 2.7
theta5_261 0.668 1.96
theta5_264 0.695 2.2
theta5_268 0.796 4.36
theta5_270 0.660 3.84
theta5_272 1.165 3.5
theta5_273 0.978 4.64
theta5_279 0.676 3.64 
theta5_281 1.063 4.45 
theta5_282 1.468 12.92 
theta5_292 0.787 4.9 
theta5_293 0.761 3.59 
theta5_294 1.046 8.11 
theta5_298 1.038 7.61 
theta5_299 0.397 4.47 
theta5_317 0.681 1.36 
theta5_318 1.011 4.12 
theta5_320 0.880 4.74 
theta5_326 1.954 13.77 
theta5_327 0.725 5.73 
theta5_328 1.383 11.73 
theta5_333 1.940 2.11 
theta5_334 1.281 3.82 
theta5_335 1.647 8.66 
theta5_43 0.917 6.87 
theta5_50 1.044 3.46 
theta5_52 1.210 2.82 
theta5_71 0.656 6.01 
theta5_79 1.345 6.52 
theta6_100 0.624 2.97 
theta6_104 0.410 3.48 
theta6_108 0.596 4.3 
theta6_124 1.279 7.69 
theta6_126 0.486 3.44 
theta6_131 0.643 3.97 
theta6_16 0.832 6.06 
theta6_167 1.054 2.98 
theta6_171 0.769 3.61 
theta6_176 0.362 1.32 
theta6_199 0.755 5.57 
theta6_2 0.787 2.48 
theta6_225 0.481 1.75 
theta6_230 0.697 3.22 
theta6_247 1.240 2.21 
theta6_278 0.448 3.01 
theta6_284 1.322 8.48 
theta6_287 0.445 2.22 
theta6_290 0.955 3.7 
theta6_291 0.156 1.19 
theta6_294 0.645 2.41 
theta6_324 1.122 8.28 
theta6_329 0.646 3.44 
theta6_331 0.852 1.89 
theta6_333 0.594 1.02 
theta6_37 0.718 3.01 
theta6_43 0.883 4.65 
theta6_44 1.248 8.68 
theta6_45 0.889 5.02 
theta6_49 0.607 2.44 
theta6_50 1.409 4.53 
theta6_52 1.265 6.43 
theta6_55 0.611 6.64 
theta6_59 0.774 2.68 
theta6_70 0.487 1.65 
theta6_89 0.914 10.85 
theta6_96 0.592 2.4 
theta7_10 0.521 2.29 
theta7_115 0.438 4.07 
theta7_119 0.473 4.32 
theta7_129 0.816 10.11 
theta7_137 0.502 2.51 
theta7_14 0.517 1.49 
theta7_142 0.546 3.41 
theta7_15 0.517 2.89 
theta7_158 1.011 5.32 
theta7_174 0.476 4.97 
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theta7_185 0.659 2.92
theta7_186 0.264 2.45
theta7_187 0.612 3.83
theta7_189 0.712 2.79
theta7_191 0.410 1.03
theta7_198 0.673 4.45
theta7_229 0.654 4.41
theta7_239 1.004 10.77
theta7_243 0.526 2.92
theta7_250 0.741 7.09
theta7_263 0.755 4.84
theta7_266 0.617 3.95
theta7_27 0.408 2.98
theta7_281 0.895 2.68
theta7_283 1.280 15.72
theta7_309 0.568 5.26
theta7_323 0.611 4.25
theta7_324 0.218 1.55
theta7_331 0.476 1.42
theta7_335 0.244 2.09
theta7_5 0.612 4.15
theta7_59 0.345 3.94
theta7_70 0.509 2
theta7_78 0.892 8.96
theta7_81 0.694 3.51
theta7_83 0.687 3.18
theta7_91 1.435 10.75
theta7_93 0.468 3.04
theta8_125 4.221 5.02
theta8_140 1.924 2.76
theta8_141 3.924 3.54
theta8_180 1.600 1.71
theta8_184 3.778 8.31
theta8_191 3.410 1.83
theta8_192 2.212 5.85
theta8_203 3.451 4.2
theta8_210 4.406 10.76
theta8_225 3.321 4.43
theta8_233 2.650 2.93
theta8_254 2.184 4
theta8_257 1.344 1.93
theta8_266 2.985 6.09
theta8_268 2.948 2.08
theta8_271 2.752 4.46
theta8_281 5.636 5.54
theta8_282 5.740 9.5
theta8_288 4.187 4.45
theta8_289 2.215 2.24
theta8_300 2.538 2.76
theta8_302 2.035 2.89
theta8_304 1.632 3.85
theta8_306 2.339 4.44
theta8_308 3.811 4.35
theta8_309 1.845 1.87
theta8_312 1.482 0.98
theta8_314 3.458 4.18
theta8_324 3.000 3.38
theta8_331 5.235 8.93
theta8_44 3.560 4.81
theta8_48 3.141 3.06
theta8_69 2.149 4.27
theta8_75 2.081 3.24
theta9_10 0.350 1.01
theta9_118 0.595 5.01
theta9_120 0.928 6.57
theta9_131 1.558 8.97
theta9_135 0.559 2.84
theta9_144 0.763 6.03
theta9_147 0.827 3.36
theta9_153 0.604 3.14 
theta9_156 1.096 9.05 
theta9_160 1.741 3.7 
theta9_161 1.388 7.89 
theta9_162 0.572 1.71 
theta9_174 0.484 2.32 
theta9_190 0.339 2.12 
theta9_192 0.801 3.12 
theta9_2 0.487 1.39 
theta9_202 0.562 1.95 
theta9_218 0.775 4.15 
theta9_229 0.654 2.2 
theta9_230 0.691 1.48 
theta9_252 1.528 5.58 
theta9_261 1.160 3.14 
theta9_275 1.099 5.06 
theta9_277 0.609 1.93 
theta9_282 2.279 12.36 
theta9_293 0.918 1.89 
theta9_296 1.123 10.29 
theta9_3 1.251 6.68 
theta9_50 0.567 2.19 
theta9_54 1.027 5.66 
theta9_57 1.124 6.77 
theta9_59 0.834 3.54 
theta9_83 0.538 1.47 
theta9_84 1.048 2.81 
theta9_91 0.794 5.62 
theta9_95 0.686 3.1 
theta9_99 0.783 2.8 
theta9_329 0.679 3.66 
theta9_331 1.149 5.34 
theta9_333 0.932 2.05 
theta9_336 1.248 10.6 
theta10_129 0.510 2.54 
theta10_131 0.888 13.47 
theta10_135 0.383 4.05 
theta10_140 0.346 5.29 
theta10_146 0.209 2.19 
theta10_159 0.434 4.98 
theta10_161 0.287 3.05 
theta10_173 0.430 3.3 
theta10_176 0.542 10.5 
theta10_181 0.252 1.97 
theta10_191 0.344 4.64 
theta10_193 0.496 2.73 
theta10_195 0.375 4.06 
theta10_198 0.219 1.03 
theta10_203 0.480 2.86 
theta10_215 0.377 6.99 
theta10_218 0.591 9.85 
theta10_220 0.323 4.69 
theta10_226 0.304 3.14 
theta10_271 0.323 5.23 
theta10_285 0.465 4.64 
theta10_287 0.346 3.42 
theta10_289 0.636 9.1 
theta10_291 0.933 8.04 
theta10_299 0.255 2.38 
theta10_301 0.589 5.56 
theta10_309 0.915 9.72 
theta10_310 0.745 9.95 
theta10_313 0.589 4.1 
theta10_314 0.599 3 
theta10_315 0.923 11.34 
theta10_317 0.558 3.68 
theta10_319 0.759 8.83 
theta10_320 0.240 3.06 
theta10_325 0.764 8.08 
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theta10_331 0.992 7.81
theta10_332 0.442 5.11
theta10_48 0.514 5.68
theta11_105 1.685 3.78
theta11_121 1.364 2.51
theta11_126 1.813 3.88
theta11_128 0.866 5.81
theta11_130 1.051 4.72
theta11_138 1.109 3.15
theta11_171 1.430 3.1
theta11_18 0.958 2.42
theta11_217 2.482 3.76
theta11_241 0.764 2.78
theta11_246 1.749 4.88
theta11_259 1.191 7.32
theta11_267 0.633 2.37
theta11_276 1.325 3.59
theta11_294 1.122 3.21
theta11_30 1.077 1.88
theta11_309 0.956 1.42
theta11_312 0.902 0.86
theta11_332 0.681 1.07
theta11_54 0.941 2.22 
theta11_59 0.922 1.77 
theta11_70 0.938 1.9 
theta11_72 1.469 3.44 
theta11_80 2.652 5.84 
theta11_94 0.986 3.15 
theta12_114 1.503 2.76 
theta12_116 1.643 4.75 
theta12_12 1.092 4.51 
theta12_120 2.316 8.59 
theta12_130 1.023 4.63 
theta12_156 2.086 8.57 
theta12_157 2.113 14.09 
theta12_160 3.172 3.43 
theta12_175 1.646 5.47 
theta12_18 0.729 2.26 
theta12_184 1.676 4.27 
theta12_194 2.967 8.66 
theta12_217 1.533 1.63 
theta12_237 1.540 4.25 
theta12_239 3.363 9.86 
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Table D.10. Additional significant fixed effects revealed in step 3 of estimating Model 4 where each municipality 
is tested in 12 service sectors simultaneously conditioning on the effects found to be significant in 
step 1.1  
Service sector Municipality name Municipality number
1. Administration .........................................  
Moskenes 
Nordkapp  
 
1874
2019
2. Primary schools .......................................  none none
3. Other education ......................................  
Risør 
Masfjorden  
Sør-Aurdal  
0901
1266
0540
4. Child care ...............................................  none none
5. Health care .............................................  
Åmli 
Snillfjord  
Tjeldsund  
0929
1613
1852
6. Social services ........................................  
Valle  
Kristiansand  
Fredrikstad  
0940
1001
0106
7. Child protection .......................................  Stranda Tjeldsund  
1525
1852
8. Care for the elderly and disabled ...............  none none
9. Culture ...................................................  Suldal Bardu  
1134
1922
10. Municipal roads .....................................  
Åmli 
Odda  
Vefsn  
Dyrøy  
0929
1228
1824
1926
11. Water supply and sanitation ....................  Vevelstad Ringerike  
1816
0605
12. Other infrastructure ................................  
Sauda 
Askøy  
Nore og Uvdal 
1135
1247
0633
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Table D.11. Model 4 parameter estimates where step 3 was carried out in 12 sectors simultaneously 
Sector Parameter Estimate t-value 
Budget surplus Intercept -2.340 -
 Growth in municipality incomes 0.556 25.15
Administration  Intercept 1.411 17.92
 Inverse population size 4.390 29.10
 Index of farming industry  5.463 6.87
Primary schools Intercept -0.917 -3.61
 Population share 6-12 years of age 54.939 19.77
 Population share 13-15 years of age 70.270 13.13
 Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 1.691 31.58
 Inverse population size 2.510 14.12
Other education Intercept 0.463 10.44
 Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years 5.373 8.90
 Refugees with integration grants  33.241 25.80
Child care  Intercept 1.114 6.56
 Population share 1-5 years of age 0.440 0.16
 Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years 22.329 13.97
Health care Intercept 0.601 13.77
 Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.357 13.27
 Inverse population size 1.823 22.13
Social services  Intercept -0.317 -5.25
 Refugees with integration grants  52.401 30.81
 Refugees without integration grants  3.475 2.39
 Share of divorced/ separated 16-59 years 11.383 12.81
 Unemployed 16-59 years share of total population  13.654 7.98
 Number of poor share of total population 6.534 6.72
 Share of disablement pensioners 18-49 years 8.978 4.74
Child protection Intercept 0.248 5.53
 Share of children 0-15 years with single mother/ father 14.738 13.49
 Number of poor share of total population 4.875 6.79
Care for the  Intercept 1.068 4.49
elderly and  Population share 67-79 years of age 30.925 9.16
disabled  Population share 80-89 years of age 66.160 11.93
 Population share 90 years and above 203.886 12.91
 High-cost recipients share of total population 739.977 13.17
 Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above without grant 222.763 11.47
 Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above  with grant 505.276 16.33
 Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.795 8.55
 Inverse population size 2.117 8.17
Culture  Intercept 0.614 15.70
 Inverse population size 0.451 6.23
Municipal roads Intercept 0.021 1.13
 Amount of snowfall 0.065 14.73
 Kilometers of municipal roads 25.190 36.26
Water supply  Intercept 1.000 21.85
and sanitation Capacity of advanced purification 0.585 19.71
 Inverse population size 0.423 3.67
Other infrastructure Intercept 0.799 9.89
 Inverse population size 1.573 10.57
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Table D.12. Effects on the marginal budget shares in Model 4 with municipality effects included in 12 
service sectors 
Sector Explanatory variable Estimate t-value
1. Administration  Constant 0.184 20.65
 Average education -0.027 -10.09
 Share of socialists 0.001 0.14
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.004 0.71
   
2. Primary schools Constant 0.167 18.18
 Average education -0.024 -7.78
 Share of socialists -0.001 -0.07
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.002 0.29
   
3. Other education Constant -0.014 -4.56
 Average education 0.007 6.56
 Share of socialists 0.017 5.55
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.008 4.02
   
4. Child care  Constant -0.060 -6.89
 Average education 0.050 17.70
 Share of socialists -0.018 -1.91
 Share of residents in a densely populated area -0.023 -4.22
   
5. Health care Constant 0.072 13.53
 Average education -0.005 -3.27
 Share of socialists 0.006 1.41
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.002 0.81
   
6. Social assistance  Constant -0.009 -2.40
 Average education 0.004 3.07
 Share of socialists 0.012 3.23
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.016 5.52
   
7. Child protection  Constant 0.001 0.33
 Average education 0.003 2.97
 Share of socialists -0.007 -2.40
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.016 9.14
   
8. Care for the elderly and disabled  Constant 0.245 14.75
 Average education -0.019 -3.41
 Share of socialists 0.007 0.54
 Share of residents in a densely populated area -0.005 -0.65
   
9. Culture  Constant 0.058 14.08
 Average education 0.001 1.08
 Share of socialists -0.000 -0.08
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.012 4.55
   
10. Municipal roads  Constant 0.017 6.93
 Average education -0.001 -0.95
 Share of socialists -0.010 -4.67
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.013 9.42
   
11. Water supply and sanitation  Constant 0.045 6.75
 Average education -0.003 -1.72
 Share of socialists -0.012 -1.87
 Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.017 4.15
   
12. Other infrastructure  Constant 0.123 14.74
 Average education 0.003 1.04
 Share of socialists 0.033 4.72
 Share of residents in a densely populated area -0.041 -7.75
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Appendix E: Economic regions and region fixed effects 
Table E.1. Labour market regions 
 Labour market region Region number
 ØST-NORGE 
1 Sør-Østfold 11
2 Oslo 12
3 Vestfold 13
4 Kongsberg 14
5 Hallingdal 15
6 Valdres 21
7 Gudbrandsdalen 22
8 Lillehammer 23
9 Gjøvik 24
10 Hamar 25
11 Kongsvinger 26
12 Elverum 27
13 Tynset/Røros 28
 SØR-NORGE 
14 Nordvest-Telemark 31
15 Øst-Telemark 32
16 Sør-Telemark 33
17 Arendal 34
18 Kristiansand 35
19 Lister 36
 VEST-NORGE 
20 Stavanger 41
21 Haugesund 42
22 Sunnhordland 43
23 Bergen 44
24 Sunnfjord (Førde/Florø) 51
25 Sognefjord (Sogndal/Årdal) 52
26 Nordfjord 53
27 Søndre Sunnmøre 54
28 Ålesund 55
29 Molde 56
30 Nordmøre 57
31 Kristiansund 58
 MIDT-NORGE 
32 Trondheim 61
33 Midt-Trøndelag 62
34 Namsos 63
35 Ytre Helgeland 64
36 Indre Helgeland 65
 NORD-NORGE 
37 Bodø 71
38 Narvik 72
39 Vesterålen 73
40 Lofoten 74
41 Harstad 75
42 Midt-Troms 76
43 Tromsø 77
44 Alta 81
45 Hammerfest 82
46 Vadsø 83
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Table E.2. Municipalities grouped by labour market region 
Region Municipality 
11 0101 
 0105 
 0106 
 0111 
 0118 
 0128 
12 0104 
 0119 
 0121 
 0122 
 0123 
 0124 
 0125 
 0127 
 0135 
 0136 
 0137 
 0138 
 0211 
 0213 
 0214 
 0215 
 0216 
 0217 
 0219 
 0220 
 0221 
 0226 
 0227 
 0228 
 0229 
 0230 
 0231 
 0233 
 0234 
 0235 
 0236 
 0237 
 0238 
 0239 
 0301 
 0532 
 0533 
 0534 
 0602 
 0605 
 0612 
 0621 
 0622 
 0623 
 0624 
 0625 
 0626 
 0627 
 0628 
 0711 
 0713 
13 0701 
 0702 
 0704 
 0706 
 0709 
 0714 
 0716 
 0719 
 0720 
 0722 
 0723 
 0728 
14 0604 
 0631 
 0632 
 0633 
15 0615 
 0616 
 0617 
 0618 
 0619 
 0620 
21 0540 
 0541 
 0542 
 0543 
 0544 
 0545 
22 0511 
 0512 
 0513 
 0514 
 0515 
 0516 
 0517 
 0519 
 0520 
23 0501 
 0521 
 0522 
24 0502 
 0528 
 0529 
 0536 
 0538 
25 0403 
 0412 
 0415 
 0417 
26 0402 
 0418 
 0419 
 0420 
 0423 
 0425 
27 0426 
 0427 
 0428 
 0429 
 0430 
 0434 
28 0432 
 0436 
 0437 
 0438 
 0439 
 0441 
 1640 
 1644 
31 0826 
 0828 
 0829 
 0830 
 0831 
 0833 
 0834 
32 0807 
 0821 
 0822 
 0827 
33 0805 
 0806 
 0811 
 0814 
 0815 
 0817 
 0819 
34 0901 
 0904 
 0906 
 0911 
 0912 
 0914 
 0919 
 0929 
35 0926 
 0928 
 0935 
 0937 
  
Norwegian local government behaviour in a dynamic context Documents 6/2011
160 Statistics Norway
 0938 
 0940 
 0941 
 1001 
 1002 
 1014 
 1017 
 1018 
 1021 
 1026 
 1027 
 1029 
36 1003 
 1004 
 1032 
 1034 
 1037 
 1046 
41 1101 
 1102 
 1103 
 1111 
 1112 
 1114 
 1119 
 1120 
 1121 
 1122 
 1124 
 1127 
 1129 
 1130 
 1133 
 1141 
 1142 
 1144 
42 1106 
 1134 
 1135 
 1145 
 1146 
 1149 
 1151 
 1160 
 1211 
 1216 
43 1219 
 1221 
 1222 
 1223 
 1224 
44 1201 
 1227 
 1228 
 1231 
 1232 
 1233 
 1234 
 1235 
 1238 
 1241 
 1242 
 1243 
 1244 
 1245 
 1246 
 1247 
 1251 
 1252 
 1253 
 1256 
 1259 
 1260 
 1263 
 1264 
 1265 
 1266 
 1411 
51 1401 
 1412 
 1413 
 1416 
 1418 
 1428 
 1429 
 1430 
 1431 
 1432 
 1433 
 1438 
52 1417 
 1419 
 1420 
 1421 
 1422 
 1424 
 1426 
53 1439 
 1441 
 1443 
 1444 
 1445 
 1449 
54 1511 
 1514 
 1515 
 1516 
 1517 
 1519 
 1520 
55 1504 
 1523 
 1524 
 1525 
 1526 
 1528 
 1529 
 1531 
 1532 
 1534 
 1546 
56 1502 
 1535 
 1539 
 1543 
 1545 
 1547 
 1548 
 1551 
 1557 
57 1560 
 1563 
 1566 
 1567 
 1571 
58 1503 
 1554 
 1573 
 1576 
 1576 
61 1601 
 1612 
 1613 
 1617 
 1620 
 1621 
 1622 
 1624 
 1627 
 1630 
 1632 
 1633 
 1634 
 1635 
 1636 
 1638 
 1648 
 1653 
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 1657 
 1662 
 1663 
 1664 
 1665 
 1711 
 1714 
 1718 
 1723 
62 1702 
 1717 
 1719 
 1721 
 1724 
 1725 
 1729 
 1736 
63 1703 
 1738 
 1739 
 1740 
 1742 
 1743 
 1744 
 1748 
 1749 
 1750 
 1751 
 1755 
64 1811 
 1812 
 1813 
 1815 
 1816 
 1818 
 1820 
 1822 
 1827 
 1834 
 1835 
65 1824 
 1825 
 1826 
 1828 
 1832 
 1833 
71 1804 
 1836 
 1837 
 1838 
 1839 
 1840 
 1841 
 1845 
 1848 
 1849 
72 1805 
 1850 
 1851 
 1852 
 1853 
 1854 
 1919 
73 1866 
 1867 
 1868 
 1870 
 1871 
74 1856 
 1857 
 1859 
 1860 
 1865 
 1874 
75 1901 
 1911 
 1913 
 1915 
 1917 
76 1920 
 1922 
 1923 
 1924 
 1925 
 1926 
 1927 
 1928 
 1929 
 1931 
77 1902 
 1933 
 1936 
 1938 
 1939 
 1940 
 1941 
 1942 
 1943 
81 2011 
 2012 
 2014 
 2015 
82 2004 
 2017 
 2018 
 2019 
 2020 
 2021 
 2022 
 2023 
83 2002 
 2003 
 2024 
 2025 
 2027 
 2028 
 2030 
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Table E.3. Regional effects in model 7 for sector 0 – 12 
Region    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
11 4.416 3.220 2.900 0.387 1.213 1.474 0.731 0.445 5.594 2.690 0.573 1.276 4.539 
13 -2.685 -1.386 -0.718 -0.272 -0.550 -0.800 0.149 -0.213 -2.103 -0.547 -0.220 -0.027 -1.352 
14 4.010 3.891 2.500 0.008 1.218 1.060 0.468 0.577 4.853 2.184 0.497 1.389 4.510 
15 -12.824 -8.127 -7.243 -1,738* -3.877 -3.266 -0.934 -0.471 -15.558 -5.602 -1.504 -1.552 -8.054 
21 -5.666 -3.383 -1.748 -0.716 -1.418 -1.139 0.163 -0.298 -4.318 -1.895 -0.594 0.263 -2.489 
22 -9.880 -6.816 -4.927 -1.448 -1.836 -2.556 -0.306 -0.943 -10.881 -3.387 -1.344 -1.245 -7.665 
23 12.408 8.321 7.320 1.261 2.802 3.484 1,273* 0.380 14.165 5.208 1.398 3.254 9.455 
24 4.894 3.061 2.572 0.668 0.989 1.420 0.723 0.205 5.458 2.226 0.489 1.281 3.571 
25 -3.695 -2.966 -2.498 -0.510 -0.958 -1.333 0.310 -0.524 -4.557 -1.997 -0.609 -0.543 -3.749 
26 3.866 3.753 3.517 0.717 1.352 1.756 1.153 0.169 7.716 2.145 0.547 1.171 4.252 
27 -1.279 0.053 -0.519 -0.212 -0.254 0.116 0.616 -0.379 -0.590 -0.332 -0.248 -0.386 0.355 
28 -7.662 -4.803 -2.975 -0.819 -1.816 -1.484 0.172 -0.541 -7.475 -2.159 -1.087 -0.679 -4.578 
31 14.065 9.467 8.942 1.486 3.884 5.146 1.029 0.869 14.684 6.521 1.647 3.109 12.345 
32 -12.761 -7.993 -5.164 -1.188 -2.973 -2.633 -0.291 -0.786 -12.519 -4.625 -1.414 -1.800 -9.110 
33 -11.909 -7.562 -5.995 -1.049 -2.589 -3.130 -0.436 -0.772 -12.531 -4.540 -1.318 -2.403 -8.213 
34 -10.554 -6,961* -4.804 -1.064 -2.232 -3,104* 0.030 -0.635 -9.423 -3.852 -1.079 -1.403 -7.242 
35 7.527 5.427 4.477 0.755 2,304* 2.174 0,807** 0.399 8.775 3,470* 1.009 2,015** 6.434 
36 -29,160* -18,540* -14,293* -2,871* -6,830* -8,354* -1,742* -1,933** -27,411* -11,091* -3,17* -5,638* -21,16* 
41 -0.084 -0.430 -0.041 -0.244 0.512 -0.271 0.126 0.077 -0.205 0.206 -0.033 -0.354 -0.310 
42 -3.201 -2.356 -0.696 -0.254 0.023 -1.110 0.228 -0.312 -2.324 -0.560 -0.325 -0.658 -1.607 
43 -17.083 -10.641 -7.797 -1.811 -4.171 -4.365 -0.720 -1.208 -16.669 -6.635 -1.843 -2.567 -12.139 
44 -8,541* -5.137 -3.220 -0.843 -1.656 -1.963 -0.082 -0,524* -7.193 -2.944 -0.838 -1,821* -5.748 
51 0.842 1.164 1.721 0.234 0.808 0.997 0,491* 0.152 3.100 1.141 0.252 0.412 2.006 
52 0.170 1.113 1.595 -0.067 0.637 1.131 0.587 0.075 2.469 0.700 0.232 0.384 1.908 
53 -8.938 -6.198 -4.238 -0.845 -2.093 -2.518 -0.426 -0,790* -7.450 -3.359 -0.827 -2.160 -6.120 
54 0.451 0.521 1.556 0.371 0.738 0.276 0.102 -0.151 2.293 0.514 0.297 0.168 1.147 
55 -6.138 -4.008 -2.609 -0.410 -1.149 -1.314 -0.277 -0,802** -5.468 -2.391 -0.431 -0.962 -4.337 
56 -8.047 -4.514 -3.082 -0.518 -1.365 -1.936 -0.142 -0.798 -5.530 -2.609 -0.569 -1.277 -5.216 
57 -5.322 -3.112 -1.892 -0.347 -0.854 -1.443 0.093 -0.328 -3.899 -1.296 -0.538 -0.718 -3.319 
58 -6.085 -3.359 -2.735 -0.544 -1.288 -1.562 -0.037 -0.453 -4.916 -2.003 -0.594 -1.113 -3.809 
61 -2.104 -1.071 -0.592 -0.099 -0.123 -0.459 0.126 -0,229* -1.923 -0.617 -0.268 -0.437 -0.838 
62 2.186 1.859 1.639 0.249 1.108 1.063 0.311 0.059 3.418 1.073 0.336 0.206 2.438 
63 -7,859* -4.513 -2.895 -0.764 -1.283 -1.432 -0.221 -0,680** -5.676 -2.395 -0.835 -0.498 -4.035 
64 -3.269 -1.715 -0.602 -0.163 -0.228 0.032 0.379 -0.015 -0.297 -0.758 -0.440 -0.925 -2.064 
65 -18.667 -11.698 -9.465 -1.793 -3.462 -4.791 -0.747 -1.518 -19.749 -7.455 -1.866 -3.869 -13.984 
71 -3.122 0.536 0.409 -0.150 -0.291 0.038 0.371 -0.054 0.202 -0.449 -0.030 -1,275* -1.056 
72 -28,005* -15.474 -13.075 -2.765 -5.832 -7.146 -1.427 -2,077** -26.899 -10.169 -3.025 -4.817 -20.041 
73 9.607 7.579 6.079 1.145 2.905 3.450 0.791 0.363 13.965 4.359 1.327 2.049 8.118 
74 -8.103 -4.317 -3.011 -0.660 -0.919 -1.125 -0.163 -0.815 -5.745 -2.970 -0.649 -2.286 -5.458 
75 12,483* 9,419* 8,631** 1,743** 3,487* 3,974* 0.542 0.668 17,219** 5,524* 2,06** 2,919** 9.171 
76 4.240 4.120 3,863* 0.685 1,771* 1.804 0.284 0.141 7.404 2.483 1,07** 1,469* 4.108 
77 -3.309 -0.029 1.017 -0.105 0.442 0.273 0.130 -0.233 1.352 -0.385 0.112 -0.911 -0.434 
81 -53,380* -32.411 -23.014 -5.623 -11.378 -12.611 -3.120 -3.152 -51.989 -20.332 -6.224 -9.736 -39.090 
82 1.749 4.031 3.540 0.547 1,740** 2.051 0,606** 0.198 5.663 1.925 0.848 1.202 2.295 
83 5.839 5,479* 5,020** 0,859* 1,782** 3,188** 0,987** 0,549* 9,342* 3,391* 0.772 1,837* 4.324 
Region 12 (Oslo) is the base region. 
* indicates significance at 10% significance level 
** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
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Table E.4. Regional effects in model 8 for sectors 0 – 12. 
Region 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
11 -1.364 -0.371 0.075 -0.126 -0.466 -0.099 0,447** 0.123 -0.334 0.469 -0.084 0.185 0.374 
13 -0.601 0.058 0.367 -0.006 0.286 -0.169 0,283** -0.055 0.333 0.418 0.041 0,423** 0.367 
14 -1.391 0.634 -0.380 -0,483* -0.392 -0.449 0.139 0,358* -0.759 -0.032 -0.126 0.355 0.423 
15 2.133 1,936** 0.490 -0.170 -0.461 0,981** -0.012 0,510** 0.134 0.294 0.168 1,127** 2,990** 
21 -1.202 -0.362 0.739 -0,192** -0.570 0.197 0,496** -0.016 0.640 -0.114 -0.080 1,133** 1.039 
22 -3.011 -1,943** -0.567 -0.505 -0,975* -0.485 0.127 -0,485** -3,074* -0.395 -0,428** 0.158 -1,678* 
23 -0.908 -1.174 -0.357 0.172 -0.962 -0.503 0.386 -0.615 -0.518 -0.553 -0.329 0.358 0.059 
24 -0.069 -0.122 0.125 0.157 -0.114 0.063 0,422** -0.081 0.112 0.349 -0.075 0.341 -0.106 
25 -0.794 -1.037 -0.815 -0.140 -0.343 -0.506 0,495* -0.367 -1.576 -0.917 -0.247 -0.020 -1.352 
26 -2.408 -0.722 0.169 0.066 -0.104 -0.115 0,787** -0,199* 0.774 -0.445 -0.194 -0.081 -0.637 
27 -1.83 0.005 -0.430 -0.136 -0.397 0.162 0,597** -0,425** -0.727 -0.368 -0,239** -0.361 0.360 
28 -3,28** -1,692** -0.463 -0,225* -0,922** -0.098 0,448** -0,304** -2,363** -0.271 -0,526** 0.223 -0.849 
31 -3,64** -1,645* 0.108 -0.213 -0.649 0.462 0.008 -0.178 -3,568** -0.406 -0,317* -0.079 -0.594 
32 -3.688 -1.838 -0.292 -0.130 -0.994 0.034 0.277 -0.308 -2.730 -0.928 -0.308 -0.036 -1.712 
33 -1.268 -0.323 -0.106 0,215** -0.213 -0.081 0,226* -0.071 -0.738 -0.019 0.014 -0.233 0.324 
34 -0.981 -0.682 0.180 -0.004 0.031 -0,428* 0,609** -0.055 0.818 0.009 0.039 0,381** 0.220 
35 1.568 1,621** 1,103** 0.094 0,941** 0.479 0,423** 0.029 2,363** 1,131** 0,295** 0,757** 1,612** 
36 -1.092 -0.031 0.587 0.074 -0,635** -0.311 -0.014 -0,311* 2,539** 0.343 0.066 -0.143 0.571 
41 0.234 -0.169 0.289 -0,172** 0.095 -0.146 0,159* 0.096 0.198 0,404* -0.000 -0.225 0.053 
42 -3,53** -1,904** -0.204 -0.133 -0,652** -0,973** 0,221* -0,310** -1,652** -0.421 -0,254** -0,525** -0,865** 
43 -2.310 -0.873 0.009 -0.164 -0,873** -0.042 0.168 -0.360 -0.663 -0.671 -0.078 0.274 -0.468 
44 -2,10** -0,732** 0.283 -0.091 -0,358** -0.028 0,324** -0,145** 0.048 -0.320 -0.088 -0,601** -0.509 
51 -2,71** -0,980** -0.166 -0.128 -0.382 0.087 0,262** -0.047 -0.315 -0.244 -0,144* -0.233 -0.572 
52 -5,22** -1,532** -0.366 -0,517* -1,126* 0.046 0.238 -0.165 -1.775 -1,373** -0,265** -0.436 -1,369* 
53 -0.996 -0.945 -0.030 -0.008 -0.358 -0.189 0.050 -0,369** 1.138 -0.118 0.086 -0,577* 0.144 
54 -0.492 -0.046 1,071** 0,284** 0,715** 0.047 0.050 -0,197* 1,343* 0.207 0,167* -0.005 0.489 
55 -1,60* -0,704* 0.088 0.121 -0,441* 0.080 0.052 -0,498** -0.060 -0.380 0.119 0.065 -0.420 
56 -2.055 -0.173 0.506 0.215 -0.151 -0.027 0.290 -0,418** 1.587 0.048 0.173 0.002 -0.055 
57 -3,20** -1,364* -0.463 -0.014 -0.722 -0,759* 0,231* -0.119 -0.936 -0.225 -0,237** -0.240 -1.039 
58 -1.525 -0.019 -0.335 -0.090 -0.070 -0.160 0.244 -0.165 0.146 -0.204 -0.072 -0.221 -0.094 
61 -1,08* -0.319 0.084 0.028 -0.096 -0.164 0,172** -0,157** -0,814* -0.210 -0,144** -0,260** 0.058 
62 -1.671 -0.432 -0.250 -0.126 0.101 0.124 0.042 -0.108 -0.510 -0.486 -0.086 -0,436** -0.328 
63 -2,91** -0,960** -0.147 -0,172* -0.273 0.136 0.030 -0,420** 0.104 -0.354 -0,197** 0,442** 0.067 
64 -3,15** -1,169** 0.053 0.040 -0.508 0.265 0,412** 0.033 0.531 -0.484 -0,347** -0,662** -1,308** 
65 -3.254 -1.062 -0.375 0.019 -0.752 -0.339 0.152 -0.580 -2.669 -1.025 0.057 -0.701 -1.367 
71 -3,23** 0,996* 0,721* -0.022 -0.339 0.230 0,386** -0.039 0.965 -0.251 0.033 -1,144** -0.557 
72 -4,85** 0.759 0.062 -0.163 -0.603 -0.228 0.014 -0,698** -0.846 -0.294 -0.225 0.016 -0.960 
73 -2.231 0.167 0.288 0.044 0.116 0.266 0.034 -0.318 2.304 -0.201 -0.014 -0.170 -0.416 
74 -3.044 -0.354 0.467 0.067 -0.253 0.527 0.125 -0.506 0.700 -0.623 0.062 -0,994* -0.682 
75 -0.959 0.862 1,659** 0,368** 0.778 0.260 -0.230 -0.036 4,160** 0.308 0,529** 0.478 -0.749 
76 -3,17** -0.441 0.163 -0.066 -0.241 -0.152 -0,200* -0,227** 0.082 -0.414 0,232** 0.166 -1,285** 
77 -4,08** -0.044 1,111** -0.048 0.270 0.268 0.054 -0,253** 1,274* -0,491* 0.081 -0,983** -0.428 
81 -9.102 -2.377 1.118 -0,495** -1.144 0.485 -0.485 -0.287 -2.681 -1,882** -0.793 -0.783 -3,389** 
82 -6,63** -0.465 0.618 -0.013 -0,897** 0.317 0.076 -0,352** -1,985* -1,093** 0.028 -0.115 -2,772** 
83 -6,13** -1.275 0.333 -0.016 -1,808** 0.423 0.251 -0.161 -1.929 -0,973** -0,489** -0.162 -3,216** 
Region 12 (Oslo) is the base region. 
* indicates significance at 10% significance level 
** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
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